Nassau Agreement
The Nassau Agreement, concluded on 21 December 1962, was an agreement negotiated between President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, and Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to end the Skybolt Crisis. A series of meetings between the two leaders over three days in the Bahamas followed Kennedy's announcement of his intention to cancel the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile project. The US agreed to supply the UK with Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles for the UK Polaris programme.
Under an earlier agreement, the US had agreed to supply Skybolt missiles in return for allowing the establishment of a ballistic missile submarine base in the Holy Loch near Glasgow. The British Government had then cancelled the development of its medium-range ballistic missile, known as Blue Streak, leaving Skybolt as the basis of the UK's independent nuclear deterrent in the 1960s. Without Skybolt, the V-bombers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) were likely to have become obsolete through being unable to penetrate the improved air defences that the Soviet Union was expected to deploy by the 1970s.
At Nassau, Macmillan rejected Kennedy's other offers, and pressed him to supply the UK with Polaris missiles. These represented more advanced technology than Skybolt, and the US was not inclined to provide them except as part of a Multilateral Force within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Under the Nassau Agreement the US agreed to provide the UK with Polaris. The agreement stipulated that the UK's Polaris missiles would be assigned to NATO as part of a Multilateral Force, and could be used independently only when "supreme national interests" intervened.
The Nassau Agreement became the basis of the Polaris Sales Agreement, a treaty which was signed on 6 April 1963. Under this agreement, British nuclear warheads were fitted to Polaris missiles. As a result, responsibility for Britain's nuclear deterrent passed from the RAF to the Royal Navy. The President of France, Charles de Gaulle, cited Britain's dependence on the United States under the Nassau Agreement as one of the main reasons for his veto of Britain's application for admission to the European Economic Community (EEC) on 14 January 1963.
Background[edit]
British nuclear deterrent[edit]
During the early part of the Second World War, Britain had a nuclear weapons project, codenamed Tube Alloys.[1] At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill and the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, signed the Quebec Agreement, which merged Tube Alloys with the American Manhattan Project to create a combined British, American and Canadian project.[2] The British Government trusted that the United States would continue to share nuclear technology, which it regarded as a joint discovery, after the war,[3] but the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) ended technical cooperation.[4]
Fearing a resurgence of United States isolationism, and Britain losing its great power status, the British Government restarted its own development effort,[5] now codenamed High Explosive Research.[6] The first British atomic bomb was tested in Operation Hurricane on 3 October 1952.[7][8] The subsequent British development of the hydrogen bomb, and a favourable international relations climate created by the Sputnik Crisis, led to the McMahon Act being amended in 1958, resulting in the restoration of the nuclear Special Relationship in the form of the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement, which allowed Britain to acquire nuclear weapons systems from the United States.[9]
Canadian interlude[edit]
It was customary for the Canadians to be consulted when there was a meeting between the British and American leaders on the North American side of the Atlantic. This nicety was not observed when the Nassau conference was arranged,[63] but the Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, invited Macmillan to a meeting in Ottawa. Macmillan countered with an offer to meet in Nassau after the Skybolt issue was resolved.[64] Kennedy and Diefenbaker loathed each other, and Kennedy made plans to leave early to avoid Diefenbaker,[63] but Macmillan persuaded Kennedy to stay for a lunch meeting.[64] Kennedy later described the uncomfortable meeting as being like "three whores at a christening".[63]
Nuclear weapons had become a political issue in Canada in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Canadian Bomarc surface-to-air missiles had sat idly by while the country was threatened with a nuclear attack due to Diefenbaker's insistence that their nuclear warheads be stored outside Canada,[65] an arrangement which the Americans regarded as impractical.[66] Macmillan briefed Diefenbaker on the Nassau Agreement,[67] which Diefenbaker took to mean that manned bombers were now considered obsolete. This gave him further cause to continue to delay a decision on the Bomarc warheads, which were intended to shoot down bombers.[68] He did, however, express interest in Canadian participation in the Multilateral Force.[68][69]