
Fall of the Fascist regime in Italy
The fall of the Fascist regime in Italy, also known in Italy as 25 Luglio (Italian: Venticinque Luglio, pronounced [ˌventiˈtʃiŋkwe ˈluʎʎo]; lit. "25 July"), came as a result of parallel plots led respectively by Count Dino Grandi and King Victor Emmanuel III during the spring and summer of 1943, culminating with a successful vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister Benito Mussolini at the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism on 24–25 July 1943. As a result, a new government was established, putting an end to the 21 years of Fascist rule in the Kingdom of Italy, and Mussolini was placed under arrest.[1][2][3][4]
This article is about the fall of Fascism in the Kingdom of Italy. For the 1945 end of the fascist collaborationist Italian Social Republic, see Liberation Day (Italy).Two parallel plots[edit]
After the failure of the Feltre meeting and the first bombing of Rome, the crisis accelerated.[79] The day after Feltre, 20 July, Mussolini met Ambrosio twice. During the second meeting, the Duce told him that he had decided to write to Hitler, confessing the need for Italy to abandon the alliance. Ambrosio was still angry about the missed opportunity to do this in Feltre and offered his resignation to the Duce, who rejected it.[80] Mussolini was now useless for Ambrosio. Therefore, Ambrosio decided to set the putsch in motion.[81]
At the same time, Grandi and Luigi Federzoni, his close ally and Italian nationalist leader, were trying to estimate how many among the 27 members of the Grand Council would vote for his document. They concluded that of the 27 members, 4 were for it, 7 against and 16 undecided.[82][83] Grandi could not reveal to his colleagues the real consequences of the approval of his OdG: the dismissal of Mussolini, the end of the Fascist Party, and war against Germany.[82] Only a couple of gerarchi had the necessary political intelligence to understand it. The rest were still hopeful that the Duce, who had made their decisions for the last 21 years, could once again produce a miracle. Consequently, Grandi decided to write his OdG in a vague form and leave it open to interpretation.[84] The OdG was divided into three parts. It began with a long, rhetorical appeal to the nation and the armed forces, praising them for their resistance to the invaders. In the second part, the document asked for the restoration of the pre-Fascist institutions and laws. The end of the document was an appeal to the King; he should assume supreme civil and military power according to Article 5 of the constitution of the kingdom. Grandi believed that the approval of the OdG would be the signal that the King was waiting for. On 21 July, Mussolini ordered Scorza to convoke the Grand Council, and he sent the invitation one day later.[84] Grandi went to Scorza and explained his OdG on the same day, who agreed to support it.[85] Scorza asked Grandi for a copy of his document, and he met Mussolini and showed him the OdG the next day. The Duce called it a "not admissible and cowardly" document.[86] Afterwards, Scorza secretly prepared another OdG, similar to that of Grandi, but which asked for the concentration of power in the Fascist Party.
On 22 July, the King met with Mussolini, who wanted to report the outcome of Feltre.[66] According to Badoglio, Mussolini promised the King that he would disengage Italy from the war by 15 September.[87] The two-month delay can be explained by the fact that Bastianini had begun contact with the Allies which would need time to proceed, and Mussolini needed time to justify himself and Italy before the world for his betrayal. According to Badoglio, the King agreed with Mussolini, which is why the Duce was not worried about the outcome of the Grand Council meeting.[88] A coup d'état was destined to fail without the aid of the King. At the end of the meeting, Mussolini was convinced that the King would stand by his side, and Victor Emmanuel was disappointed after telling him in vain that he should resign.[89] The King was forced now to consider the putsch seriously, as he knew that Bastianini was trying to contact the Allies while Farinacci, the fascist hardliner, was organizing a putsch to depose him and Mussolini and bring Italy under direct German control.[90] The real decision was made after knowing that the Grand Council had approved Grandi's OdG.[91]
At 17:30 on the same day, Grandi went to Palazzo Venezia under the official reason of presenting a new book about the Italian participation in the non-intervention committee in Spain to Mussolini.[92][93] The meeting was scheduled to last 15 minutes, but it was prolonged until 18:45. The Chief of Police and the German Feldmarschall Kesselring were waiting to be received by the Duce.[84] Mussolini later denied that he spoke with Grandi about the OdG, but it is apparent that Grandi, who loved the Duce, explained to him the consequences of his OdG and gave him a chance to save face and resign before the vote.[94][95] In that case, the Grand Council's meeting would have been superfluous.[96] Mussolini listened while Grandi was explaining the necessity of resigning to avoid a catastrophe, but at the end rebuked him saying that his conclusions were wrong since Germany was about to produce a decisive secret weapon.[97] After that, Mussolini met Kesselring and the Chief of Police, Chierici, whom he confided in that it would have been easy to bring Grandi, Bottai and Ciano back to the fold as they were eager to be persuaded by him.[98] On 23 July, Mussolini accepted the resignation of Cini, which was supposed to be a signal to his opponents.[99] At the same time, Grandi, Federzoni, de Marsico (one of the best jurists in Italy), Bottai and Ciano modified the OdG by removing the interpretative introduction which explained the functions of the Grand Council. This demonstrated that the assembly had the constitutional power to remove Mussolini.[100] According to the constitutionalists, the "Leggi Fascistissime" of December 1925 bent the Constitution, but did not break it. Because of these laws, the Duce ruled the country on behalf of the King, who always remained the source of executive power. If the Grand Council, which was the trait d'union between Fascism and the state, passed a vote of no confidence on the dictator, the King would have been entitled to remove him and nominate his successor.[101] Ciano was acquainted with the OdG by Bottai, and Grandi was reluctant to accept him since he was the son-in-law of Mussolini and known for his superficial and inconstant character. However, Ciano insisted, unaware that this decision would provoke his death six months later in Verona. After that, Grandi had Farinacci visit his office in the parliament to show him his OdG. Farinacci told Grandi that he accepted the first part of the document, but that he did not agree with the rest: the military powers had to be given to the Germans, and Italy should start to fight the war by getting rid of Mussolini and the generals.[100] Farinacci asked him for a copy of his OdG, and like Scorza, he used it to produce another OdG of his own.[102] In the time left before the meeting, Grandi contacted other participants asking them to join his action.[103]