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Battle of Grozny (1999–2000)

The 1999–2000 battle of Grozny was the siege and assault of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces, lasting from late 1999 to early 2000. This siege and assault of the Chechen capital resulted in the widespread devastation of Grozny. In 2003, the United Nations designated Grozny as the most destroyed city on Earth due to the extensive damage it suffered. The battle had a devastating impact on the civilian population. It is estimated that between 5,000[5] and 8,000[6] civilians were killed during the siege, making it the bloodiest episode of the Second Chechen War.

Prelude[edit]

On 15 October 1999, after mounting an intense tank and artillery barrage against Chechen separatists, Russian forces took control of a strategic ridge within artillery range of Grozny. They then made several abortive attempts to seize positions on the outskirts of the city. On 4 December, the commander of Russian forces in the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, claimed that Grozny was fully blockaded by Russian troops. General Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the army's general staff, even predicted the rebels would abandon the Chechen capital on their own, urged to withdraw by civilians fearing widespread destruction.[7] Supported by the Russian Air Force, the Russian forces vastly outnumbered and out-gunned the Chechen irregulars, who numbered around 3,000 fighters, and was considerably larger and much better prepared than the force sent to take the Chechen capital in the First Chechen War.

Tactics[edit]

Russian forces[edit]

The Russian tactic in 1999 was to hold back tanks and armored personnel carriers and subject the entrenched Chechens to an intensive heavy artillery barrage and aerial bombardment before engaging them with relatively small groups of infantry, many with prior training in urban warfare. The Russian forces relied heavily on rocket artillery such as BM-21 Grad,[8] BM-27 Uragan, BM-30 Smerch, ballistic missiles (SCUD, OTR-21 Tochka), cluster bombs[9] and fuel air explosives. (The TOS-1, a multiple rocket launcher with thermobaric weapon warheads, played a particularly prominent role in the assault). These weapons wore down the Chechens, both physically and psychologically, and air strikes were also used to attack fighters hiding in basements; such attacks were designed for maximum psychological pressure. They would also demonstrate the hopelessness of further resistance against a foe that could strike with impunity and that was invulnerable to countermeasures. In November, the Kremlin appointed Beslan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, as head of the pro-Moscow Chechen State Council. Gantamirov had just been pardoned by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and released from a 6-year prison sentence which he had been serving for embezzling federal funds which had been earmarked for the rebuilding of Chechnya in 1995 and 1996. He was chosen to lead a pro-Russian Chechen militia force in the upcoming battle. Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo however refused to supply the militia with heavy weapons, limiting their combat arsenal to "obsolete AK-47s" and accused Gantamirov of accepting anyone who would volunteer, including rebel fighters.[10] The militia, often used to spearhead the federal forces, suffered heavy casualties, losing more than 700 men in the battle.

Chechen fighters[edit]

The Russians met fierce resistance from Chechen rebel fighters intimately familiar with their capital city. The defenders had chosen to withstand the heavy Russian bombardment for the chance to come to grips with their enemy in an environment of their choosing, using interconnected firing positions and maneuver warfare. In stark contrast to the ad hoc defense of 1994, the separatists prepared well for the Russian assault. Grozny was transformed into a fortress city under the leadership of field commander Aslambek Ismailov. The Chechens dug hundreds of trenches and antitank ditches, built bunkers behind apartment buildings, laid land mines throughout the city, placed sniper nests on high-rise buildings and prepared escape routes. In some instances whole buildings were booby-trapped; the ground floor windows and doors were usually boarded-up or mined, making it impossible for the Russians to simply walk into a building. Relying on their high mobility (they usually did not use body armor because of lack of equipment), the Chechens would use the trenches to move between houses and sniper positions, engaging the Russians as they focused on the tops of buildings or on windows. Well-organized small groups of no more than 15 fighters moved freely about Grozny using the city's sewer network, even sneaking behind Russian lines and attacking from the rear.

Breakout[edit]

With their supply routes interdicted by an increasingly effective Russian blockade, ammunition running low and their losses mounting, the Chechen rebel leadership decided that resistance was futile. At a meeting in a bunker in central Grozny the rebel commanders decided on a desperate gamble to break through the three layers of Russian forces and into the mountains. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov had been evacuated earlier to a secret headquarters somewhere in the south of Chechnya. About 1,000–1,500 fighters under field commander Ruslan Gelayev withdrew without orders, leaving other rebel forces exposed.


The main Chechen forces began to escape on the last day of January and first day of February during a winter storm, after an attempt to bribe their way out. A reconnaissance party they sent ahead failed to return but the commanders decided to leave anyway.[28] Some 4,000[29] rebel fighters and some civilians,[30] moving in a southwesterly direction, were met with heavy artillery fire. The column of some 2,000 fighters, several hundred non-combatants and 50 Russian prisoners of war, entered a minefield between the city and the village of Alkhan-Kala. The Russian forces ambushed them as they were crossing a bridge over the Sunzha River and bombarded them with artillery. The Chechens pushed on through the minefield, being unaware of it and lacking engineers.[28] Scores of rebel fighters were killed by the combination of artillery fire and the crossing of the minefield, including several top Chechen commanders: Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov, the city's mayor Lecha Dudayev and Aslambek Ismailov, the commander of the defense of Grozny. The rebels said they lost about 400 fighters in the minefield at Alkhan-Kala,[31] including 170 killed. About 200 of the wounded were maimed, including Abdul-Malik Mezhidov and Shamil Basayev, (the latter stepping on a mine while leading his men).[32] In all, there were at least 600 casualties during the escape. Russian generals initially refused to admit that the Chechens had escaped from the blockaded city, saying that fierce fighting continued within the city. President Vladimir Putin's aide and the Russian government's spokesman on Chechnya Sergei Yastrzhembsky, said that if the rebels abandoned Grozny, "we would have informed you".[33] Gen. Viktor Kazantsev asserted that as many as 500 rebels were killed during the breakout.[34]


After some fighting on the outskirts of the village, Alkhan-Kala itself was hit by OTR-21 Tochka tactical missiles tipped with cluster munition warheads, killing or wounding many civilians.[35] The rebels moved on, but a number of wounded fighters, including Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, were left in the local hospital and were captured by the Russians. On 4 February, Russian forces, allegedly attempting to stop the Chechens from any further retreat, bombed the village of Katyr-Yurt. Up to 20,000 refugees desperately fled an intense bombardment that lasted for two days and killed hundreds of civilians, including the bombing of a civilian convoy which had been trying to leave the settlement during a lull in the fighting.[36] A rebel post-operative war council was held in the village of Alkhan-Yurt, where it was decided that the Chechen forces would withdraw into the inaccessible Vedeno and Argun gorges in the southern mountains to carry on a guerrilla campaign against the Russians. The rebels then withdrew into the mountains.

Battle of Grozny (disambiguation)

1999 Grozny refugee convoy shooting

Russian war crimes

Siege of Mariupol

Jenkinson, Brett C. (2002). (PDF). United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.

"Tactical Observations from the Grozny Combat Experience"

"The Hunter, The Hammer and Heaven" "The Hammer is a first hand account of Pelton's journey into Grozny in December 1999. Pelton interviewed the captured Russian GRU officer Aleksey Galkin and all of the top Chechen commanders including President Aslan Maskhadov.

Robert Young Pelton

Return to Grozny: 1999–2000