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Pareto efficiency

In welfare economics, a Pareto improvement formalizes the idea of an outcome being "better in every possible way". A change is called a Pareto improvement if it leaves everyone in a society better-off (or at least as well-off as they were before). A situation is called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if all possible Pareto improvements have already been made; in other words, there are no longer any ways left to make one person better-off, unless we are willing to make some other person worse-off.[1]

In social choice theory, the same concept is sometimes called the unanimity principle, which says that if everyone in a society (non-strictly) prefers A to B, society as a whole also non-strictly prefers A to B.


The Pareto front consists of all Pareto-efficient situations.[2]


In addition to the context of efficiency in allocation, the concept of Pareto efficiency also arises in the context of efficiency in production vs. x-inefficiency: a set of outputs of goods is Pareto-efficient if there is no feasible re-allocation of productive inputs such that output of one product increases while the outputs of all other goods either increase or remain the same.[3]


Besides economics, the notion of Pareto efficiency has also been applied to selecting alternatives in engineering and biology. Each option is first assessed, under multiple criteria, and then a subset of options is identified with the property that no other option can categorically outperform the specified option. It is a statement of impossibility of improving one variable without harming other variables in the subject of multi-objective optimization (also termed Pareto optimization).

History[edit]

The concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian civil engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution.


Pareto originally used the word "optimal" for the concept, but this is somewhat of a misnomer: Pareto's concept more closely aligns with an idea of "efficiency", because it does not identify a single "best" (optimal) outcome. Instead, it only identifies a set of outcomes that might be considered optimal, by at least one person.[4]

Variants[edit]

Weak Pareto efficiency[edit]

Weak Pareto efficiency is a situation that cannot be strictly improved for every individual.[12]


Formally, a strong Pareto improvement is defined as a situation in which all agents are strictly better-off (in contrast to just "Pareto improvement", which requires that one agent is strictly better-off and the other agents are at least as good). A situation is weak Pareto-efficient if it has no strong Pareto improvements.


Any strong Pareto improvement is also a weak Pareto improvement. The opposite is not true; for example, consider a resource allocation problem with two resources, which Alice values at {10, 0}, and George values at {5, 5}. Consider the allocation giving all resources to Alice, where the utility profile is (10, 0):

Pareto efficiency and equity[edit]

Although an outcome may be a Pareto improvement, this does not imply that the outcome is equitable. It is possible that inequality persists even after a Pareto improvement. Despite the fact that it is frequently used in conjunction with the idea of Pareto optimality, the term "efficiency" refers to the process of increasing societal productivity.[18] It is possible for a society to have Pareto efficiency while also have high levels of inequality. Consider the following scenario: there is a pie and three persons; the most equitable way would be to divide the pie into three equal portions. However, if the pie is divided in half and shared between two people, it is considered Pareto efficient – meaning that the third person does not lose out (despite the fact that he does not receive a piece of the pie). When making judgments, it is critical to consider a variety of aspects, including social efficiency, overall welfare, and issues such as diminishing marginal value.

Use in engineering[edit]

The notion of Pareto efficiency has been used in engineering.[22] Given a set of choices and a way of valuing them, the Pareto front (or Pareto set or Pareto frontier) is the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient. By restricting attention to the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient, a designer can make trade-offs within this set, rather than considering the full range of every parameter.[23]

Use in public policy[edit]

Modern microeconomic theory has drawn heavily upon the concept of Pareto efficiency for inspiration. Pareto and his successors have tended to describe this technical definition of optimal resource allocation in the context of it being an equilibrium that can theoretically be achieved within an abstract model of market competition. It has therefore very often been treated as a corroboration of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" notion. More specifically, it motivated the debate over "market socialism" in the 1930s.[4]


However, because the Pareto-efficient outcome is difficult to assess in the real world when issues including asymmetric information, signalling, adverse selection, and moral hazard are introduced, most people do not take the theorems of welfare economics as accurate descriptions of the real world. Therefore, the significance of the two welfare theorems of economics is in their ability to generate a framework that has dominated neoclassical thinking about public policy. That framework is that the welfare economics theorems allow the political economy to be studied in the following two situations: "market failure" and "the problem of redistribution".[24]


Analysis of "market failure" can be understood by the literature surrounding externalities. When comparing the "real" economy to the complete contingent markets economy (which is considered efficient), the inefficiencies become clear. These inefficiencies, or externalities, are then able to be addressed by mechanisms, including property rights and corrective taxes.[24]


Analysis of "the problem with redistribution" deals with the observed political question of how income or commodity taxes should be utilized. The theorem tells us that no taxation is Pareto-efficient and that taxation with redistribution is Pareto-inefficient. Because of this, most of the literature is focused on finding solutions where given there is a tax structure, how can the tax structure prescribe a situation where no person could be made better off by a change in available taxes.[24]

Use in biology[edit]

Pareto optimisation has also been studied in biological processes.[25] In bacteria, genes were shown to be either inexpensive to make (resource-efficient) or easier to read (translation-efficient). Natural selection acts to push highly expressed genes towards the Pareto frontier for resource use and translational efficiency.[26] Genes near the Pareto frontier were also shown to evolve more slowly (indicating that they are providing a selective advantage).[27]

Common misconceptions[edit]

It would be incorrect to treat Pareto efficiency as equivalent to societal optimization,[28] as the latter is a normative concept, which is a matter of interpretation that typically would account for the consequence of degrees of inequality of distribution.[29] An example would be the interpretation of one school district with low property tax revenue versus another with much higher revenue as a sign that more equal distribution occurs with the help of government redistribution.[30]

Criticism[edit]

Some commentators contest that Pareto efficiency could potentially serve as an ideological tool. With it implying that capitalism is self-regulated thereof, it is likely that the embedded structural problems such as unemployment would be treated as deviating from the equilibrium or norm, and thus neglected or discounted.[4]


Pareto efficiency does not require a totally equitable distribution of wealth, which is another aspect that draws in criticism.[31] An economy in which a wealthy few hold the vast majority of resources can be Pareto-efficient. A simple example is the distribution of a pie among three people. The most equitable distribution would assign one third to each person. However, the assignment of, say, a half section to each of two individuals and none to the third is also Pareto-optimal despite not being equitable, because none of the recipients could be made better off without decreasing someone else's share; and there are many other such distribution examples. An example of a Pareto-inefficient distribution of the pie would be allocation of a quarter of the pie to each of the three, with the remainder discarded.[32]


The liberal paradox elaborated by Amartya Sen shows that when people have preferences about what other people do, the goal of Pareto efficiency can come into conflict with the goal of individual liberty.[33]


Lastly, it is proposed that Pareto efficiency to some extent inhibited discussion of other possible criteria of efficiency. As Wharton School professor Ben Lockwood argues, one possible reason is that any other efficiency criteria established in the neoclassical domain will reduce to Pareto efficiency at the end.[4]

analog in decision theory

Admissible decision rule

Arrow's impossibility theorem

Bayesian efficiency

Fundamental theorems of welfare economics

Deadweight loss

Economic efficiency

Highest and best use

Kaldor–Hicks efficiency

Marginal utility

when a market result is not Pareto-optimal

Market failure

concept in order theory

Maximal element

Maxima of a point set

Multi-objective optimization

Nash equilibrium

Pareto-efficient envy-free division

for the "(weak) Pareto principle"

Social Choice and Individual Values

TOTREP

Welfare economics

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(January–June 2005). "Pareto's revenge" (PDF). Journal of Social and Economic Development. 7 (1): 1–11.

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(2004). Welfare economics towards a more complete analysis. Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780333971215.

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Rubinstein, Ariel

Mathur, Vijay K. (Spring 1991). "How well do we know Pareto optimality?". The Journal of Economic Education. 22 (2): 172–178. :10.2307/1182422. JSTOR 1182422.

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; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (January 1984). "Pareto inferior trade". The Review of Economic Studies. 51 (1): 1–12. doi:10.2307/2297701. JSTOR 2297701.

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