Battle of Navarino
The Battle of Navarino was a naval battle fought on 20 October (O. S. 8 October) 1827, during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829), in Navarino Bay (modern Pylos), on the west coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, in the Ionian Sea. Allied forces from Britain, France, and Russia decisively defeated Ottoman and Egyptian forces which were trying to suppress the Greeks, thereby making Greek independence much more likely. An Ottoman armada which, in addition to Imperial warships, included squadrons from the eyalets of Egypt and Tunis,[a] was destroyed by an Allied force of British, French and Russian warships. It was the last major naval battle in history to be fought entirely with sailing ships, although most ships fought at anchor. The Allies' victory was achieved through superior firepower and gunnery.
The context of the three Great Powers' intervention in the Greek conflict was the Russian Empire's long-running expansion at the expense of the decaying Ottoman Empire. Russia's ambitions in the region were seen as a major geostrategic threat by the other European powers, which feared the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. The precipitating factor was support of elements in Orthodox Russia for Greek coreligionists, despite the opposition of Tsar Alexander in 1821 following the Greek rebellion against their Ottoman overlords. Similarly, despite official British interest in maintaining the Ottoman Empire, British public opinion strongly supported the Greeks. Fearing unilateral Russian action, Britain and France bound Russia, by treaty, to a joint intervention which aimed to secure Greek autonomy, whilst still preserving Ottoman territorial integrity as a check on Russia.
The Powers agreed, by the Treaty of London (1827), to force the Ottoman government to grant the Greeks autonomy within the empire and despatched naval squadrons to the Eastern Mediterranean to enforce their policy. The naval battle happened more by accident than by design as a result of a manoeuvre by the Allied commander-in-chief, Admiral Edward Codrington, aimed at coercing the Ottoman commander to obey Allied instructions. The sinking of the Ottomans' Mediterranean fleet saved the fledgling Greek Republic from collapse. But it required two more military interventions, by Russia in the form of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29 and a French expeditionary force to the Peloponnese to force the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from central and southern Greece, to finally secure Greek independence.
Background[edit]
The Ottoman Turks had conquered the Greek-controlled Byzantine empire during the 15th century, taking over its territory and its capital, Constantinople, and becoming its effective successor-state.[3] In 1821, Greek nationalists revolted against the Ottomans, aiming to liberate ethnic Greeks from four centuries of Ottoman rule.[4] Fighting raged for several years but by 1825, a stalemate had developed, with the Greeks unable to drive the Ottomans out of most of Greece, but the Ottomans were unable to crush the revolt definitively. However, in 1825, the Sultan succeeded in breaking the stalemate. He persuaded his powerful wali (viceroy) of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, who was technically his vassal but in practice autonomous, to deploy his Western-trained and equipped army and navy against the Greeks. In return, the Sultan promised to grant the rebel heartland, the Peloponnese, as a hereditary fief to Ali's eldest son, Ibrahim. In February 1825, Ibrahim led an expeditionary force of 16,000 into the Peloponnese, and soon overran its western part; he failed, however, to take the eastern section, where the rebel government was based (at Nafplion).[5]
The Greek revolutionaries remained defiant, and appointed experienced philhellenic British officers at the head of the army and fleet: Maj Sir Richard Church (land) and Lord Cochrane (sea). By this time however, the Greek provisional government's land and sea forces were far inferior to those of the Ottomans and Egyptians: in 1827, Greek regular troops numbered less than 5,000, compared to 25,000 Ottomans in central Greece and 15,000 Egyptians in the Peloponnese. Also, the Greek government was virtually bankrupt. Many of the key fortresses on what little territory it controlled were in Ottoman hands. It seemed only a matter of time before the Greeks were forced to capitulate.[6] At this critical juncture, the Greek cause was rescued by the decision of three Great Powers—Great Britain, France and Russia—to intervene jointly in the conflict.
Diplomacy of the Great Powers[edit]
From the inception of the Greek revolt until 1826, Anglo-Austrian diplomatic efforts were aimed at ensuring the non-intervention of the other great powers in the conflict.[7] Their objective was to stall Russian military intervention in support of the Greeks, in order to give the Ottomans time to defeat the rebellion.[8] However, the Ottomans proved unable to suppress the revolt during the long period of non-intervention secured by Anglo-Austrian diplomacy. By the time the Ottomans were making serious progress, the situation evolved in ways that would make non-interventionism untenable. In December 1825, the diplomatic landscape changed with the death of Tsar Alexander and the succession of his younger brother Nicholas I to the Russian throne. Nicholas was a more decisive and risk-taking character than his brother, as well as being far more nationalistic. The British government's response to the evolving situation was to move towards joint intervention instead to limit Russian expansionism. Britain, France, and Russia signed the Treaty of London on 6 July 1827. The treaty called for an immediate armistice between the belligerents, in effect demanding a cessation of Ottoman military operations in Greece just when the Ottomans had victory in their grasp. It also offered Allied mediation in the negotiations on a final settlement that were to follow the armistice.[9] The treaty called on the Ottomans to grant Greece a degree of autonomy, but envisaged it ultimately remaining under Ottoman suzerainty.[10]
A secret clause in the agreement provided that if the Ottomans failed to accept the armistice within a month, each signatory Power would despatch a consul to Nafplion, the capital of the Hellenic Republic, thereby granting de facto recognition to the rebel government, something no Power had done hitherto.[11] The same clause authorized the signatories in concert to instruct their naval commanders in the Mediterranean to "take all measures that circumstances may suggest" (i.e. including military action) to enforce the Allied demands, if the Ottomans failed to comply within the specified time limit. However, the clause added that Allied commanders should not take sides in the conflict.[12] On 20 August 1827, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral of the Blue Sir Edward Codrington, a veteran of 44 years at sea and a popular hero for his role in the Battle of Trafalgar, received his government's instructions regarding enforcement of the treaty. Codrington could not have been a less suitable person for a task which required great tact. An impetuous fighting sailor, he entirely lacked diplomatic finesse, a quality he despised and derisively ascribed to his French counterpart, Henri de Rigny. He was also a sympathiser with the Greek cause, having subscribed to the London Philhellenic Committee.[13]
Codrington controversy[edit]
In the aftermath of Navarino, Codrington pressed for an Egyptian withdrawal from the Peloponnese, but it took a year to achieve it. The news of Navarino made Codrington a hero twice over in the eyes of the general British public. But in Whitehall, senior naval and diplomatic echelons were appalled by the outcome of his campaign. It was considered that Codrington had grossly exceeded his instructions by provoking a showdown with the Ottoman fleet, and that his actions had gravely compromised the Ottoman ability to resist Russian encroachment. At a social event, King George IV was reported as referring to the battle as "this untoward [i.e., undesirable] event". Codrington's political situation in London became even more precarious in January 1828, when Wellington became Prime Minister. The coincident launch of Tsar Nicholas's war on the Ottomans realised the worst fears of British policy-makers and deepened their anger at Codrington.
Initially, official disapproval of Codrington had to be restrained because of the admiral's huge popularity with the public. The Admiralty's revenge took petty form, such as its refusal, despite repeated requests by Codrington, to pay his crews their traditional prize money from the sale of captured Ottoman treasure and goods. Meanwhile, Wellington was biding his time until he felt it was politically safe to remove Codrington from the Mediterranean theatre. Finally, in June 1828, the Admiralty announced that Codrington was being relieved of his command (although he remained in acting-command until his replacement arrived in August). Although the King felt obliged by public opinion to grant Codrington the high honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath, the Admiralty's failure to give him another operational command in his remaining decade of service was eloquent testimony to his fall from favour.
Codrington spent much time in his later years defending his actions in Greece. His enemies accused him of deliberately plotting the destruction of the Ottoman fleet because of his Hellenophile sympathies, a charge that Codrington vehemently denied. The issue turned on whether he knew that his move into Navarino Bay would result in a battle. The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there are Codrington's clear orders to his captains to engage only if attacked. On the other, is Codrington's private correspondence, notably to his sister, which suggests that he regarded a military showdown as inevitable.[53]