2022 Kherson counteroffensive
A military counteroffensive was launched by Ukraine on 29 August 2022 to expel Russian forces occupying the southern regions of Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.
Military analysts consider the counteroffensive to be the third strategic phase of the war in Ukraine, along with the concurrent eastern counteroffensive, after the initial invasion and the battle of Donbas.[25]
After many strikes against Russian military targets, Ukraine announced the start of a full-scale counteroffensive on 29 August 2022.[26] On 9 October, Ukraine said it recaptured 1,170 square kilometers of land.[27] On 9 November, Russian troops were ordered to withdraw from Kherson, the only regional capital captured since the start of the invasion.[28] Ukrainian forces liberated the city of Kherson two days later, on 11 November.[29]
Counteroffensive
August
On 29 August, Zelenskyy announced the start of a full-scale counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in the south, a claim that was corroborated by the Ukrainian parliament as well as Operational Command South.[103][104][105][1][10]
At the start of the operation, the Ukrainian operational group "Kakhovka" and some Ukrainian officials claimed that their forces had broken through defensive lines manned by the 109th DPR Regiment and Russian paratroopers.[1] The 109th DPR Regiment was a conscript unit which was known to serve on garrison duty in the Kherson area.[10] Ukrainian officials also claimed that they had hit and destroyed a large Russian base in the area[106] amid a general increase of Ukrainian air and artillery bombardments of Russian positions.[10] The authorities in occupied Kherson called these claims "fake" and "an illusion",[107] but also announced a workplace evacuation from Nova Kakhova following Ukrainian missile strikes.[108] Locals reported heavy fighting across the Kherson frontline, while electrical networks temporarily failed and evacuations of civilians took place.[106] An NPR journalist in the area confirmed the increased intensity of combat and that more Ukrainian forces were moving to the frontline.[109] The Ukrainian government and military largely refused to talk about territorial changes on the offensive's first day, though anonymous Ukrainian officials, Western journalists and a number of Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian troops had captured several settlements north and northwest of Kherson, at a bridgehead across the Inhulets River, as well as south of the Kherson–Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[10] Among these were the villages of Sukhyi Stavok,[10] Novodmytrivka,[a] Arkhanhelske, Tomyna Balka and Pravdyne.[2] The Ukrainians also attacked Russian pontoon ferries on the Dnipro River.[16]
By 30 August, Russia was beginning to direct large numbers of troops and equipment to the Kherson frontline to counter the Ukrainian offensive. Meanwhile, Ukraine intensified its attacks on Russian concentration points, ammunition depots, bridges and other targets. In Kherson city, there were reports of fighting between Ukrainian partisans and pro-Russian security forces. Russian milbloggers claimed that battles were ongoing at Myrne, Soldatske and Snihurivka, Ukraine had retaken Ternovi Pody, but been repelled at Pravdyne and Oleksandrivka.[16] According to Pantelis Boubouras, Greece's honorary consul in Kherson, the Ukrainians had relatively easily broken the Russian first line of defense near Kherson city, but had encountered much stiffer resistance at the Russian second line of defense in the area. By 31 August, this second line was the main focus of combat, with Boubouras stating that local sources had informed that both sides were suffering heavy losses. However, a Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainians were making progress toward Vysokopillia further north, though the overall situation at the northern frontline remained unclear.[110][111] Milbloggers also claimed that the Russians had been able to stabilize the frontline at Oleksandrivka as well as Blahodatne, but had failed when attempting to retake Myrne. Ukrainian advances were also reported at Ternovi Pody and Lyubomyrivka.[111] Later that day, Ukrainian sources claimed that four small villages had already been retaken, though Ukrainian soldiers also stated their opinion that this operation was not a large counteroffensive but rather a localized operation. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych cautioned that the offensive was going to be a "slow operation to grind the enemy", not a quick and massive campaign.[112][113][114]
Analysis
On 10 September 2022, Taras Berezovets stated that the southern counteroffensive had been part of a "disinformation campaign" to distract Russia from the real counteroffensive being prepared in the Kharkiv oblast.[185] The Institute for the Study of War analyzed that Russian forces began moving equipment from the eastern frontlines to those in the south in order to prepare for the impending counteroffensive.[186] Thus, Russian frontlines in Kharkiv oblast were left relatively unprotected to Ukrainian advances.
On 24 September 2022, The New York Times reported that Ukrainian commanders and servicemen acknowledged suffering heavy losses during the Kherson offensive, mostly caused by lack of ammunition, strong Russian defenses and the role of Russian artillery.[187] Casualties in one Ukrainian battalion were so high its units' members were replaced three times.[188] Ukrainian colonel Vadym Sukharevsky credited part of Ukraine's victory in Kherson to the artillery systems, guided munitions and long-range rocket launchers sent by Western partner countries for an article by The Washington Post.[189]
Following the liberation of Kherson, the Institute for the Study of War argued that "Russia's withdrawal from Kherson City is igniting an ideological fracture between pro-war figures and Russian President Vladimir Putin, eroding confidence in Putin's commitment and ability to deliver his war promises", noting criticism toward the Russian government from nationalist figures such as Aleksandr Dugin, Igor "Strelkov" Girkin and the Wagner Group; the ISW also noted how "Russian military leadership is trying and largely failing to integrate combat forces drawn from many different organizations and of many different types and levels of skill and equipment into a more cohesive fighting force in Ukraine", especially noting the lack of organization of military forces coming from Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic.[190]