Kallikratis Programme
The Kallikratis Programme (Greek: Πρόγραμμα Καλλικράτης, romanized: Prógramma Kallikrátis) is the common name of Greek law 3852/2010 of 2010, a major administrative reform in Greece. It brought about the second major reform of the country's administrative divisions following the 1997 Kapodistrias reform.
Kallikratis programme
Named after ancient Greek architect Callicrates, the programme was presented by the socialist Papandreou cabinet and was adopted by the Hellenic Parliament in May 2010.[1] The programme's implementation started with the November 2010 local elections, and was completed by January 2011. It was amended by the Kleisthenis I Programme (Law 4555/2018), which was adopted in July 2018 and implemented in September 2019.[2]
History[edit]
Administrative reforms in the 1990s[edit]
1994 reforms under the socialist Papandreou government turned the largely dysfunctional prefectures into Prefectural Self-Government entities (PSGs) with prefects and prefectural councils both being popularly elected.[3] In return, the thirteen administrative regions of Greece, which had already been created in 1987, but in the absence of a working budget remained unable to fulfill even their limited responsibilities,[4] now assumed the prefectures' competences in regard to tax collection, European structural funding and treasury.[5]
Part of the subsequent Kapodistrias plan, Law 2539/1997 sharply reduced the number of municipalities and communities from 5.823 to 1.033,[6] after the increasing urbanization had left small communities literally dying out.[7] With a median of just 4,661.5 inhabitants, a large number of small municipalities and rural communities however remained independent. This included 88 communities with a population of less than 1000, down to Gramos with just 28 inhabitants.[8]
With the territorial reforms of the 1990s, Greece has been cited as the first southern European country to follow a coercive top-down approach for territorial reforms, an approach rather typical for northern European countries.[9] Though strengthened by the 1990s reforms, the prefectural second-tier level however did not meet expectations. Largely subverted by an uncoordinated but convergent anti-reform opposition, the reformed prefectures lost a number of important competences following court decisions. The numerous controversies largely undermined public trust in the prefectural level.[10]
The failed Kapodistrias II[edit]
After the electoral victory of the liberal-conservative New Democracy party in 2004, the Karamanlis government had initially been reluctant to pursue further administrative reforms, as it had opposed the reforms of the 1990s.[11] In a late implementation of a provision that was already part of the Kapodistrias plan, the 147 provinces, as subunits of the 51 prefectures, were abolished in 2007.
Only after the 2007 reelection did the Karamanlis government decide that further reforms were necessary to bring the territorial structure in line with the European Union's Lisbon Strategy and the requirements of the Fourth Programming Period (2007–2013).[11] The thirteen regions were planned to be combined to just six major "programmatic supra-regions" that were expected to more successfully compete for European structural funding. Municipalities would be amalgamated from 1034 down to 400, and prefectural governments reduced from 50 down to 16, in order to overcome fragmentation, to facilitate fiscal control by the state, and to create economies of scale.[12]
Putting administrative efficiency first, the top-down reform plan was criticized as subordinating questions of legitimacy and participation. Rather than being opposed by the parliamentary opposition, the plan faced obstruction by the more conservative camp within the governing party and ultimately failed.[12]
Kallikratis: New attempt at administrative reform[edit]
Following the landslide victory of the socialist PASOK in the early 2009 legislative election, a new attempt at further administrative reforms was started. The Kallikratis plan was presented to the public in January 2010, amidst the beginnings of the Greek financial crisis. While in terms of figures rather similar to the failed New Democracy plans, it was not confined to reducing the sheer number of administrative entities and their state accountability.[13] In a country which has been widely regarded as the most centralist country of the European Union,[14] with many smaller municipalities, especially rural communities being "extremely understaffed and deprived of any possibility to fulfil their tasks,"[15] an emphasis was put on strengthening the remaining authorities in terms of autonomy of self-governance, public transparency and overall accessibility to citizens.[13] At the same time, the programme aimed at reducing local government employees by 50%, from around 50.000 to 25.000 across the country.[16]
The law was adopted in May 2010 and was implemented following the November 2010 local elections comprising the constituting regional elections, which replaced provincial elections as they were held before in 2002 and 2006.[13]
Reactions[edit]
Scholarly assessments[edit]
Scholars of Southern European studies have described the Kallikratis reform as surprising, as it abolished a great number of prestigious and powerful political posts, which ahead of the looming crisis would have been regarded indispensable for keeping party clientelism alive. Bertrana and Heinelt described the Papandreou government's decision as using a singular window of opportunity to overcome long-standing resistance against reform. While in regard to the massive-scale top-down approach deviating from a Southern European strategy,[9] compared to federal states such as Germany, interaction between national and subnational levels remains relatively weak with the subnational levels remaining strictly separated from the deconcentrated administration of the central government.[23] Also, state supervision remains largely confined to a posteriori control[23] of the legality of a subnational entity's activity.[24]
Howard Elcock suggested that in spite of all efforts, officialdom's reluctance makes securing transparency a continuing struggle, so the Greek citizen remained an administré rather than a participant in government[7]. Unnecessary decimation of local community organization led, in several occasions, to further minimization of participation. In the meantime, the hasty manner through which the law came into action paralyzed local authorities' initiative and independent funding.[25]
Kallikratis and austerity[edit]
Akrivopoulou et al. pointed out that the Kallikratis program needs to be seen in the context of the general effort to create a smaller state. They point to specific provisions in the First and even more so in the Second Memorandum concerning the role of local governance for overall austerity.[26]
Nicos Souliotis pointed out that the Kallikratis plan fosters the transfer of austerity policies to the local administrations, as the devolution of responsibilities to the subnational levels has not been accompanied by the transfer of the financial resources required to fulfil the responsibilities.[27]