Continental philosophy
Continental philosophy is a term used to describe some philosophers and philosophical traditions that do not fall under the umbrella of analytic philosophy. However, there is no academic consensus on the definition of continental philosophy. Prior to the twentieth century, the term "continental" was used broadly to refer to philosophy from continental Europe.[1][2] A different use of the term originated among English-speaking philosophers in the second half of the 20th century, who used it to refer to a range of thinkers and traditions outside the analytic movement.[3] Continental philosophy includes German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School as well as branches of Freudian, Hegelian and Western Marxist views.[4] There is widespread influence and debate between the analytic and continental traditions; some philosophers see the differences between the two traditions as being based on institutions, relationships, and ideology rather than anything of significant philosophical substance.[5][6]
"Continental Philosophy" redirects here. For the 2005 book by William R. Schroeder, see Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach.The term continental philosophy lacks clear definition and may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views; Hans-Johann Glock has made a similar argument for analytic philosophy.[6] Simon Glendinning has suggested that the term “continental philosophy” was originally more pejorative than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers.[7] Nonetheless, Michael E. Rosen has ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.[8] The themes proposed by Michael E. Rosen derive from a broadly Kantian thesis that knowledge, experience, and reality are bound and shaped by conditions best understood through philosophical reflection rather than exclusively empirical inquiry.[9]