Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy
At the onset of Confederation in 1867, political planners in Canada and Great Britain realized that Canada had substantial maritime interests to protect. Boasting the fourth largest Merchant Marine in the world, and deriving the majority of its foreign capital through maritime trading should have been enough to persuade the Canadian government of the strategic importance of the seas. Adding the fact that Canada was one of the great shipbuilding and ship-owning countries of the world, and it soon made the need for maritime protection obvious.[1]
For Britain's Royal Navy, the Canadian merchant fleet represented a ready supply of vessels that could have been converted to auxiliary warships, with some help to procure the necessary armament should a crisis arise. Soon enough, though, sail gave way to steam, and Canada's mercantile fleet became inadequate to complement the British Navy. In 1865, the British Parliament had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865, which enabled colonies to establish and maintain naval forces for foreign defence in the European theatre.[2] Canada's maritime interests needed to be safeguarded, and Britain wanted Canada to assume its fair share.
Laurier's two alternatives[edit]
The British government was advised that Britain was losing the naval arms race against Germany. This shocking revelation, made on 16 March 1909, spread panic throughout the empire and led to several offers of funds for the construction of dreadnoughts from New Zealand and several Australian states' governments. Pressure was exerted by the Canadian imperialists to follow suit. This crisis changed the Canadian Navy question from a local issue to one encompassing the naval defence of the whole empire. The ensuing resolution was presented to the House of Commons by the one-time minister of Marine and Fisheries conservative MP Sir George Foster from New Brunswick and stated:
"That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and natural environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone benefits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to suitable protection of her exposed coastline and great seaports."[19]
The two options were the establishment of the Canadian Navy or continued financial support of the one in Britain. The former became the position generally supported in the House. As the debate ensued, it became clear that Laurier's scheme of militarizing the Fisheries Protection Service was inadequate and would not garner unanimous support. The amended proposal was that of a small navy, given that "The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service".[20]
At the Imperial Conference of July and August 1909, the Admiralty stated that to be effective in contributing to the defence of the imperial sea lanes, the Canadian Navy should comprise a minimum of three Bristol-class cruisers and four destroyers. A fleet of one Boadicea-class heavy cruiser, four Bristols, and six destroyers for an annual spending of £600,000[21] was considered much preferable. The Admiralty offered to loan two cruisers to Canada to begin training. This led to accusations from Laurier's opposition that what was really attempted was the creation of a unit of the Imperial Navy, not a Canadian Navy proper. The Naval Service Act, proposed to the House of Commons on 10 January 1910, called for a fleet of eleven warships: one Boadicea, four Bristol-class cruisers and five torpedo-boat destroyers. All ships were to have been built in Canada, at an annual cost of $2.5 million.[22]
Opposition[edit]
The opposition Conservative coalition, the imperialists under Sir Robert Borden and the Nationalistes led by Henri Bourassa, vehemently opposed Laurier's plans for a Canadian Navy, but for totally different reasons. Bourassa founded the daily newspaper Le Devoir,[9] with the express purpose of defeating the Naval Service Act through insinuations and allegations that conscription would soon follow. His camp claimed that the cruisers proposed were more than Canada needed for fisheries and sovereignty protection, but were sufficient to attract the attention of other navies. He further stated that Canadian squadrons, paid by and for Canada, put under the command of the Admiralty in times of war, meant an "automatic involvement on every imperial war."[9] This would put Canada in danger of being drawn into distant conflicts as a result of its ships operating under the White Ensign.
The Borden camp, on the other hand, charged that the Liberals were insufficiently loyal to the empire. They contended that the proposal was not enough to secure Canada's coasts or help Britain in its current arms race crisis against Germany and that the only viable option was to vote money for the construction of battleships to expand the navy in Britain.[23]
Fall of the Laurier Government[edit]
On 21 September 1911, Sir Robert Borden's Conservatives defeated the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The naval issue had ranked far behind that of trade reciprocity with the US in most of Canada during the election campaign, but Henri Bourassa made sure that it took centre stage in Quebec. It cost the Liberals eighteen seats in Quebec. Although Laurier's other losses in the rest of Canada were sufficient to ensure his defeat, the loss of the Quebec seats would set the tone for Borden's naval policy. This almost doomed the RCN to languish and suffer an apparently slow and unnoticed death over the years leading to World War I. With Robert Borden's government winning the election in the Fall of 1911, a priority was to accommodate French Canadian concerns by reducing the Royal Canadian Navy's budget.[33]
At the urging of the Admiralty's First Sea Lord Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister Borden agreed to finance the construction of three dreadnoughts for $35 million.[34] This plan was far more costly than Laurier's original plan of the Canadian-built fleet and would reap no benefits to Canadian industries whatsoever. On 5 December 1912, Borden introduced the Naval Aid Bill as a one-time contribution to Britain's navy. After bitter debate, the Bill passed third reading in Parliament the second week of May 1913 but was soundly defeated by the Liberal-majority Senate. Canada was left with the Naval Service Act on the books, but no naval policy.