Director of Central Intelligence
The director of central intelligence (DCI) was the head of the American Central Intelligence Agency from 1946 to 2004, acting as the principal intelligence advisor to the president of the United States and the United States National Security Council, as well as the coordinator of intelligence activities among and between the various US intelligence agencies (collectively known as the Intelligence Community from 1981 onwards).
Not to be confused with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or Director of National Intelligence.Director of Central Intelligence
DCI
No fixed term
January 23, 1946
December 17, 2004
CIA Director
The office existed from January 1946 to December 17, 2004. After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act it was replaced by the director of national intelligence (DNI) as head of the Intelligence Community and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) as head of the CIA.
Directors' management styles and effect on operations[edit]
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, 1947–1950[edit]
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was the third director of central intelligence, but the first who served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. During his tenure, a National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948, (NSC 10/2) further gave the CIA the authority to carry out covert operations "against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons."[25] Those operations, however, were initially conducted by other agencies such as the Office of Policy Coordination. See Approval of Clandestine and Covert Operations and Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for details of the eventual merger of these operations with the CIA, as well as how the equivalent functions were done in other countries.
Walter Bedell Smith, 1950–1953[edit]
During the first years of its existence, other branches of the US federal government did not exercise very much supervision over the Central Intelligence Agency. Supposedly justified by the desire to match and defeat Soviet actions throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, it undertook a task that many believed could be accomplished only through an approach similar to the Soviet intelligence agencies, under names including NKVD, MVD, NKGB, MGB, and KGB. Those Soviet organizations also had domestic responsibilities.
Allen W. Dulles, 1953–1961[edit]
The rapid expansion of the CIA, and a developed sense of independence under the DCI Allen Dulles exacerbated the problem of the US Intelligence Community's freedom from independent review. After the armed landing of Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961, President John F. Kennedy discharged and replaced Dulles. Dulles had been an OSS. veteran from World War II. His autobiography[26] is more noteworthy for giving insight into the mindset of key people in the field than it is in giving a detailed description of the CIA and its operations.
John McCone, 1961–1965[edit]
President John F. Kennedy exercised greater supervision, and he appointed a Republican with a general engineering background, John McCone. McCone, despite a lack of intelligence agency background, is often considered one of the most competent DCIs, and an excellent manager. The agency stepped up its activity in Southeast Asia under President Lyndon Johnson. McCone resigned from his position of DCI in April 1965, believing himself to have been unappreciated by Johnson. McCone's final policy memorandum to Johnson argued that expansion of the War in Vietnam would arouse national and world discontent over the war, before it defeated the North Vietnamese regime.
William Raborn, 1965–1966[edit]
Raborn, a distinguished naval officer who directed the design and development of the entire Polaris ballistic missile submarine system, had a somewhat short and unhappy tenure as the DCI. His background included no foreign relations experience, and intelligence experience only concerning naval operations. CIA historians have said "Raborn did not 'take' to the DCI job", in their opinion.[27] Raborn resigned as the DCI on June 30, 1966, having served for only fourteen months. He was then replaced by his deputy, Richard Helms.
Richard M. Helms, 1966–1973[edit]
Helms was an OSS and CIA veteran, and the first DCI to have risen through the ranks at CIA. Helms became the director of the Office of Special Operations (OSO) after the CIA's disastrous role in the attempted Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961. Helms was made the deputy director of central intelligence under Admiral William Raborn. A year later, in 1966, he was appointed as the director.
In the early 1970s, partially as a result of the Watergate affair break-ins under President Richard Nixon, the United States Congress took a more active role in intelligence agencies, as did independent commissions such as the 1975 United States President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States, also called the Rockefeller Commission after its chairman. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal domestic spying on American citizens, drew considerable congressional oversight that had not been previously exercised.
Certain of the individuals involved in the Watergate break-ins had worked, in the past, for the CIA. In an audio tape provoking Nixon's resignation as president, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of the Watergate affair would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba, and, therefore, that the CIA should tell the FBI to cease investigating the Watergate burglary, due to reasons of "national security".[28] Helms refused.
The ease of Helms's role under President Lyndon Johnson changed with the arrival of President Richard Nixon and Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger. After the debacle of Watergate, from which Helms succeeded in distancing the CIA as far as possible, the agency came under much tighter congressional control. Nixon, however, considered Helms to be disloyal, and fired him as DCI in 1973. Helms was the only DCI convicted for irregularities in office; his autobiography describes his reaction to the charges.[29]
James R. Schlesinger, 1973[edit]
On 2 February 1973 he became the director of central intelligence, following the previous director Richard Helms, after he had been fired for his refusal to block the Watergate Affair's investigation. Although his service at the CIA was short, barely six months, it was a stormy one as he again undertook comprehensive organizational and personnel changes. Schlesinger became so unpopular at the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, that a security camera was installed opposite his official portrait for fear that it would be vandalized. By this time he had a reputation as a tough, forthright, and outspoken administrator. Schlesinger's appointment as the Secretary of Defense cut short his service as the DCI. He commissioned reports—known as the "Family Jewels"—on illegal activities by the agency.
William Colby, 1973–1976[edit]
William Colby was another intelligence professional who was promoted to the top job. His autobiography was entitled "Honorable Men", and he believed that a nation had to believe such people made up its intelligence service.[30] In December 1974, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh broke the news of the "Family Jewels" (leaked to him by Colby) in a front-page article in The New York Times, revealing that the CIA had assassinated foreign leaders, and had conducted surveillance on some seven thousand American citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS).
Congress responded to the "Family Jewels" in 1975, investigating the CIA in the Senate via the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), and in the House of Representatives via the Pike Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY). President Gerald Ford created the aforementioned Rockefeller Commission, and issued an Executive Order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders.
Colby's tenure as DCI congressional investigations into alleged US intelligence malfeasance over the preceding twenty-five years. Colby cooperated, not out of a desire for major reforms, but in the belief that the actual scope of such misdeeds was not great enough to cause lasting damage to the CIA's reputation. He believed that cooperating with Congress was the only way to save the agency from dissolution. Colby also believed that the CIA had a moral obligation to cooperate with the Congress and demonstrate that the CIA was accountable to the Constitution. This caused a major rift within the CIA ranks, with many old-line officers such as former DCI Richard Helms believing that the CIA should have resisted congressional intrusion.
Colby's time as DCI was also eventful on the world stage. Shortly after he assumed leadership, the Yom Kippur War broke out, an event that surprised not only the American intelligence agencies but also the Israelis. This intelligence surprise reportedly affected Colby's credibility with the Nixon administration. Meanwhile, after many years of involvement, South Vietnam fell to Communist forces in April 1975, a particularly difficult blow for Colby, who had dedicated so much of his life and career to the American effort there. Events in the arms control field, Angola, the Middle East, and elsewhere also demanded attention.
George H. W. Bush, 1976–1977[edit]
George H. W. Bush's confirmation as the director of central intelligence was opposed by many politicians and citizens who were still reeling from the Watergate scandal (when Bush was the head of the Republican National Committee, and a steadfast defender of Nixon) and the Church Committee investigations. Many arguments against Bush's initial confirmation were that he was too partisan for the office. The Washington Post, George Will, and Senator Frank Church were some notable figures opposed to Bush's nomination. After a pledge by Bush not to run for either president or vice president in 1976, opposition to his nomination died down.
Bush served as the DCI for 355 days, from January 30, 1976, to January 20, 1977.[31] The CIA had been rocked by a series of revelations, including disclosures based on investigations by the Senate's Church Committee, about the CIA's illegal and unauthorized activities, and Bush was credited with helping to restore the agency's morale.[32] On February 18, 1976, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905, which established policy guidelines and restrictions for individual intelligence agencies, and clarified intelligence authorities and responsibilities. Bush was given 90 days to implement the new order, which called for a major reorganization of the American Intelligence Community and firmly stated that intelligence activities could not be directed against American citizens.[33] In his capacity as DCI, Bush gave national security briefings to Jimmy Carter both as a presidential candidate and as president-elect, and discussed the possibility of remaining in that position in a Carter administration.[34]
George H. W. Bush eventually became the 43rd US vice president in 1981 and the 41st US president in 1989 and is to date the only CIA director to serve in either office.
Stansfield Turner, 1977–1981[edit]
A US Naval Academy classmate of Jimmy Carter's, Turner enjoyed the confidence of the White House, but his emphasis on technical methods of intelligence collection, such as SIGINT and IMINT, and his apparent dislike for, and firing of, HUMINT specialists made him quite unpopular within the CIA. Turner eliminated more than 800 operational positions in what was called the "Halloween Massacre", invoking a moniker previously used in conjunction with President Ford's 1975 staff reorganization. This organizational direction is notable because his successor William J. Casey was seen to have a completely opposite approach, focusing much of his attention on HUMINT. Turner gave notable testimony to Congress revealing much of the extent of the MKULTRA program, which the CIA ran from the early 1950s to late 1960s. Reform and simplification of the intelligence community's multilayered secrecy system was one of Turner's significant initiatives, but produced no results by the time he left office. He also wrote a book on his experience at CIA.[35]
During Turner's term as head of the CIA, he became outraged when former agent Frank Snepp published a book called Decent Interval which exposed incompetence among senior American government personnel during the fall of Saigon.[36] accused Snepp of breaking the secrecy agreement required of all CIA agents, and then later was forced to admit under cross-examination that he had never read the agreement signed by Snepp.[37] Regardless, the CIA ultimately won its case against Snepp at the US Supreme Court. The court forced Snepp to turn over all his profits from Decent Interval and to seek preclearance of any future writings about intelligence work for the rest of his life.[38] The CIA would later rely on the Snepp legal precedent in forcing Turner to seek preclearance of his own memoirs, which were highly critical of President Ronald Reagan's policies.[39]