Constructivism (international relations)
In international relations (IR), constructivism is a social theory that asserts that significant aspects of international relations are shaped by ideational factors.[1][2][3] The most important ideational factors are those that are collectively held; these collectively held beliefs construct the interests and identities of actors.[1][3]
In contrast to other prominent IR approaches and theories (such as realism and rational choice), constructivists see identities and interests of actors as socially constructed and changeable; identities are not static and cannot be exogenously assumed.[1][2][4][5] Similar to rational choice, constructivism does not make broad and specific predictions about international relations; it is an approach to studying international politics, not a substantive theory of international politics.[1][6][7] Constructivist analysis can only provide substantive explanations or predictions once the relevant actors and their interests have been identified, as well as the content of social structures.[1]
The main theories competing with constructivism are variants of realism, liberalism, and rational choice that emphasize materialism (the notion that the physical world determines political behavior on its own), and individualism (the notion that individual units can be studied apart from the broader systems that they are embedded in).[1] Whereas other prominent approaches conceptualize power in material terms (e.g. military and economic capabilities), constructivist analyses also see power as the ability to structure and constitute the nature of social relations among actors.[8][7]
Development[edit]
Nicholas Onuf has been credited with coining the term constructivism to describe theories that stress the socially constructed character of international relations.[9] Since the late 1980s to early 1990s, constructivism has become one of the major schools of thought within international relations.
The earliest constructivist works focused on establishing that norms mattered in international politics.[1] Peter J. Katzenstein's edited volume The Culture of National Security compiled works by numerous prominent and emerging constructivists, showing that constructivist insights were important in the field of security studies, an area of International Relations in which realists had been dominant.[1]
After establishing that norms mattered in international politics, later veins of constructivism focused on explaining the circumstances under which some norms mattered and others did not.[1] Swathes of constructivist research have focused on norm entrepreneurs: international organizations and law: epistemic communities; speech, argument, and persuasion; and structural configuration as mechanisms and processes for social construction.[1]
Alexander Wendt is the most prominent advocate of social constructivism in the field of international relations.[10] Wendt's 1992 article "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics"[4] laid the theoretical groundwork for challenging what he considered to be a flaw shared by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, namely, a commitment to a (crude) form of materialism. By attempting to show that even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is socially constructed—that is, not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human practice—Wendt opened the way for a generation of international relations scholars to pursue work on a wide range of issues from a constructivist perspective. Wendt further developed these ideas in his central work, Social Theory of International Politics (1999). Following up on Wendt, Martha Finnemore offered the first "sustained, systematic empirical argument in support of the constructivist claim that international normative structures matter in world politics" in her 1996 book National Interests in International Society.[11]
There are several strands of constructivism.[5][12] On the one hand, there are "conventional"[7][13] constructivist scholars such as Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Katzenstein, Elizabeth Kier, Martha Finnemore, and Alexander Wendt, who use widely accepted methodologies and epistemologies. Their work has been widely accepted within the mainstream IR community and generated vibrant scholarly discussions among realists, liberals, and constructivists. These scholars hold that research oriented around causal explanations and constitutive explanations is appropriate.[6] Wendt refers to this form of constructivism as "thin" constructivism.[3] On the other hand, there are "critical" radical constructivists who take discourse and linguistics more seriously, and adopt non-positivist methodologies and epistemologies.[7]A third strand, known as critical constructivism, takes conventional constructivists to task for systematically downplaying or omitting class factors.[14] Despite their differences, all strands of constructivism agree that neorealism and neoliberalism pay insufficient attention to social construction in world politics.[3]
Critique by emotional choice theorists[edit]
Proponents of emotional choice theory argue that constructivist approaches neglect the emotional underpinnings of social interactions, normative behavior, and decision-making in general. They point out that the constructivist paradigm is generally based on the assumption that decision-making is a conscious process based on thoughts and beliefs. It presumes that people decide on the basis of reflection and deliberation. However, cumulative research in neuroscience suggests that only a small part of the brain's activities operate at the level of conscious thinking. The vast majority of its activities consist of unconscious appraisals and emotions.[73]
The significance of emotions in decision-making has generally been ignored by constructivist perspectives, according to these critics. Moreover, emotional choice theorists contend that the constructivist paradigm has difficulty incorporating emotions into its models, because it cannot account for the physiological dynamics of emotions. Psychologists and neurologists have shown that emotions are based on bodily processes over which individuals have only limited control. They are inextricably intertwined with people's brain functions and autonomic nervous systems, which are typically outside the scope of standard constructivist models.[74]
Emotional choice theory seeks to capture not only the social but also the physiological and dynamic character of emotions. It posits that emotion plays a key role in normative action. Emotions endow norms and identities with meaning. If people feel strongly about norms, they are particularly likely to adhere to them. Rules that cease to resonate at an affective level, however, often come to lose their prescriptive power. Emotional choice theorists note that recent findings in neurology suggest that humans generally feel before they think. So emotions may lead them to prioritize the constructivist “logic of appropriateness” over the rationalist “logic of consequences,” or vice versa. Emotions may also infuse the logic of appropriateness and inform actors how to adjudicate between different norms.[75]