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Moral nihilism

Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist.[1][2]

This article is about the meta-ethical position. For a more general discussion of amoralism, see Amorality.

Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, which allows for actions to be wrong relative to a particular culture or individual. It is also distinct from expressivism, according to which when we make moral claims, "We are not making an effort to describe the way the world is ... we are venting our emotions, commanding others to act in certain ways, or revealing a plan of action".[3]


Moral nihilism today broadly tends to take the form of an Error Theory: The view developed originally by J.L. Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Error theory and nihilism broadly take the form of a negative claim about the existence of objective values or properties. Under traditional views there are moral properties or methods which hold objectively in some sense beyond our contingent interests which morally obligate us to act. For Mackie and the Error Theorists, such properties do not exist in the world, and therefore morality conceived of by reference to objective facts must also not exist. Therefore, morality in the traditional sense does not exist.


However, holding nihilism does not necessarily imply that one should give up using moral or ethical language; some nihilists contend that it remains a useful tool.[4] In fact Mackie and other contemporary defenders of Error Theory, such as Richard Joyce, defend the use of moral or ethical talk and action even in knowledge of their fundamental falsity. The legitimacy of this activity is a subject of debate in philosophy.

Applied ethics[edit]

A pressing question is how one might apply the belief that there are no objective morals. Perhaps the most common response, and the position which Mackie adopts, is to view moralizing as an inherently useful practice, and that everyone is better off behaving in a moralistic manner.[8]


On the other hand, Richard Garner advocated for the idea of “moral abolitionism”. He argues that, if one were to believe that there are no objective morals, then to engage in moralism is a deceptive behavior. It is wrong because it harms one’s epistemological integrity. Furthermore, by refusing to make moral judgements generally, people would be more likely to engage with others in a more genuine fashion. The social benefit is that “we will find that there will be less to argue about, and that our conflicts and disagreements with others, at last seen for what they are, can be addressed and resolved”.[8] Garner encouraged people to adhere to an alternative to traditional normative morality: "informed, compassionate amoralism," a blend of compassion, non-duplicity, and clarity of language that he believed would nurture our capability for tolerance, creation, and cooperation.

Arguments for nihilism[edit]

Argument from queerness[edit]

The most prominent argument for nihilism is the argument from queerness.


J. L. Mackie argues that there are no objective ethical values, by arguing that they would be queer (strange):

Pratt, Alan (n.d.). . Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. Retrieved 2020-12-01.

"Nihilism"

Bilgrami, Akeel (2006). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Harman, Gilbert (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.  9780195021431. OCLC 2725781.

ISBN

Joyce, Richard (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Korsgaard, Christine (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mackie, John (1977). Ethics: inventing right and wrong. London.  0140135588. OCLC 24729622.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)

ISBN

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2010). The Fundamentals of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.  978-0-19-063139-0.

ISBN

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2018). The Fundamentals of Ethics (fourth ed.). Oxford University Press.  978-0-19-532086-2.

ISBN

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2019), , in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-05-28

"Moral Skepticism"

Timmons, Mark (1999). Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press..

Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics, New York: Macmillan.

Garner, Richard T.; (1994). Beyond Morality. Temple University Press.

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003). Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?, Oxford University Press.

Shafer-Landau, Russ & Terence Cuneo (eds.) (2007). Foundations of Ethics, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006a). "Moral Skepticism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ()

link

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006b). Moral Skepticisms, Oxford University Press.

van Roojen, Mark (2004). "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ()

link

About the queerness argument