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Accountability

Accountability, in terms of ethics and governance, is equated with answerability, culpability, liability, and the expectation of account-giving.[1]

As in an aspect of governance, it has been central to discussions related to problems in the public sector, nonprofit, private (corporate), and individual contexts. In leadership roles,[2] accountability is the acknowledgment of and assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions, and policies such as administration, governance, and implementation, including the obligation to report, justify, and be answerable for resulting consequences.


In governance, accountability has expanded beyond the basic definition of "being called to account for one's actions".[3] It is frequently described as an account-giving relationship between individuals, e.g. "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct."[4]


Accountability cannot exist without proper accounting practices; in other words, an absence of accounting means an absence of accountability. Another key area that contributes to accountability is good records management.[5]

History and etymology[edit]

"Accountability" derives from the late Latin accomptare (to account), a prefixed form of computare (to calculate), which in turn is derived from putare (to reckon).[6] While the word itself does not appear in English until its use in 13th century Norman England,[7] the concept of account-giving has ancient roots in record-keeping activities related to governance and money-lending systems that first developed in Ancient Egypt,[8] Israel,[9] Babylon,[10] Greece,[11] and later Rome.[12]

Accountability and corruption[edit]

Political corruption refers to "the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gains". Corrupt practices include fraud, appropriation of public funds, and accepting bribes.[59][60] Corruption can cause people to negatively evaluate politicians, since citizens may perceive corruption as a signal of poor performance, motivating them to sanction an incumbent.[61] As the model of retrospective voting suggests that voters incentivize good politicians' behavior by rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance, citizens are expected to sanction corrupt politicians.[59] However, studies suggest that though voters have a distaste for corruption, they often fail to punish corrupt incumbents; some of them receive benefits from their representatives' corrupt practices, and prefer to retain this type of politician.[62][59] In high-corruption contexts, voters may become more tolerant of or even prefer corrupt politicians because others are also perceived as corrupt, leading to a corrupt equilibrium "where voters are generally willing to retain corrupt politicians", referred to as a "political corruption trap".[62] This high corruption equilibrium is difficult to break due to interaction between corrupt politicians, voters who tolerate and retain corrupt politicians, and potential entrants or challengers who also engage in corrupt practices, leading to the maintenance of corruption.[62]


Democracy does not seem to reduce corruption.[63] Economic development is associated with a decrease in corruption.[63] Freedom of the press contributes to the reduction of corruption by exposing corrupt actions.[63] Documentation on how a corrupt government (e.g. Alberto Fujimori's government from 1998 to 2000 in Peru) can strategically undermine checks-and-balances institutions, suggests that the news media—i.e. newspapers and mainly television—is crucial to the dissemination of information to the public.[64] There is also evidence about the importance of local media, such as local radio stations, in holding corrupt incumbents accountable and in promoting non-corrupt politicians. Information about corruption may not only lead to vote losses for the incumbent parties, but also for challenging parties, as well the erosion of partisan attachments, which implies that information about corruption also provokes citizens' disengagement from the political process.[61]


Scholarly literature about corruption finds mixed results about the role of political institutions on the level of a country's corruption.[63] For example, some scholarly research suggests that more horizontal accountability, or oversight across branches of government, would generally decrease corruption.[65] However, other research shows that increased oversight could increase corruption when actors in one branch can pressure actors in another to collude; in Ghana, bureaucrats are more likely to engage in corruption on behalf of politicians when politicians have higher levels of discretion to oversee the bureaucracy (e.g., by threatening to transfer noncompliant bureaucrats).[66]


Low accountability for corruption is difficult to combat, and some anti-corruption activities may also lead to perverse consequences.[67] For example, in places where private sector work pays better than public sector work (e.g., China), highly qualified individuals engaging in public sector work may only find such work attractive because it allows for further compensation through corrupt activities. Government anti-corruption activities can therefore decrease the quality and overall representativeness of the bureaucracy as a result.[68] On the other hand, there is evidence that, despite strategic evasion and unintentional consequences, anti-corruption initiatives are beneficial, as they lower malfeasance and increase social welfare, even where strategic evasion is relatively large.[69]

In education[edit]

As defined by National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME), accountability is "[a] program, often legislated, that attributes the responsibility for student learning to teachers, school administrators, and/or students. Test results typically are used to judge accountability, and often consequences are imposed for shortcomings."[77]


Student accountability is traditionally based on school and classroom rules, combined with sanctions for infringement.


In contrast, some educational establishments such as Sudbury schools believe that students are personally responsible for their acts, and that traditional schools do not permit students to choose their course of action fully; they do not permit students to embark on the course, once chosen; and they do not permit students to suffer the consequences of the course, once taken. Freedom of choice, freedom of action, freedom to bear the results of action are considered the three great freedoms that constitute personal responsibility. Sudbury schools claim that "'Ethics' is a course taught by life experience". They adduce that the essential ingredient for acquiring values—and for moral action—is personal responsibility, that schools will become involved in the teaching of morals when they become communities of people who fully respect each other's right to make choices, and that the only way the schools can become meaningful purveyors of ethical values is if they provide students and adults with real-life experiences that are bearers of moral import. Students are given complete responsibility for their own education and the school is run by a direct democracy in which students and staff are equals.[78]

Media and accountability[edit]

Econometric research has found that countries with greater press freedom tend to have less corruption.[79] Greater political accountability and lower corruption were more likely where newspaper consumption was higher, according to data from roughly 100 countries and from different states in the US.[80] Congressmen who receive less press coverage are less likely to produce a positive impact for their constituencies, are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings, and federal spending for their district is lower.[81] One explanation for the positive impact of media on accountability stems from Besley and Burgess' work.[82] They argue that media resolves the information asymmetries between citizens and government and provides a way of overcoming obstacles preventing political action.[82] When elected officials and the public gain information, the public is better equipped to hold politicians accountable and politicians are more responsive.[83][81] Ferraz & Finan demonstrate this in the Brazilian context. In their work, they find releasing audit reports prior to elections creates a more informed electorate which holds incumbent officials accountable.[84]


While evidence supports the positive impact of press freedom on political accountability, other work highlights the significance of factors such as media concentration and ownership as government tools for influencing or controlling news content.[85] Non-democratic regimes use media for a variety of purposes such as – (i) to enhance regime resilience, (ii) censor, or (iii) strategically distract the public.[86] Control of the media may also be especially beneficial to incumbents in new or developing democracies, who consider media control a spoil of office.[87]


An analysis of the evolution of mass media in the U.S. and Europe since World War II noted mixed results from the growth of the Internet: "The digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression [and] information [but] has had mixed effects on freedom of the press": It has disrupted traditional sources of funding, and new forms of Internet journalism have replaced only a tiny fraction of what's been lost.[88] Various systems have been proposed for increasing the funds available for investigative journalism that allow individual citizens to direct small amounts of government funds to news outlets or investigative journalism projects of their choice.

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Media related to Accountability at Wikimedia Commons

Citizens' Circle for Accountability