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Naturalistic fallacy

In philosophical ethics, the naturalistic fallacy is the claim that it is possible to define good in terms of natural entities, or properties such as pleasant or desirable. The term was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica.[1]

For the claim that something is good or right because it is natural (or bad or wrong because it is unnatural), see Appeal to nature.

Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40); however, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.

Moore, George Edward (1903). . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-334-04040-X.

Principia Ethica

(1939). "The Naturalistic Fallacy". Mind. XLVIII (192): 464–77. doi:10.1093/mind/XLVIII.192.464. JSTOR 2250706.

Frankena, W. K.

Curry, Oliver (2006). . Evolutionary Psychology. 4: 234–47. doi:10.1177/147470490600400120.

"Who's afraid of the naturalistic fallacy?"

Walter, Alex (2006). . Evolutionary Psychology. 4: 33–48. doi:10.1177/147470490600400102.

"The anti-naturalistic fallacy: Evolutionary moral psychology and the insistence of brute facts"

; Dietrich, Eric; Clark, Anne B. (2003). "On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology". Biology and Philosophy. 18 (5): 669–81. doi:10.1023/A:1026380825208. S2CID 30891026.

Wilson, David Sloan

Archived 2021-04-12 at the Wayback Machine

Principia Ethica

(ed.). "G.E. Moore". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Zalta, Edward N.

(ed.). "Moral non-naturalism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Zalta, Edward N.

entry in The Fallacy Files

Appeal to Nature