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Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)

An Iraqi insurgency began shortly after the 2003 American invasion deposed longtime leader Saddam Hussein. It is considered to have lasted until the end of the Iraq War and U.S. withdrawal in 2011. It was followed by a renewed insurgency.

The initial outbreak of violence (the 2003–2006 phase) was triggered by the fall and preceded the establishment of the new Iraqi government by the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF–I), which was led by the United States. From around 2004 to May 2007, Iraqi insurgents largely focused their attacks on MNF-I troops,[11] but later shifted to targeting the post-invasion Iraqi security forces as well.


The insurgents were composed of a diverse mix of private militias, pro-Saddam Ba'athists, local Iraqis opposed to the MNF–I and/or the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and a number of foreign jihadists. The various insurgent groups fought an asymmetric war of attrition against the MNF–I and the Iraqi government, while also fighting among themselves.


The insurgency was shaped by sectarian tensions in Iraq, particularly between Shia Muslims (~60% of the population) and Sunni Muslims (~35% of the population). By February 2006, the violence escalated into a Shia–Sunni civil war, and for the next two years, the MNF–I and the Iraqi government were locked in intense fighting with various militants, who were also targeting each other based on their sectarian affiliations. Many of the militant attacks in American-controlled territories were directed at the Shia-dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki. Militancy continued amid post-invasion Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as the federal government tried to establish itself in the country. The civil war and sectarian violence ended in mid-2008, having been quelled by the American troop surge of 2007.


However, after the American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, a renewed sectarian and anti-government insurgency swept through the country, causing thousands of casualties. Two years later, the violence of the new insurgency escalated into the Second Iraq War, largely triggered by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

the supporters of Saddam Hussein's former administration including army or intelligence officers, whose ideology is a variant of Pan-Arabism.

Ba'athists

Iraqis who believe in a strong version of Iraqi self-determination. These policies may not necessarily espouse a Pan-Arab ideology, but rather advocate the country's territorial integrity including Kuwait and Khuzestan. Historical figures of this movement include the pre-Ba'athist leader of Iraq Abd al-Karim Qasim and his government.

Iraqi nationalists

Iraqi Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam: individuals with a Salafi-only policy opposed to non-Salafis though not aligned to one specific ethnic group. Though opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, these groups are not wholly sympathetic towards the former Ba'ath Party as its members included non-Salafis.

Salafi

militias, including the southern, Iran-linked Badr Organization, the Mahdi Army, and the central-Iraq followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. These groups neither advocate the dominance of a single ethnic group, nor the traditional ideologies behind the Iraqi state (e.g. these particular Shi'as do not support the capture of Khuzestan or other border areas with Iran, but rather promote warm relations with Iran's Shi'a government).

Shi'a

Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to and largely driven by the Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "jihadists");

al Qaeda

Possibly some socialist revolutionaries (such as the , which claimed one attack in 2007).

Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance

groups and political parties (not part of the armed insurgency).

Non-violent resistance

Awareness of American public opinion[edit]

A single study has compared the number of insurgent attacks in Iraq to supposedly negative statements in the U.S. media, release of public opinion polls, and geographic variations in access to international media by Iraqis. The purpose was to determine if there was a link between insurgent activity and media reports. The researchers' study suggested it may be possible that insurgent attacks spiked by 5 to 10% after increases in the number of negative reports of the war in the media. The authors believe this may possibly be an "emboldenment effect" and speculated that "insurgent groups respond rationally to expected probability of US withdrawal."[92]

Polls suggest the majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of Coalition forces.

[93]

A majority of both Sunnis and Shi'as want an end to the U.S. presence as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the Coalition soldiers being there by greater margins.

[94]

Polls suggest the vast majority of Iraqis support attacks on insurgent groups with 80% supporting US attacks on Al-Qaeda.[96]

[95]

A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on Al Qaeda in Iraq and the U.S. presence. Some polls have found the following:


Directly after the invasion, polling suggested that a slight majority supported the US invasion.[97] However polls conducted in June 2005 suggest that there is some sentiment towards Coalition armies being in Iraq. A 2005 poll by British intelligence said that 45% of Iraqis support attacks against Coalition forces, rising to 65% in some areas, and that 82% are "strongly opposed" to the presence of Coalition troops.[98] Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament.[99] These results are consistent with a January 2006 poll that found an overall 47% approval for attacks on U.S.-led forces. That figure climbed to 88% among Sunnis. Attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians, however, were approved of by only 7% and 12% of respondents respectively. Polls conducted between 2005 and 2007 showed 31–37% of Iraqi's wanted US and other Coalition forces to withdraw once security was restored and that 26–35% wanted immediate withdrawal instead.[100][101][102]


A September 2006 poll of both Sunnis and Shias found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave within a year, with 65% favoring an immediate pullout and 77% voicing suspicion that the U.S. wanted to keep permanent bases in Iraq.[103] 61% approved of attacks on U.S. forces.[93] A later poll in March 2007[104] suggests the percentage of Iraqis who approve of attacks on Coalition forces has dropped to 51%. In 2006 a poll conducted on the Iraqi public revealed that 52% of the ones polled said Iraq was going in the wrong direction and 61% claimed it was worth ousting Saddam Hussein.[100]


Despite a majority having previously been opposed to the US presence, 60% of Iraqis opposed American troops leaving directly prior to withdrawal, with 51% saying withdrawal would have a negative effect.[105][106]

Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000–5,000 In a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has been destroyed or dispersed, but had staged a comeback in 2005, albeit not to former strength, in the course of 2005–2008 the remainder of the insurgency was defeated in Fallujah and the rest of Al-Anbar province.

(August 2011): 1,000+

Samarra

(August 2011 ): 1,000+

Baquba

Baghdad (August 2011): 2,000+

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerrilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the "-iya" cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgents are believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.


Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 3,000 and 7,000 fighters along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):


Guerilla forces operate in many of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, due to mostly ineffective Iraqi security forces in this area. There was extensive guerrilla activity in Ramadi, the capital of the province, as well as al-Qa'im, the first stop on an insurgent movement route between Iraq and Syria. In 2006, reports suggested that the Anbar capital Ramadi had largely fallen under insurgent control along with most of the Anbar region, and that as a result the United States had sent an extra 3,500 marines to reestablish control of the region. In the early part of 2007 the insurgency suffered serious setbacks in Ramadi after they were defeated in the Second Battle of Ramadi in the fall of 2006. With the help of the Anbar Salvation Council, incidents fell from an average of 30 attacks per day in December 2006 to an average of fewer than four in April 2007.[107]


Baghdad is still one of the most violent regions of the country, even after the 2007 troop surge more than two-thirds of the violence that takes place in Iraq happens in Baghdad even though the Iraqi Government is in firm control of the entire city. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces had also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, had enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street, which however subsequently saw a massive surge of insurgent activity.[108] and after the failed Coalition Operation Together Forward fell under Sunni insurgent control. The U.S. and Iraqi Forces scored many decisive victories in 2007 during the U.S. troops surge when they launched Operation Law and Order and Operation Phantam Thunder which broke the back of the insurgency and has since the saw a mass reduction in violence by 80 percent since then.


Recent intelligence suggests that the base of foreign paramilitary operations has moved from Anbar to the religiously and ethnically mixed Diyala province. By July 2007 Diyala had fallen under almost total Insurgent control, and had become the headquarters for the Sunni-dominated Islamic State of Iraq, which has issued a proclamation declaring the regional capital Baqubah its capital.


In response to a law allowing for the partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions, members of the Mutayibeen Coalition (Khalf al-Mutayibeen[109]), a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups including Al Qaeda in Iraq, announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq encompassing parts of 6 of Iraq's 18 provinces on 15 October 2006.[109][110] Yet another show of defiance came on 18 October when Sunni fighters brazenly paraded in Ramadi. Similar parades were held two days later in several towns across western Iraq, two of which occurred within two miles of U.S. military bases.


By October 2006, small radicalized militias had seemed to overshadow the larger and more organized Sunni groups which had composed the insurgency previously.[111] As disagreements emerged in pre-existing groups for reasons ranging from the rift in the Sunni forces between foreign and Iraqi fighters, competition between Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, and anger over various decisions such as Muqtada al Sadr's agreement to join the political process, dozens of insurgency groups sprung up across the country, though particularly in Baghdad where the U.S. army has listed 23 active militias. Residents have described the capital as being a patchwork of militia run fiefs. As a result of the insurgency's splintering nature, many established leaders seemed to lose influence. This was particularly illustrated on 19 October, when members of the Mahdi army briefly seized control of Amarah. The attack, while demonstrating the influence of the Madhi army, is believed to have originated as a result of contention between local units of the Madhi army and the allegedly Badr brigade run security forces, and the timing suggested that neither Al Sadr nor his top commanders had known or orchestrated the offensive.[112]


At the height of the war, insurgents launched hundreds of attacks each month against Coalition forces. Overtime, insurgency groups moved to more sophisticated methods of attack such as Explosively formed penetrators, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. These attacks contributed to the rate of civilian casualties which in turn reduced Iraq's public safety as well as the reliability of infrastructure.[113]


As of 29 January 2009 4,235 U.S. soldiers, 178 British soldiers and 139 soldiers from other nations (allied with the coalition) have died in Iraq. 31,834 U.S. soldiers had been wounded.[114] Coalition forces do not usually release death counts. As such, the exact number of insurgents killed by the Coalition or Iraqi forces is unknown. Through September 2007 more than 19,000 insurgents were reported to have been killed in fighting with Coalition forces and tens of thousands of Iraqi "suspected civilians" were captured (including 25,000 detainees in U.S. military custody at the time), according to military statistics released for the first time.[115]

Challenge Project

Sectarian violence in Iraq (2006–2008)

Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013)

Consolation payment

Fallujah during the Iraq War

Juba (sniper)

List of revolutions and rebellions

Iraq War order of battle 2009

USA kill or capture strategy in Iraq

USA list of most-wanted Iraqis

Joint Special Operations Command Task Force in the Iraq War

Task Force ODIN

Executive Order 13303

Chronology:

Bishku, Michael B. (2018), Israel and the Kurds: A Pragmatic Relationship in Middle Eastern Politics, vol. 41, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

Chehab, Zaki. Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency, & Co Ltd. ISBN 1-84511-110-9.

I. B. Tauris

Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report, April 2005

Rogers, Paul. Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency. I.B. Tauris.  1-84511-205-9.

ISBN

Enders, David. Baghdad Bulletin: Dispatches on the American Occupation University of Michigan Press (4 April 2005)  0-472-11469-7 JSTOR

ISBN

O'Connell, Edward. Bruce R. Pirnie. / RAND ISBN 978-0-8330-4297-2.

Counterinsurgency in Iraq: 2003–2006

Christopher Alexander, Charles Kyle and William McCallister , Commonwealth Institute 14 November 2003

The Iraqi Insurgent Movement

PBS Frontline 21 February 2006

Frontline: The Insurgency

. Compiled by Project on Defense Alternatives, March 2006. Updated 22 August 2006.

Insurgent Iraq: Links to full-text online articles and reports about the Iraqi Insurgency

"". wadinet.de (PDF)

Electronic Propaganda in Iraq