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Sweden during World War II

Sweden maintained its policy of neutrality during World War II. When the war began on 1 September 1939, the fate of Sweden was unclear. But by a combination of its geopolitical location in the Scandinavian Peninsula, realpolitik maneuvering during an unpredictable course of events, and a dedicated military build-up after 1942, Sweden kept its official neutrality status throughout the war. At the outbreak of hostilities, Sweden had held a neutral stance in international relations for more than a century, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 and the invasion of Norway.[1]

At the outbreak of war in September 1939, twenty European nations were neutral. Sweden was one of only nine of these nations to maintain this stance for the remainder of the war, along with Ireland, Portugal,[2] Spain,[3] Switzerland, and the microstates of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Vatican City, and San Marino. The Swedish Government made a few concessions, and sometimes breached the nation's neutrality in favor of both Germany and, later, the Western Allies.


During the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June–July 1941), Sweden allowed the Wehrmacht to use Swedish railways to transport the German 163rd Infantry Division along with heavy weapons from Norway to Finland. Until 1943, German soldiers traveling on leave between Norway and Germany were allowed passage through Sweden—the so-called permittenttrafik. Iron ore was sold to Germany throughout the war and Germany owned several mines in Sweden that had been bought by German companies before the outbreak of the war. These mines were called Tyskgruvorna ("German mines"). For the Allies, Sweden shared military intelligence and helped to train soldier refugees from Denmark and Norway, to be used in the liberation of their home countries.[4] It also allowed the Allies to use Swedish airbases between 1944 and 1945.


Swedish neutrality remains a subject of debate. Proponents argue that during the war, Sweden softened its policy against accepting refugees, admitting thousands of Jews and political dissenters from Norway and Denmark. Conversely, opponents such as Winston Churchill suggest that Sweden "ignored the greater moral issues of the war and played both sides for profit".[5]

Background[edit]

Political[edit]

Between 1523 and Sweden's final war with Russia in 1809, a state of war had existed between these two countries for 67 out of those 286 years. Russia was seen as the historical hereditary enemy of Sweden. In the peace that followed the Finnish War in 1809, all of Finland had been ceded to Russia and Sweden was reduced to two thirds of its former size.


As the end of the 19th century approached, and the beginning of the 20th began, Sweden, like many other nations, became beset by strikes and public disorder. Appalling working conditions were no longer tolerated and the working class was rising against the state. In 1908 alone, there were about 300 strikes in Sweden.[6] By 1917, Sweden's need for a new political system was apparent from these riots. Sweden had remained neutral during World War One but with a tendency to side with the Central Powers. Since the 1880s, the socialist movement in Sweden had been divided into two opposing groups: the revolutionary socialists, a communist movement; and the reformists, a social democratic movement – the latter of which being the larger of the two. In 1917, the rules of democracy were changed in Sweden, the electorate's size grew and in 1921, women were also allowed to vote.

135,402 rifles, 347 machine guns, and 450 light machine guns with 50,013,300 rounds of small arms ammunition

144 field guns, 100 and 92 anti-tank guns with 301,846 shells

anti-aircraft guns

300 and 500 depth charges

naval mines

17 fighter aircraft, five light bombers, one transport aircraft turned into a bomber, and three reconnaissance aircraft

DC-2

Concessions[edit]

To Nazi Germany[edit]

Perhaps the most important aspect of Sweden's concessions to Germany during the Second World War was the extensive export of iron ore for use in the German weapons industry, reaching ten million tons per year. As Germany's preparations for war became more apparent and the risk of another war became obvious, international interest in Swedish iron ore increased. At the time, British intelligence had estimated that German industry relied heavily on Swedish iron ore and a decrease or halt in Swedish ore exports could have a disastrous effect on Germany's military efforts. Sir Ralph Glyn, a British Member of Parliament, claimed that a cessation of Swedish iron ore exports would bring the war to an end within months.[51][52] Winston Churchill himself said the following about the Swedish ore exports in an internal memo to the cabinet discussing the Norwegian trade route with shipments of Swedish iron ore.

Diplomatic history of World War II

Military equipment of Sweden during World War II

Neutral powers during World War II

Nordische Gesellschaft

Skirmish at Sövde

Carlgren, W. M. Swedish foreign policy during the Second World War (London: E. Benn, 1977)

Fritz, Martin. The Adaptable Nation: essays in Swedish economy during the Second World War (Göteborg: Ekonomisk-historiska inst., Univ.: 1982)

Gilmour, John. Sweden, the Swastika, and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second World War (2011)

online

Levine Paul A. "Swedish neutrality during the Second World War: tactical success or moral compromise?" in Wylie, Neville, European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Levine, Paul A. From indifference to activism: Swedish diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–1944 (Uppsala: Univ.: 1996)

Ludlow, Peter. "Britain and Northern Europe 1940–1945", Scandinavian Journal of History (1979) 4: 123–62

Ross, John (1989). Neutrality and International Sanctions. New York: Praeger.  978-0-275-93349-4.

ISBN

Scott, Carl-Gustaf (2002). "The Swedish Midsummer Crisis of 1941: The Crisis that Never Was". Journal of Contemporary History. 37 (3): 371–394. :10.1177/00220094020370030301. OCLC 196909719. S2CID 159896889.

doi

Wahlbäck, Krister. "Sweden: Secrecy and Neutrality", Journal of Contemporary History (1967) 2#1

Ziemke, Earl F. (1960). . Command Decisions. United States. Dept. of the Army. Office of Military History. ISBN 978-1519745088. OCLC 1518217. Archived from the original on 30 December 2007. Retrieved 20 June 2009.

"The German Decision To Invade Norway and Denmark"