Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial
The Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial was heard in the Supreme Court of South Africa from 21 October 1985 to 23 June 1986. In the largest political trial since the Rivonia Trial, the apartheid state pursued charges of high treason against 16 leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and four affiliated organisations. State v Ramgobin and Others was generally regarded as a failure in both legal and political terms: the charges against 12 defendants were dropped in December 1985 and the remaining four were freed in June 1986, while the South African state received international criticism for having instituted the charges in the first place.
State v Ramgobin and Others
21 October 1985
23 June 1986
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- Mewa Ramgobin and 15 others:
- George Sewpersadh
- M. J. Naidoo
- Essop Jassat
- Aubrey Mokoena
- Curtis Nkondo
- Archie Gumede
- Paul David
- Albertina Sisulu
- Frank Chikane
- Cassim Saloojee
- Ismail Mohamed
- Thozi Gqweta
- Sisa Njikelana
- Sam Kikine
- Isaac Ngcobo
- Mewa Ramgobin and 15 others:
The 16 defendants were leaders of the UDF, the Natal Indian Congress, the Transvaal Indian Congress, the Release Mandela Committee, and the South African Allied Workers' Union. Among them were both co-presidents of the UDF, Albertina Sisulu and Archie Gumede. Also among them were five of the so-called Durban Six, who made international news in September 1984 for evading arrest by taking refuge in the British consulate in Durban. Each of the 16 was arrested in Natal or the Transvaal between August 1984 and February 1985 during the period of heightened state repression that followed UDF-led boycotts of the 1984 general election and new Tricameral Parliament.
In a 587-page indictment finally delivered in April 1985, the state alleged that the accused had, through ostensibly non-violent political acts, sought to further "a revolutionary alliance" whose aim was to incite a revolt and overthrow the government. In particular, the state sought to argue that the UDF and its affiliates were co-conspirators of the illegal African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and South African Congress of Trade Unions. Represented by Ismail Mahomed, the defendants pled not guilty to all charges. In December 1985, following damaging cross-examination of the state's star expert witness, the state announced that it would withdraw the charges against all but four of the defendants; the trial resumed in February 1986 with only the four trade unionists in the dock. The charges against them were dropped in June 1986 after Judge President John Milne ruled that key evidence was inadmissible.
Upon the conclusion of the trial, the UDF declared itself and its methods vindicated. In addition to the embarrassments suffered by the prosecution in the courtroom, the trial had been condemned by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 560 and had attracted international attention to apartheid security legislation, particularly the Internal Security Act, the law in terms of which the defendants had been arrested and charged.
Arrests: 1984–1985[edit]
The Durban Six: Spring 1984[edit]
Five of the defendants in the trial were arrested in extraordinary circumstances: on the pavement outside the British consulate in Durban, where they had taken refuge for several weeks in what became a significant diplomatic incident. There were six fugitives, known as the Durban Six: they were Archie Gumede, the co-president of the UDF; Billy Nair of the UDF executive; Mewa Ramgobin, George Sewpershad, and M. J. Naidoo of the NIC executive; and Paul David of the RMC.[5] David had evaded arrested in the August crackdown, while the five others – alongside Kader Hassim, chairman of the African Peoples' Democratic Union of Southern Africa, and Sam Kikine, general secretary of SAAWU – had been released from detention on 7 September. They had been released after an order by the Supreme Court, which found that their detention was not justified by Law and Order Minister Louis le Grange's contention that they had been trying to "create a revolutionary climate".[5] Le Grange had signed fresh detention orders soon after the court ruling and they were wanted by the police.[5][9]
The Durban Six walked into the British consulate mid-morning on 13 September, requested British protection, and were reluctantly granted leave by consular staff to remain overnight in the three-room office.[9][10] They ultimately remained on the premises for several weeks, demanding negotiations with South African authorities about their detention or the conditions thereof.[9] While the British refused to intercede on their behalf, and openly encouraged the fugitives to leave,[11] they also refused South African requests to deliver the fugitives into police custody. In retaliation, on 24 September, South Africa revoked a former promise to extradite the Coventry Four, who were wanted in Britain on arms smuggling charges.[10] The British indicated that they were considering withdrawing their ambassador from Pretoria and expelling the South African ambassador from London.[12]
During their time in the consulate, the six fugitives unsuccessfully challenged the new detention orders in the Supreme Court[10] and extended unsuccessful requests for sanctuary in the embassies of the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany.[5] On 6 October, three of the fugitives – Sewpershad, Naidoo, and Ramgobin of the NIC – voluntarily left the consulate and were immediately re-arrested on the pavement in front of the consulate.[5] Gumede, Nair, and David remained inside the consulate.
Trial: 1985–1986[edit]
Not guilty plea: October 1985[edit]
The substantive trial began on 21 October in the Supreme Court, and all of the accused pled not guilty to the charge of high treason and incitement to overthrow the government in terms of Section 54 of the Internal Security Act.[5][18] They also pled not guilty to alternative statutory charges of terrorism and supporting the aims of an illegal organisation.[5][23]
Observers widely expected a lengthy show trial, lasting over a year and involving testimony from over one hundred state's witnesses.[5][16][23] Although there was legal precedent for the treason charge to carry the death penalty,[5] the government was not expected to seek the maximum penalty:[8][15] critics claimed that the government's aim was not to win the case, but to tie up the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement, prevent them from playing a political role, and ideally disable the UDF entirely.[22][16][7] On another interpretation, the government's primary aim was the moral delegitimisation of the movement's leaders and the movement itself,[17] with defendant Cassim Saloojee latter arguing that "a whole style of protest was on trial. This trial was not simply a trial against us. It was a trial against the UDF, against mass struggle and against mass protest.''[19]
Expert testimony: December 1985[edit]
In the assessment of reporter Allister Sparks, the prosecution's case was brought to "crisis point" in early December 1985 by Mohamed's cross-examination of the state's star witness, Isaak D. de Vries, who was a doctoral student and lecturer in politics at Rand Afrikaans University.[24] De Vries, a prolific state's witness, was presented as an expert on revolutionary strategy; the prosecution's case depended on his theoretical understanding of revolution, and on his interpretation of the history of the UDF and its affiliates, to establish the existence of a so-called revolutionary alliance linking the UDF to the illegal ANC, SACP, and SACTU.[17][24]
During cross-examination, Mahomed identified factual inaccuracies in de Vries's testimony;[19] among other things, he guided de Vries to retract his claim that the NIC and TIC were committed to violent revolution and to admit that the groups were in fact guided by the non-violent philosophy of their founder, Mahatma Gandhi.[24] After Mahomed accused him of being "a theoretician who has no factual background and no expertise to make statements or assessments", de Vries, with prompting from Judge Milne, conceded that his claims could not be regarded as conclusive.[19][24] He said that he had misunderstood his role in the prosecution and had made "fundamental mistakes" in his evidence which could have misled the court.[24][25] On 5 December, the prosecution requested a two-day adjournment – the third it had taken during de Vries's testimony – to consider the implications of his admissions to the court.[24][25]
Twelve released: December 1985[edit]
On 9 December,[5] the trial resumed after the adjournment and Natal Attorney General Michael Imber announced that the state would withdraw the charges against 12 of the defendants and seek only to prosecute the four SAAWU leaders: Kikine, Njikelana, Ngocobo, and Gqweta. The state did not explain its decision.[8]
Legacy[edit]
International response[edit]
Throughout the saga – from the August 1984 arrests until the conclusion of the trial – the government faced "a storm of criticism" from abroad.[22] Indeed, on some accounts, it was public protest against UDF leaders' prolonged detention without trial that led the government to replace their preventative orders with substantive criminal charges.[11][14] But the decision to proceed with trial was also criticised, leading to the accusation that the apartheid government was "using the courts as an extension of its detention system, bringing poorly based charges against legitimate political opponents simply to put them out of action".[25]