Scientific realism

Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. A believer of scientific realism takes the universe as described by science to be true (or approximately true), because of their assertion that science can be used to find the truth (or approximate truth) about both the physical and metaphysical in the Universe.

Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism.

First, it is a set of claims about the features of an ideal ; an ideal theory is the sort of theory science aims to produce.

scientific theory

The theory of meaning—see Hempel (1950).

verificationist

Troubles with the analytic-synthetic distinction—see (1950).

Quine

The theory-ladenness of observation—see (1958) Kuhn (1970) and Quine (1960).

Hanson

Difficulties moving from the observationality of terms to observationality of sentences—see (1962).

Putnam

The vagueness of the observational-theoretical distinction—see G. Maxwell (1962).

Scientific realism is related to much older philosophical positions including rationalism and metaphysical realism. However, it is a thesis about science developed in the twentieth century. Portraying scientific realism in terms of its ancient, medieval, and early modern cousins is at best misleading.

Scientific realism is developed largely as a reaction to logical positivism. Logical positivism was the first philosophy of science in the twentieth century and the forerunner of scientific realism, holding that a sharp distinction can be drawn between theoretical terms and observational terms, the latter capable of semantic analysis in observational and logical terms.

Logical positivism encountered difficulties with:

These difficulties for logical positivism suggest, but do not entail, scientific realism, and led to the development of realism as a philosophy of science.

Realism became the dominant philosophy of science after positivism.^[2]^: 70 Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image (1980) developed constructive empiricism as an alternative to realism. He argues against scientific realism that scientific theories do not aim for truth about unobservable entities.^[3] Responses to van Fraassen have sharpened realist positions and led to some revisions of scientific realism.

Anti-realism

Constructivist epistemology

Critical realism (philosophy of perception)

Dialectical materialism

Instrumentalism

Musgrave's scientific realism

Naïve realism

Pessimistic induction

Scientific materialism

Scientific perspectivism

Social constructionism

Boyd, R. N. (1988). "How to Be A Moral Realist", in G. Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism, , pp. 181–228.

Cornell University Press

. (2006). Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism. Toronto Studies in Philosophy: University of Toronto Press

Bunge, Mario

Bunge, Mario. (2001). Scientific Realism: Selected Essays of Mario Bunge. Mahner, M. (Ed.) New York: Prometheus Books

Devitt, Michael, "Scientific realism". In: Oxford handbook of contemporary analytic philosophy (2005)

Hempel, Carl. (1950). "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" in Boyd, Richard et al. eds. (1990). The Philosophy of Science Cambridge: MIT Press..

Hunt, Shelby D. (2003). "Controversy in Marketing Theory: For Reason, Realism, Truth, and Objectivity." Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Hunt Shelby D. (2011). "Theory Status, Inductive Realism, And Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25(2), 159–178.

Kukla, A. (2000). Social constructivism and the philosophy of science. London: Routledge.

Kuhn, Thomas. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Laudan, Larry. (1981). "A Confutation of Convergent Realism" Philosophy of Science

Leplin, Jarrett. (1984). Scientific Realism. California: University of California Press.

Leplin, Jarrett. (1997). A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lipton, Peter. (2004). Inference to the best explanation, 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities" in and G. Maxwell Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time vol. 3, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3-15.

H. Feigl

(2023). "Touching Reality". A critique of scientific realism in the context of cosmology.

Merritt, D.

Okasha, Samir. (2002). Philosophy of science: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See especially chapter 4, "Realism and Anti-Realism."

Putnam, Hilary. (1962). "What Theories are Not" in Ernst Nagel et al. (1962). Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Stanford University Press.

Psillos, Stathis. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.

Quine, W.V.O. (1951). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in his (1953). From a Logical Point of View Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[1]

Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Word and Object

Sankey, H. (2001). "Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defense" retrieved from