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Natural justice

In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua) and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem). While the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by the general "duty to act fairly".

Not to be confused with Natural law.

The basis for the rule against bias is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. Bias can take the form of actual bias, imputed bias, or apparent bias. Actual bias is very difficult to prove in practice whereas imputed bias, once shown, will result in a decision being void without the need for any investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias. Cases from different jurisdictions currently apply two tests for apparent bias: the "reasonable suspicion of bias" test and the "real likelihood of bias" test. One view that has been taken is that the differences between these two tests are largely semantic and that they operate similarly.


The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals should not be penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the case, a fair opportunity to answer it, and the opportunity to present their own case. The mere fact that a decision affects rights or interests is sufficient to subject the decision to the procedures required by natural justice. In Europe, the right to a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is said to complement the common law rather than replace it.

Rule against bias[edit]

In general[edit]

People are barred from deciding any case in which bias exists or bias may fairly be suspected. This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality,[11] and applies to courts of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act judicially.[12] A public authority has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions that affect people's rights or interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-type procedure in arriving at decisions.[13]


The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. The erosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal system and leads to ensuing chaos.[14] The essence of the need for impartiality was observed by Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, in Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon (1968):[15] "Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased.'"[15]: 599 


Public confidence as the basis for the rule against bias is also embodied in the often-quoted words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that "[i]t is not merely of some importance, but of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done".[16]

The interest in good outcomes – giving prior notice increases the value of the proceedings as it is only when the interested person knows the issues and the relevant information that he or she can make a useful contribution.

The duty of respect – the affected person has the right to know what is at stake, and it is not enough to simply inform him or her that there will be a hearing.

The – notice of issues and disclosure of information opens up the operations of the public authority to public scrutiny.

rule of law

Doctrine of bias in Singapore law

Faceless court

Fundamental justice

Judicial review in English law

[1985] HCA 81, (1985) 159 CLR 550 (18 December 1985), High Court (Australia).

Kioa v West

, 1990 CANLII 138, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, Supreme Court (Canada).

Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19

Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd , [2000] QB 451, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).

[1999] EWCA Civ 3004

Tang Kin Hwa v Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board , [2005] 4 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore Law Reports (Reissue)] 604, High Court (Singapore).

[2005] SGHC 153

[2006] SGHC 194, [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 85, H.C. (Singapore).

Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni

Allan, T[revor] R.S. (1998), "Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect", , 18 (3): 497–515, doi:10.1093/ojls/18.3.497, JSTOR 764676.

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Chen, Siyuan; Leo, Lionel (2008), (PDF), Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 20: 820–833, archived from the original (PDF) on 6 November 2011.

"Natural Justice: A Case for Uniform Rigour: Ho Paul v Singapore Medical Council [2008] 2 SLR 780; Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club [2008] 2 SLR 802"

(2003), "The Human Rights Act, Article 6 and Procedural Rights", Public Law: 753–773.

Craig, Paul P.

Ho, H[ock] L[ai] (2000), , Legal Studies, 20 (1): 42–65, doi:10.1111/j.1748-121X.2000.tb00132.x, S2CID 143589537.

"The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons"

Leo, Lionel; Chen, Siyuan (2008), , Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (Dec 2008): 446–454.

"Reasonable Suspicion or Real Likelihood: A Question of Semantics? Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkani"

(November 2007), Principles of Natural Justice [speech at a programme for the orientation and training of new members, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, India, 12–28 November 2007], Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, India, archived from the original on 26 July 2011, retrieved 26 September 2011.

Manohar, Sujata V.

Maurici, James (December 2007), "The Modern Approach to Bias", Judicial Review, 12 (4): 251–260, :10.1080/10854681.2007.11426536, S2CID 153025470.

doi

Singh Rathore, Aakash, , archived from the original on 12 December 2021.

Introduction to Natural Justice]