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Islamization in Pakistan

Islamization (Urdu: اسلامی حکمرانی) or Shariazation, has a long history in Pakistan since the 1950s, but it became the primary policy,[1] or "centerpiece"[2] of the government of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the ruler of Pakistan from 1977 until his death in 1988. Zia has also been called "the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam."[3]

The Pakistan movement had gained the country independence from British India as a Muslim-majority state.[4] At the time of its founding, the Dominion of Pakistan had no official state religion prior to 1956, when the constitution had declared it the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Despite this, no religious laws had yet been adopted for government and judicial protocols and civil governance, until the mid-1970s with the coming of General Muhammed Zia Ul-Haq in a military coup, also known as Operation Fair Play, which deposed the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.


Zia-ul-Haq committed himself to enforcing his interpretation of Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet" Muhammad), i.e. to establish an Islamic state and enforce sharia law.[5]


Zia established separate Shariat judicial courts[6] and court benches[7][8] to judge legal cases using Islamic doctrine.[9] New criminal offenses (of adultery, fornication, and types of blasphemy), and new punishments (of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death), were added to Pakistani law. Interest payments for bank accounts were replaced by "profit and loss" payments. Zakat charitable donations became a 2.5% annual tax. School textbooks and libraries were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material.[10] Offices, schools, and factories were required to provide praying space.[11] Zia bolstered the influence of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Islamic parties,[9] and conservative scholars were often on television.[11] Tens of thousands of activists from the Jamaat-e-Islami party were appointed to government posts to ensure the continuation of his agenda after his death.[5][9][12][13] Conservative ulama were added to the Council of Islamic Ideology.[7]


In 1984 a referendum gave Zia and the Islamization program 97.7% approval in official results. However, there have been protests against the laws and their enforcement during and after Zia's reign. Women's and human rights groups opposed incarceration of rape victims under hadd punishments, new laws that valued women's testimony (Law of Evidence) and blood money compensation (diyat) at half that of a man. Religious minorities and human rights groups opposed the "vaguely worded" Blasphemy Law and the "malicious abuse and arbitrary enforcement" of it.[14]


Possible motivations for the Islamisation programme included Zia's personal piety (most accounts agree that he came from a religious family),[15] desire to gain political allies, to "fulfill Pakistan's raison d'etre" as a Muslim state, and/or the political need to legitimise what was seen by some Pakistanis as his "repressive, un-representative martial law regime".[16]


How much success Zia had strengthening Pakistan's national cohesion with state-sponsored Islamisation is disputed. Shia-Sunni religious riots broke out over differences in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) – in particular, over how Zakat donations would be distributed.[17][18] There were also differences among Sunni Muslims.[19]


The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a coalition of Islamist political parties in Pakistan, calls for the increased Islamization of the government and society, specifically taking an anti-Hindu stance. The MMA leads the opposition in the national assembly, held a majority in the NWFP Provincial Assembly, and was part of the ruling coalition in Balochistan. However, some members of the MMA made efforts to eliminate their rhetoric against Hindus.[20]

The 1980 law prohibited derogatory remarks against Islamic personages, and carried a three-year prison sentence.

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In 1982 the small religious minority were prohibited from saying or implying they were Muslims.

Ahmadiyya

In 1986 declaring anything that implied disrespect to the Muhammad, Ahl al-Bayt (family members of Muhammad), Sahabah (companions of Muhammad) or Sha'ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols), was made a cognisable offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine, or both.[84]

Islamic prophet

Between legal norms and socially observed norms;

Between statutory legal norms and the norms applied in practice in the courts (e.g. Hadd is difficult to implement because confession, retraction of confession and strict standards of proof make it difficult to execute);

Between different formal legal norms (e.g. non-compliance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is tolerated by the courts but should be strictly punished under the Zina Ordinance). Another example of this contradiction is that the constitution assures women equal status on the one hand but, on the other hand, they are greatly discriminated in criminal law.

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Islamization has been harshly criticized. Author Ian Talbot has accused it of appearing "to have reduced a great faith tradition, rich in humanity, culture and a sense of social justice, to a system of punishments and persecution of minority groups."[16] Author Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri suggests that Zia's interpretation of Islam may have "contributed to the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and retrogression" in Pakistan.[68] Another authority on the topic, Christophe Jaffrelot attributes the rise of Islamic movements including the Lashkar-e-Taiba as an 'unintended consequence of the policy of Islamisation and support for Jihad movements' undertaken by Pakistani authorities since Zia. A blurb for a book of essays on The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009 published by the Middle East Institute, sums up the 30 year impact of Islamisation beginning with Zia as, "a country’s founding creed violated, much of its resources misspent, and its social fabric rent".[161] Under Zia stricter Islamic rules did not appear to lead to greater social tranquility. Crime, drinking, drug addiction are thought to have increased.[119]


Others, at least writing in the 1980s and 1990, thought the impact of the process was overstated. In 1986 New York Times journalist Steven Wiesman wrote that religious and political leaders agreed that Islamisation changes were "largely marginal or cosmetic."[119] Academic Charles H. Kennedy, wrote in the mid-1990s that while during the Zia administration "hardly a day passed in which one or more of the issues of the program were not the focus of political debate in Pakistan," the process had relatively small impact, as policies were "already in place", "cosmetic", or were "left unimplemented".[162] [163] Kennedy's explanation for why the rhetoric on Islamisation would be so extravagant while the reality was so modest is that both proponents and opponents had incentives to exaggerate its scope and impact—doing so would rally their respective political bases of support. On the other hand, the "insiders" responsible for a functioning state, who implemented Islamisation had (and have) an incentive to preserve stability and order and make sure Islamisation took place in an "ordered and prudent" (and cautious) manner.[164] Exaggeration by enemies of Islamisation in the media and opposition (e.g. Benazir Bhutto) were not censored or even contested by the government or government bureaucracy, as they "proved" to Islamic activists on the other side of the issue that the "government was enthusiastically implementing Nizam-e-Mustapha".[165] Lacking in depth and homegrown knowledge of Pakistan, the foreign press accepted these reports.[165]


According to Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, the law under Zia is unstable. It has frequently changed or threatened to change because of differences of opinion among the ruling factions. There are inconsistencies

Islamization

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2020 Karak temple attack

Khan, Ayesha. The Women's Movement in Pakistan: Activism, Islam and Democracy. United Kingdom, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018.

Malik, I.. State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity. United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996.

Jaffrelot, Christophe (2016), The Pakistan Paradox: Instability & Resilience, Oxford University Press.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996). . Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195357110.

Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism

Kennedy, Charles (1996). "Introduction". Islamization of Laws and Economy, Case Studies on Pakistan. Anis Ahmad, author of introduction. Institute of Policy Studies, The Islamic Foundation. p. 21.

Kennedy, Charles (1996). Islamization of Laws and Economy, Case Studies on Pakistan. Institute of Policy Studies, The Islamic Foundation.

Lau, Martin (1 September 2007). . Washington and Lee Law Review. 64 (4): 1292. Retrieved 18 November 2014.

"Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances- A Review"

Ghattas, Kim: Black wave : Saudi Arabia, Iran and the rivalry that unravelled the Middle East. Wildfire, London 2020,  978-1-4722-7110-5.

ISBN