Unconventional warfare (United States)
In US military doctrine, unconventional warfare (abbreviated UW) is one of the core activities of irregular warfare. Unconventional warfare is essentially support provided by the military to a foreign insurgency or resistance. The legal definition of UW is:
Main articles: Unconventional warfare, Insurgency, United States Special Operations Command, and United States Army Special Forces
In 1998, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, then USSOCOM commander and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Robert E. Kelley "Unconventional warfare is not a viable mission for Special Forces. The only reason you train for unconventional warfare is because it is the best vehicle for maintaining your Special Forces skill set." Kelley also cites the October 1997 Army Special Forces Vision XXI as saying "Dissident elements are the key to UW mission potential in any region. As long as there are dissidents, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interest."[2]
Gen. Schoomaker, however, did use the term global scouts to describe the role that Special Forces have in "preparing the battlefield" before regular forces enter it. While the later stages of UN operations in Somalia suffered from overly ambitious goals resulting in the Battle of Mogadishu, SF teams preceded the United States Marine Corps unit that formed the first overt assistance force, and made contact with various clans whose cooperation was needed. Such contact falls into the early parts of the UW operational model, without moving into combat phases. Other than special reconnaissance, such information collection is not now listed as a basic SF mission. Kelley suggests that the SF UW doctrine be revised to include just such activity:
Kelley concluded that UW remains a viable mission, but the doctrine for it, as of 2000, is outdated. It has been relatively rare that U.S. forces, since World War II, actually trained and led a guerrilla force. They did so in Laos, but, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, they supported an existing rebel force. For example, UW missions were sometimes initiated by paramilitary personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, sometimes with SF personnel on clandestine detail to the CIA. See CIA activities in Laos. Eventually, these UW forces came back under U.S. Army control. Later in the Vietnam War, SF-led units conducted offensive actions against opponents on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other infiltration paths. Increasingly, SF personnel took on other missions, principally SR and DA.
In 1990–91, the UW mission supported intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversion by the Kuwaiti underground. UW had a major role, in 2001, of supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. UW experience is more of support to intelligence collection, subversion and sabotage by insurgents, and less one of direct combat through raids and ambushes. Current doctrine allows both; there may need to be a change of emphasis.
Support to the UW force[edit]
Strike support[edit]
In the organization chart, there is a dotted line to the UCC air command, which normally controls both Air Force and Navy aircraft in the region, and may have air assets based in the U.S. detailed to them. The military staff of the guerrilla government might, assuming U.S. involvement is known, request a U.S. air strike on some target that the guerrillas cannot destroy, or perhaps even reach. Such strikes are not a panacea, as an air strike with civilian casualties will turn the essential political dynamic against the guerrilla force.
Communications[edit]
Communications security is critical. New Special Forces software-defined radios, such as the AN/PRC-148 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Inter/Intra Team Radio (JITR)[20] are easily portable, secure and flexible, but capture of such a unit, in the early phases of an operation, confirms U.S. involvement. Tactical radios used internally by the UW force are even more vulnerable to capture. When U.S. involvement is known, however, the latest technology is routinely used.
As a consequence, SF communications specialists must be competent with old but deniable radio communications, including those using Morse Code or field-improvised antennas in the high frequency (HF) range.
Intelligence support to UW forces[edit]
All levels of SF operational detachment have some intelligence collection and analysis capability. Where appropriate, SF has two standing types of teams for intelligence augmentation, one for SIGINT/secure communication and one for counterintelligence. The SF SIGINT unit is the Support Operations Team-Alpha.[21]
Sensitive intelligence sources and methods may not be shared, although the information learned through these sources and methods will be shared. This is not a U.S.-only rule; while the U.S. may not share the details of technical methods such as SIGINT, the guerrilla government may have extremely sensitive information sources. During the Vietnam War, for example, the general U.S. rule was that Vietnamese allies could see only SIGINT information that had a SECRET or lower classification, and that did not carry the additional restriction "handle through COMINT channels only".[22]
Logistics[edit]
Logistical support for all U.S. special operations come from two lines of command: USSOCOM provides "SO-peculiar support to SOF units worldwide." An example of SO-peculiar support would be providing Soviet-bloc ammunition if the guerrillas already have weapons that need it. The UCC commander, however, has overall responsibility for all joint support in his theater.[23] The JSOTF logistics officer (J-4) is responsible for using the extraordinary procurement mechanisms legislatively authorized for USSOCOM,[24] and making sure they are used appropriately.
Note that dotted lines run from the underground and auxiliary to Navy and Air special operations units under the UCC Special Operations commander. These indicate that resupply might be brought in by sea or air, and the UW force will use other than the guerrilla force to receive them.[25] Indeed, the guerrillas might make a diversionary attack to draw attention from the logistics or other vulnerable operation.
SF commands, at battalion and above, have service detachments, tailored to specific missions.[26] The SF support detachment has the responsibility for delivering supplies to the UW units in the field, by means specific to the situation, ranging from clandestine parachuting to armed conventional convoy crossing to the AO.
Title 10 United States Code, Section 167, vests the SOCOM commander with the responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services—items needed for SO activities; for which there is no service-common requirement; or which the SOCOM commander deems as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of an SO activity.[27]
Supplies may be provided by the host nation or private companies within it, if such acquisition is consistent with operational security and mission-specific requirements. This function is centralized under the JSOTF J-4, but civil affairs personnel may provide the actual interface to local providers.[23]