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Operation Blue Star

Operation Blue Star was an Indian Armed Forces operation between 1 and 10 June 1984 to remove Sikh militant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and other Sikh militants from the buildings of the Golden Temple, famed site of Sikhism.

A long-standing movement advocating for greater political rights for the Sikh community had previously existed in the Indian state of Punjab, and in 1973, Sikh activists presented the Indian government with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, a list of demands for greater autonomy for Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. In July 1982, Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of the Sikh political party Shiromani Akali Dal, invited Bhindranwale, who was wanted by authorities, to take up residence in the Golden Temple to evade arrest.[36]: 332 [37] On 1 June 1984, after negotiations with the militants failed, the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi ordered the army to launch Operation Blue Star in haste, attacking the Golden Temple and scores of other Sikh temples and sites across Punjab which included killing civilians and devotees too.[38]


The military underestimated the firepower possessed by the Sikh militants, whose armaments included Chinese-made rocket-propelled grenade launchers and ammunition with armour-piercing capabilities. Hoping to avoid damage to the holy site, Indian forces unsuccessfully assaulted the temple using light weaponry and quickly resorted to using heavy weapons, including tanks, helicopters and artillery to dislodge the well-fortified Sikh militants. Combat devolved into protracted urban warfare, with the Indian forces committing significant forces to slowly gain ground. Eventually, the Sikh militants ran out of most of their ammunition on 6 June, and by 10 June fighting had largely ceased, with the Indian forces in control of the complex. The Indian government attributed high civilian casualties to Sikh militants using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields.[39] However, Indian forces were aware that civilians were present inside, and the operation began on a Sikh religious day, the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan Dev, when many worshippers would be present. Many civilians were subject to extrajudicial killings by the military during the operation.[40][41][42][43][44]


The military action in the temple complex was criticized by Sikhs worldwide, who interpreted it as an assault on the Sikh religion and the entire Sikh community.[45] Five months after the operation, on 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated in an act of brutality by two Sikhs namely Satwant Singh and Beant Singh.[37] Congress encouraged outcry over Indira Gandhi's death led to the ensuing 1984 Anti-Sikh riots led by Congress mercenaries.[46]


Despite accomplishing its stated objectives, the operation has been described as "disastrous" for the Indian military and state.[8][47] It greatly exacerbated tensions between the Indian government and the Sikh community, many of whom had been demanding a separate state. Meanwhile, the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 turned a series of police operations into widespread sectarian violence. The brutality of the operation and high civilian casualties spawned an insurgency in Punjab, which would be waged by Sikh militants for over a decade. The operation has been used as a case study highlighting the importance of respecting religious and cultural sensitivity prior to launching military operations.


The complex would later be raided twice more as part of Operation Black Thunder I and II, with both operations having little to no civilian casualties or damage to the Temple despite larger amounts of militants than Operation Blue Star.[8]

Background

In the years leading up to the operation, there was a significant build-up in agitation for greater autonomy for the Sikh community. Economic and social pressures driven by the Green Revolution led many young Sikh men to support varying degrees of self-determination for Sikhs and Punjab, with many even advocating independence from India.


The introduction of mechanised agricultural techniques led to uneven distribution of wealth in Punjab. Industrial development did not occur at the same pace of agricultural development in Punjab, as the Indian government was reluctant to set up heavy industries in Punjab due to its status as a high-risk border state with Pakistan.[48] Meanwhile, a rapid increase in higher education opportunities without adequate rise in jobs resulted in an increase in the unemployment of educated youth.[49] The resulting unemployed Sikh youth were drawn to the militant groups, which formed the backbone of increasing militancy.[50]


In the 1950s, the Akali Dal party launched the Punjabi Suba movement, demanding a new state within India with a majority of Punjabi speaking people, out of undivided East Punjab under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh.[51] This movement resulted in fraught relations with the union government, and the Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, was raided in 1955, and many of the movement's leaders were arrested. In 1966, after negotiations, the present Punjab state with a Sikh majority was formed. Akali Dal came to power in the new Punjab state in March 1967,[52] but early governments didn't live long due to internal conflicts and power struggles within the party. Later, the party strengthened and party governments completed full term, and eventually came to play a major role in the developments to come.


After being routed in 1972 Punjab election, the Alhali Dal put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 to demand more autonomy to Punjab.[53] The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. Activist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale then joined the Akali Dal, and launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha in 1982, in a bid to urge the Indian government to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.[54]

Negotiations

In January 1984, India's secret service Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) prepared a covert plan codenamed Operation Sundown involving special forces to abduct Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex.[77] A RAW unit was formed to rehearse Operation Sundown in the Sarsawa Air Force Base in Uttar Pradesh, but the operation never materialized due to Indira Gandhi's rejection.


The government sent a team led by Narasimha Rao to try to convince Bhindranwale to back out, but he was adamant.[78][79] The negotiations failed and the law and order situation in Punjab continued to deteriorate.[78] Indira Gandhi tried to persuade the Akalis to support her in the arrest of Bhindranwale peacefully. These talks ended up being futile.[78] In the days before the assault, government representatives met with Bhindranwale in a last ditch effort to negotiate a truce. The Sikhs would withdraw, believing they had seen a commando unit move into the city.[80] Bhindranwale warned of a backlash by the Sikh community in the event of an armed assault on the Golden Temple.[81] On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that he had failed to get Bhindranwale to agree to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and that Bhindranwale was no longer under anyone's control.[82] Faced with imminent army action and with Harchand Singh Longowal abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared, "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it."[82] In his final interview to Subhash Kirpekar, Bhindranwale stated that Sikhs can neither live in India nor with India.[69]: 555 


Indira Gandhi then gave her permission to initiate Operation Blue Star on the recommendation of Army Chief Arun Shridhar Vaidya. She was apparently led to believe and had assumed that Operation Blue Star would not involve any civilian casualties.[83] The assumption was that, when confronted, Bhindranwale would surrender to the army.[69]

Preparations

Fortification of Golden Temple

An arsenal had been created within the Akal Takht over a period of several months. It was reported that trucks engaged for kar seva (religious service) and bringing in supplies for the daily langar were smuggling in guns and ammunition. The police never attempted to check these vehicles entering the Golden Temple, on instructions from superiors. During a random check one such truck was stopped and many Sten guns and ammunition were found. The Indian government White Paper alleged that after Operation Blue Star it was found that the militants had set up a grenade manufacturing facility, and a workshop for the fabrication of Sten-guns inside the Temple Complex.[84] However, the allegations of the militants being in possession of weapon workshops was never made prior to Operation Bluestar, and only after, with only the Army making these statements.[85] The statements of multiple civilian eyewitnesses instead were consistent that the militants were a small number of men and had limited arms that were used sparingly.[85]


The Harmandir Sahib compound and some of the surrounding houses were fortified under the guidance of Major General Shabeg Singh, who had joined Bhindranwale's group after dismissal from the army. During their occupation of Akal Takht, Bhindranwale's group had begun fortifying the building. The Statesman reported that light machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound,[86] and strategically placed to defend against an armed assault on the complex. The modern weapons later found inside the temple complex indicated that foreign elements were involved. The heavier weapons were found to have Pakistani or Chinese markings on them.[87] According to Lt. General J.S. Arora only 60 self-loading riles were foreign made. The rest were Indian. He also said that there were no medium machine guns and only two RPGs. Arora says that the arsenal was not truly sophisticated.[88]: 55  A Lt. Colonel part of the Operation later revealed that militants only had 4 light machine gun magazines. According to him a single light machine gun carries 12 magazines. He revealed that the main gun that was kept and used by militants was AK-47s.[88]: 55–56 


Holes were smashed through the marble walls of Akal takht to create gun positions. Walls were broken to allow entry points to the tiled courtyards. Secure machine gun nests were created. All of these positions were protected by sandbags and newly made brick walls. The windows and arches of Akal Takht were blocked with bricks and sandbags. Sandbags were placed on the turrets. Every strategically significant building of the temple complex, apart from the Harmandir Sahib in the center, had been fortified in a similar manner and allegedly defaced. The fortifications also included seventeen private houses in the residential area near the Temple. All the high rise buildings and towers near the temple complex were occupied. The militants manning these vantage points were in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh in Akal Takht.[89][69]: 551  Under the military leadership of Major General Singh, ex-army veterans and deserters had trained Bhindranwale's men.


The militants in the complex were anticipating an attack by government troops. The defences in the complex were created with the purpose of stalling an assault, giving time to provoke Sikhs in the villages and encourage them to march en masse towards the Golden Temple in support of the militants. Sufficient food to last a month was stocked in the complex.[89][90]


During this period police and security forces stationed around the temple complex were allowed only within 200 yards. This was to avoid the 'desecration' of the temple by their presence. The security forces were prevented by the politicians from taking action in enforcing the law. Even self-defence from the militants was made difficult. On 14 February 1984, a police post near the entrance of the Temple was attacked by a group of militants. Six fully armed policemen were captured and taken inside. After twenty four hours the police responded and sent in a senior police officer for negotiation. He asked Bhindranwale to release his men, along with their weapons. Bhindranwale agreed and delivered the dead body of one of the hostages who had been killed. Later the remaining five policemen were released alive, but their weapons were kept.[69]: 119 


The fortifications of the temple denied the army the possibility of commando operations. The buildings were close together and had labyrinthine passages all under the control of the militants. Militants in the temple premises had access to langars, food supplies, and water from the Sarovar (temple pond). Militants were well stocked with weapons and ammunition. Any siege under these circumstances would have been long and difficult. The option of laying down a long siege was ruled out by the army due to the risk of emotionally aroused villagers marching to the temple and clashing with the army. The negotiated settlement had already been rejected by Bhindranwale and the government decided to raid the temple.[69]: 515 

Casualties

The Indian army initially placed total casualties at[89] 554 Sikh militants and civilians dead,[26] and 83 killed (4 officers, 79 soldiers) and 236 wounded among government forces. Kuldip Nayar cites Rajiv Gandhi as allegedly admitting that nearly 700 soldiers were killed.[29] This number was allegedly disclosed by Gandhi in September 1984 as he was addressing the National Student Union of India session in Nagpur.[13]: 96  Per Ved Marwah the army suffered 35% casualties.[127][88]: 96 


According to a close associate of Bhindranwale only 35 militants were killed with the rest leaving in the early days of the Operation. They left because of a plan devised in which they would launch a revolution against the state to form Khalistan so the movement may live on. The belief of the militants was that it is better for some to live to fight another day. According to the associate all who left would die in the Punjab Insurgency.[128]


Independent casualty figures were much higher.[35] Bhindranwale and large number of his militants were killed. There were high civilian casualties as well, which the Indian government argued were due to Sikhs in the Golden Temple using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields,[39] though the operation was conducted at a time when the Golden Temple was packed to capacity with pilgrims who were there to celebrate the annual martyrdom anniversary of Guru Arjan Dev, the fifth Guru of the Sikhs.[34] The pilgrims were not allowed by the militants to escape from the temple premises in spite of relaxation in the curfew hours by the security forces.[69] According to Indian army generals, "it is possible" that militants were "depending upon the Sikh masses to form a human shield to prevent action by the army", as well as the presence of a "whole lot of moderate Akali leadership".[129]


Delivering the findings of a review in 2014, U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague attributed high civilian casualties to the Indian Government's attempt at a full frontal assault on the militants, diverging from the recommendations provided by the U.K. Military.[130][131] The Indian military had created a situation where civilians were allowed to collect inside of the temple complex. On 3 June the Indian military allowed pilgrims to enter the temple complex.[105] The Indian military also allowed thousands of protestors whom were a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha to enter the temple complex.[105] These protestors included women and children.[105] There was no warning provided to the pilgrims who entered on 3 June that a curfew was put in place by the military.[105] These pilgrims were prevented from leaving after the curfew had been placed by the army at approximately 10:00 pm.[105]


On 4 June no warning was provided to the pilgrims to evacuate and the pilgrims were deterred of leaving as the Indian army would arrest anyone who left the temple complex.[101] Although officially the army stated that it made announcements, the eyewitness testimony of pilgrims who were arrested after the assault was used as the basis of a decision in the Amritsar district court in April 2017, which held that the army made no such announcements.[110] The eyewitness testimony of survivors of the army's assault on the temple complex were consistent with stating that they were unaware of the start of the attack by the army until it took place without notice on the morning of 4 June.[108]


On 6 June the Indian military detained surviving pilgrims on the grounds that they were affiliated with the militants and subjected them to interrogations, beatings and executions.[132]

In April 2017 Justice Gurbir Singh stated that the army's failure to provide any announcement to pilgrims before commencing Operation Bluestar was a human rights violation.

[110]

The Indian army mistreated pilgrims who were detained immediately after the fighting stopped on June 6 by failing to provide them any water. Some pilgrims were reduced to collecting drinking water from the canals that contained dead bodies and were filled with blood.

[173]

Ragi Harcharan Singh stated that on June 6 the Indian army gave its first announcement for evacuation since the commencement of Operation Bluestar. Singh states that he witnessed hundreds of pilgrims, including women, being shot at by the army as they emerged from hiding.

[43]

A female survivor witnessed Indian soldiers line up Sikh men in a queue, tie their arms behind their backs with their turbans, beat them with rifle butts until they bled and then executed by being shot.

[174]

Giana Puran Singh stated he along with 3–4 others were used as human shields for the protection of an officer who wanted to inspect the inside of the Darbar Sahib for anyone using a machine gun.

[175]

A member of the AISSF stated that on June 6 those who surrendered before the army were made to lie down on the hot road, interrogated, made to move on their knees, bit with rifle butts and kicked with boots on private parts and their heads. The detainees were made to have their arms tied behind their backs with their own turbans and denied water. At about 7:00 pm the detainees were made to sit on the Parikrama near the army tanks. Many were injured as there was still firing from the side of the Akal Takht.

[175]

Post-mortem reports showed that most of the dead bodies had their hands tied behind their backs, implying they had died after the army assault and not during. These bodies were in a putrid state at the time of post-mortem as they had been exposed in the open for 72 hours before being brought in.

[44]

The Red Cross was stopped from aiding the wounded civilians by the army.: 85 

[10]

Punjab officials who visited after the Operation complained to the army of 6 cases of rape during the Operation by soldiers that they had heard of.: 78 

[10]

Kharku

Khalistan movement

Golden Temple

(2012). Sikh History in 10 volumes. Sikh University Press. ISBN 978-2930247472.: presents comprehensive details of the invasion of Indian Army (causes and events). Vols 7 to 10 also give precious information.

Harjinder Singh Dilgeer

Kirapal Singh and Anurag Singh, ed. (1999). Giani Kirpal Singh's eye-witness account of Operation Blue Star. B. Chattar Singh Jiwan Singh.  978-8176013185.: presents the version of Giani Kirpal Singh, the Jathedar of the Akal Takht.

ISBN

Johncy Itty (1985). Operation Bluestar: the political ramifications.

Man Singh Deora (1992). Aftermath of Operation Bluestar. Anmol Publications.  978-8170416456.

ISBN

; Khushwant Singh (1984). Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar & after. Vision Books.

Kuldip Nayar

Satyapal Dang; Ravi M. Bakaya (2000). Terrorism in Punjab. Gyan Books.  978-8121206594.

ISBN

Tarkunde, V. M.; Fernandes, George; Rao, Amiya; Ghose, Aurbindo; Bhattacharya, Sunil; Ahuja, Tejinder; Pancholi, N. D. (1985). Oppression in Punjab: A Citizens for Democracy Report to the Nation. New Delhi: Citizens for Human Rights and Civil Liberties.  978-0934839020.

ISBN

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