Korean DMZ Conflict
The Korean DMZ Conflict, also referred to as the Second Korean War by some,[3][4] was a series of low-level armed clashes between North Korean forces and the forces of South Korea and the United States, largely occurring between 1966 and 1969 at the Korean DMZ.
Background[edit]
The Korean War had devastated both North and South Korea, and while neither side renounced its claims to reunify Korea under its control, neither side was in a position to force reunification.
In September 1956, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford indicated within the U.S. government that the military's intention was to introduce atomic weapons into Korea, which was agreed to by the United States National Security Council and President Eisenhower. However paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement mandated that both sides could not introduce new types of weapons into Korea, thus preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles. The U.S. decided to unilaterally abrogate paragraph 13(d), breaking the Armistice Agreement, despite concerns by United Nations allies.[5][6] At a 21 June 1957 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, the U.S. informed the North Korean representatives that the U.N. Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13(d) of the armistice.[7][8] In January 1958, nuclear-armed Honest John missiles and 280mm atomic cannons were deployed to South Korea,[9] followed within a year by atomic demolition munitions[10] and nuclear-armed Matador cruise missiles capable of reaching China and the Soviet Union.[5][11]
North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13(d) as an attempt to wreck the armistice agreement and turn Korea into a U.S. atomic warfare zone.[6] It responded by digging massive underground fortifications resistant to nuclear attack, and forward deployment of its conventional forces so that the use of nuclear weapons against it would endanger South Korean and U.S. forces as well. In 1963, North Korea asked the Soviet Union for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused. China later, after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for help with developing nuclear weapons.[5]
In North Korea, the departure of the People's Liberation Army in October 1958 allowed Kim Il-sung to consolidate his power base and embark on the Chollima Movement of collectivised agriculture and industrialization to build a base for reunifying Korea by force. North Korea remained dependent on the Soviet Union for technology and on China for agricultural assistance.[1]: Chapter 1 Background
Following the war, South Korea remained one of the poorest countries in the world for over a decade. In 1960, its gross domestic product per capita was $79,[12] lower than most Latin American and some sub-Saharan African countries.[13] The April Revolution that forced President Syngman Rhee from office in April 1960 was followed by a brief period of democracy before a coup d'état led to General Park Chung Hee seizing power in May 1961. Despite the political turmoil, the South Korean economy continued to grow, led by the industrial sector.[1]: Chapter 1 Rapid industrial growth started in the late 1960s, with gross domestic product per capita rising from $100 in 1964 to $1000 in 1977.[12]
On 10 December 1962, Kim proposed a new military strategy to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, with increased emphasis placed on irregular warfare, agitation and propaganda, to be achieved by the end of the current Seven-Year Plan in 1967.[1]: 3
In June 1965, President Park signed a treaty normalizing relations with Japan, which included payment of reparations and the making of soft loans from Japan and led to increased trade and investment between the two countries. In July 1966, South Korea and the United States signed a Status of Forces Agreement, establishing a more equal relationship between the two nations. With its growing economic strength and the security guarantee of the United States, the threat of a conventional invasion from the north seemed increasingly remote.[1]: 4–5 Following the escalation of the Vietnam War with the deployment of ground combat troops in March 1965, South Korea sent the Capital Division and the 2nd Marine Brigade to South Vietnam in September 1965, followed by the White Horse Division in September 1966.
The start of the hostilities can be traced to a speech given by North Korean leader Kim Il-sung on 5 October 1966, at the Workers' Party of Korea Conference, where the status quo of the 1953 Armistice Agreement was challenged. He apparently perceived that the division of effort by the South Korean military and the ever-growing escalation of the US commitment in Vietnam had created an environment where irregular warfare could succeed in a way conventional warfare could not.[1]: 33–34 Kim believed that he could force a split between the U.S. and South Korea through armed provocations targeting U.S. forces that, together with other worldwide commitments and small wars, would force the U.S. to reassess or relinquish its commitment to South Korea, allowing North Korea to incite an insurgency in the South that would topple the Park administration.[1]: 35
There were ongoing propaganda campaigns between the north and south, such as loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ at each other.[14] Leafleting of North Korea had been resumed, such as Operation Jilli from 1964 to 1968 which delivered a few hundred million leaflets to the north.[15]
Military forces[edit]
North Korea[edit]
In 1966, the Korean People's Army (KPA) deployed eight infantry divisions along the DMZ, backed by eight more infantry divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, a tank division and a collection of separate infantry and tank brigades and regiments. Its total armed forced personnel numbered 386,000.[1]: 13–14 While strong, this conventional force was smaller than the South's ground forces of about 585,000,[16] and it was unlikely that the North could deliver a knockout blow before the U.S. could deploy additional forces.[1]: 15
The main unconventional warfare arm was the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of Defense under the operational control of the Liaison Department of the Workers' Party of Korea which included the 17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade and the all-officer Unit 124 and 283rd Army Units. These units were all highly trained and indoctrinated, skilled in demolitions and small-unit tactics, they would usually operate in small teams of 2–12 men, lightly armed with either PPS submachine guns or AK-47s. The Reconnaissance Bureau also controlled the 23d Amphibious Brigade, which used specially made infiltration boats to operate along the South Korean coastline. The Reconnaissance Bureau could also use conventional KPA and Korean People's Navy forces to support the infiltration and exfiltration of its teams.[1]: 15–18
In addition to the offensive irregular forces, North Korea also deployed several thousand operator-agitators to select, train, and supervise informants and guerrilla recruits, while others attempted to cause individual defections and unit dissatisfaction in the ROK military and generally undermine the morale of both the ROKs and the Americans.[1]: 18
United States and South Korea[edit]
The major U.S. ground combat units in Korea were the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) and 7th Infantry Division (7ID), I Corps and 8th Army. 2ID stood with the 3rd Brigade manning 29.8 km of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) essentially due north of Seoul on either side of Panmunjom, with another nine Republic of Korea Army (ROK) Divisions manning the remaining 212.8 km of the DMZ. All U.S. and ROKA forces were under the unified operational control of United Nations Command (Korea) (who was also the commander United States Forces Korea), General Charles H. Bonesteel III.[1]: 25–26 Both U.S. Army Divisions were seriously under strength as Vietnam had priority for manpower and equipment. Troops were equipped with M14 rifles rather than M16s, the only available tanks were older gasoline powered M48A2Cs, and there were a total of only 12 UH-1 Huey helicopters in South Korea seriously restricting the ability to hunt and engage infiltrators. Troops were generally draftees serving a 13-month tour, while experienced officers and NCOs preferred service in Vietnam to Korea.[1]: 27 The ROK Divisions were well trained and highly motivated with many of the officers and NCOs veterans of the Korean War, but all their equipment dated back to that war; their standard rifle was still the M1 Garand.[1]: 27–29
The main operational objective of the US and ROK Divisions was to defend against a conventional invasion from North Korea in a repeat of the attack of June 1950. While there were regular infiltrations into the South for intelligence-gathering, unconventional warfare was not seen as a particular threat and the troops were not generally trained or equipped for this role.[1]: 11–12 No counter-guerilla units or village militias existed in South Korea in 1966 and infiltrators were variously hunted by the ROK Army, Police and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency with no unified control.[1]: 30
In 1976, in now-declassified meeting minutes, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements told Henry Kissinger that there had been 200 raids or incursions into North Korea from the south, though not by the U.S. military.[17] Details of only a few of these incursions have become public, including raids by South Korean forces in 1967 that had sabotaged about 50 North Korean facilities.[18] Up to 7,700 South Korean soldiers and agents infiltrated North Korea from the end of the Korean war until 1972, an estimated 5,300 of whom never made it back.[19][20]
The ground forces were supported by fighter-bombers of the USAF 314th Air Division and by the Republic of Korea Air Force. The seas around Korea were under the control of the United States Seventh Fleet and the Republic of Korea Navy. As with the Army, the war in Vietnam was the main focus of the USAF and the USN in the Pacific.[1]: 30
North Korean strategy changes[edit]
By the end of 1968 it was apparent that despite two years of unconventional operations, North Korea had failed to ignite an insurgency in the South, the U.S.–ROK relationship was stronger than ever and President Park had cemented his legitimacy with the population. In late December Kim Il-sung purged the senior military officers responsible for the unconventional warfare campaign accusing them of failing to correctly implement the Party line, there could be no suggestion that the KWP line simply did not appeal to South Koreans. Defense Minister, General Kim Chongbong and KPA Political Bureau chairman, General Ho Pong-haek were both executed, while the chief of the General Staff, the Reconnaissance Bureau chief, the KPN commander and the commanders of three frontline KPA Corps were all imprisoned. Units 124 and 283 were disbanded and special warfare capabilities were made explicitly subordinate to conventional military operations. The KPA was transformed by the institution of a Commissar system in all units down to Company level to ensure KWP control over all military activity. Despite the change in strategy North Korea continued to conduct infiltrations, apparently as cover while the purge and restructuring was carried out.[1]: 90–93
The UN Command did not initially appreciate the changes in Pyongyang, regarding the reduction in infiltrations as being caused by effective UN action rather than the abandonment by Pyongyang of its failed strategy; limited intelligence sources and few published speeches by Kim Il-Sung gave few clues as to the KWP's policy change.[1]: 94 In mid-March the combined forces Exercise Focus Retina began in South Korea, this exercise was condemned by the North as a dress rehearsal for an invasion and KPA regulars began a series of attacks and infiltrations against 2ID position on the DMZ that lasted until mid-May.[1]: 99
On 15 April 1969 (the birthday of Kim Il-sung), two KPAF MiGs shot down a USAF EC-121M Warning Star on an electronic intelligence mission 167 km off the east coast of North Korea, killing all 31 crewmen. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered a reprisal air strike or an aerial escort linked to a diplomatic complaint at the truce table, both initially favored an air strike on the basis that force should be met with force. Nixon's advisers opposed an airstrike, fearing that this could provoke a full-scale war when the U.S. was already committed in Vietnam and they were supported in this by General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter. On 18 April Nixon announced that future intelligence flights would have fighter escorts (which had been the case until the end of 1968 when the tensions on the Korean peninsula were believed to have subsided) and a protest was lodged with the North Koreans at Panmunjom which was accepted without comment. From 19 to 26 April the Seventh Fleet's Task Force 71 (including 4 carriers and their escorts) conducted operations off the east coast of North Korea as a show of force.[1]: 101–107
Conflict diffusion[edit]
By May 1969, the level of intensity of the conflict had reduced substantially. Isolated incidents continued to occur particularly along the ROKA-controlled sectors of the DMZ, but it had become clear that the North had abandoned its hopes of starting an insurgency in the South. Qualitative improvements in the ROK Army meant that the U.S. could start to contemplate reducing its military presence in South Korea. On 25 July 1969, President Nixon announced his Nixon Doctrine that, henceforth, the U.S. expected its allies to defend themselves with U.S. air and seapower support (and the nuclear umbrella), but not U.S. ground troops.
While aimed primarily at South Vietnam, this policy would also apply to South Korea (however, Nixon assured President Park that his commitment to South Korea was unchanged). On 1 October 1969 General Bonesteel handed over command of USFK to General John H. Michaelis. One of General Michaelis' early tasks was negotiating the release of three U.S. soldiers captured when their OH-23 helicopter was shot down after straying across the DMZ; their release on 3 December 1969 is regarded as the official end of the conflict.[1]: 107–109