COVID-19 apps
COVID-19 apps include mobile-software applications for digital contact-tracing - i.e. the process of identifying persons ("contacts") who may have been in contact with an infected individual - deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic.[2]
Not to be confused with Use and development of software for COVID-19 pandemic mitigation, List of COVID-19 simulation models, or Vaccine passports during the COVID-19 pandemic.Type
Mobile software applications
Numerous tracing applications have been developed or proposed, with official government support in some territories and jurisdictions. Several frameworks for building contact-tracing apps have been developed. Privacy concerns have been raised, especially about systems that are based on tracking the geographical location of app users.
Less overtly intrusive alternatives include the co-option of Bluetooth signals to log a user's proximity to other cellphones. (Bluetooth technology has form in tracking cell-phones' locations.[3])
On 10 April 2020, Google and Apple jointly announced that they would integrate functionality to support such Bluetooth-based apps directly into their Android and iOS operating systems. India's COVID-19 tracking app Aarogya Setu became the world's fastest growing application - beating Pokémon Go - with 50 million users in the first 13 days of its release.
Issues[edit]
Uptake[edit]
Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at Cambridge University, listed a number of potential practical problems with app-based systems, including false positives and the potential lack of effectiveness if takeup of the app is limited to only a small fraction of the population.[9] In Singapore, only one person in three downloaded the TraceTogether app by the end of June 2020, despite legal requirements for most workers;[10] the app was also underused due to the fact that it required users to keep the app open at all times on iOS.[11]
A team at the University of Oxford simulated the effect of a contact tracing app on a city of 1 million. They estimated that if the app was used in conjunction with the shielding of over-70s, then 56% of the population would have to be using the app for it to suppress the virus.[12] This would be equivalent to 80% of smartphone users in the United Kingdom. They found that the app could still slow the spread of the virus if fewer people downloaded it, with one infection being prevented for every one or two users.[12]
In August 2020, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that there are disparities in smartphone between demographics and minority groups, and that "even the most comprehensive, all-seeing contact tracing system is of little use without social and medical systems in place to help those who may have the virus — including access to medical care, testing, and support for those who are quarantined."[13]
Ethical principles of mass surveillance using COVID-19 contact tracing apps[edit]
The advent of COVID-19 contact tracing apps has led to concerns around privacy, the rights of app users, and governmental authority. The European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations and the Siracusa Principles have outlined 4 principles to consider when looking at the ethical principles of mass surveillance with COVID-19 contact tracing apps.[16] These are necessity, proportionality, scientific validity, and time boundedness.
Necessity is defined as the idea that governments should only interfere with a person's rights when deemed essential for public health interests.[17][18] The potential risks associated with infringements of personal privacy must be outweighed by the possibility of reducing significant harm to others.[19] Potential benefits of contact-tracing apps that may be considered include allowing for blanket population-level quarantine measures to be lifted sooner and the minimization of people under quarantine.[20] Hence, some contend that contact-tracing apps are justified as they may be less intrusive than blanket quarantine measures.[20] Furthermore, the delay of an effective contact-tracing app with significant health and economic benefits may be considered unethical.
Proportionality refers to the concept that a contact tracing app's potential negative impact on a person's rights should be justifiable by the severity of the health risks that are being addressed.[21] Apps must use the most privacy-preserving options available to achieve their goals, and the selected option should not only be a logical option for achieving the goal but also an effective one.[22]
Scientific validity evaluates whether an app is effective, timely and accurate.[16] Traditional manual contact-tracing procedures are not efficient enough for the COVID-19 pandemic and do not consider asymptomatic transmission.[1] Contact-tracing apps, on the other hand, can be effective COVID-19 contact-tracing tools that could lead to a R value less than 1 and sustained epidemic suppression.[1] However, for apps to be effective, there needs to be a minimum 56-60% uptake in the population.[1][23] Apps should be continually modified to reflect current knowledge on the diseases being monitored.[24] Some argue that contact-tracing apps should be considered societal experimental trials where results and adverse effects are evaluated according to the stringent guidelines of social experiments.[25] Analyses should be conducted by independent research bodies and published for wide dissemination. Despite the current urgency of our pandemic situation, we should still adhere to the standard rigors of scientific evaluation.[26]
Time boundedness describe the need for establishing legal and technical sunset clauses so that they are only allowed to operate as long as necessary to address the pandemic situation. Apps should be withdrawn as soon as possible after the end of the pandemic. If the end of the pandemic cannot be predicted, the use of apps should be regularly reviewed and decisions about continued use should be made at each review. Collected data should only be retained by public health authorities for research purposes with clear stipulations on how long the data will be held for and who will be responsible for security, oversight, and ownership.[27]
Privacy, discrimination and marginalisation concerns[edit]
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has published a set of principles for technology-assisted contact tracing and[28] Amnesty International and over 100 other organizations issued a statement[29] calling for limits on this kind of surveillance.[30] The organisations declared eight conditions on governmental projects:[29]
Countries considering deployment[edit]
Centralized approaches[edit]
In the United Kingdom, Matthew Gould, chief executive of NHSX, the government body responsible for policy regarding technology in the NHS, said in late March 2020 that the organisation was looking seriously at an app that would alert people if they had recently been in contact with someone testing positive for the virus after scientists advising the government suggested it "could play a critical role" in limiting lockdowns.[209] On 22 April, the government announced that alpha testing of a prototype of the app was in progress at RAF Leeming.[210] Beta testing began on the Isle of Wight on 5 May for council staff and NHS workers before a wider rollout to all residents on 7 May.[211] By 15 May, over 72,000 had downloaded the app, equivalent to more than half of the island's population.[212]
On 18 June, following reports that the app was only detecting 75% of contacts on Android devices and 4% of contacts on iPhones,[213] the UK government announced that it would cease the development of its centralized system, and move to a decentralized system based on the Apple/Google Exposure Notification system.[214] This was later scheduled for release in England and Wales on 24 September;[215] by this date, the devolved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland had already released their own apps.[216][217]
Decentralized approaches[edit]
Both Australia and New Zealand are considering apps based on Singapore's TraceTogether app and BlueTrace protocol as of April 2020.[218]
Many countries have announced the official development, trial or adoption of decentralized proximity tracing systems, where the matching of proximity encounters happens locally on individuals' devices, such as the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) protocol or the Google-Apple Exposure Notification API. These include Austria,[219] Switzerland,[220] Estonia,[221] Latvia,[222] Canada,[223] Italy,[224][225] Germany,[226] Finland,[222] the Netherlands,[227] Ireland[228] and Denmark.[229]
In the United States, as of 10 June 2020, three states, Alabama, South Carolina, and North Dakota, have committed to using the Google-Apple Exposure Notification API. In May 2020, the U.S. state of Arizona began testing the Covid Watch app developed with the Apple/Google protocol.[230] In August 2020, the app launched publicly for a phased roll-out in the state of Arizona.[231][232][233] At least nineteen states have not yet decided, and at least seventeen other states stated there were no plans to use smartphone-based contact tracing.[234]