Contras
The Contras (from Spanish: la contrarrevolución, lit. 'the counter-revolution') were the various U.S.-backed and funded right-wing rebel groups that were active from 1979 to 1990 in opposition to the Marxist Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction Government in Nicaragua, which had come to power in 1979 following the Nicaraguan Revolution.[2][3] Among the separate contra groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) emerged as the largest by far. In 1987, virtually all Contra organizations were united, at least nominally, into the Nicaraguan Resistance.
Contras
Adolfo Calero
Enrique Bermúdez
FDN – Commandante Franklin
ARDE Frente Sur – Cúpula of 6 Regional Commandantes
YATAMA – Commandante Blas
Misura – Steadman Fagoth
1979–1990
All rural areas of Nicaragua with the exclusion of the Pacific Coast, from Río Coco in the north to Río San Juan in the south
125,000
Major operations at La Trinidad, Rama highway, and Siunalatisha and Bonanza. Numerous government bases overrun throughout Jinotega, Matagalpa, Zelaya Norte, Zelaya Sur, Chontales, and Río San Juan provinces.
During their war against the Nicaraguan government, there were numerous examples of Contras committing human rights violations and using terrorist tactics.[4][5][6][7][8][9][10] Many of these actions were reported to be carried out systematically as a part of the strategy of the Contras. Supporters of the Contras tried to downplay these violations, particularly the Reagan administration in the U.S., which engaged in a campaign of white propaganda to alter public opinion in favor of the Contras,.[11] The Global Terrorism Database reports that Contras carried out more than 1,300 terrorist attacks.[12]
From an early stage, the rebels received financial and military support from the United States government, and their military significance decisively depended on it. After U.S. support was banned by Congress, the Reagan administration covertly continued it. These illegal activities culminated in the Iran–Contra affair.
Military successes and election of Violeta Chamorro[edit]
By 1986 the contras were besieged by charges of corruption, human-rights abuses, and military ineptitude.[104] A much-vaunted early 1986 offensive never materialized, and Contra forces were largely reduced to isolated acts of terrorism.[6] In October 1987, however, the contras staged a successful attack in southern Nicaragua.[105] Then on 21 December 1987, the FDN launched attacks at Bonanza, Siuna, and Rosita in Zelaya province, resulting in heavy fighting.[106] ARDE Frente Sur attacked at El Almendro and along the Rama road.[106][107][108] These large-scale raids mainly became possible as the contras were able to use U.S.-provided Redeye missiles against Sandinista Mi-24 helicopter gunships, which had been supplied by the Soviets.[106][109] Nevertheless, the Contras remained tenuously encamped within Honduras and were not able to hold Nicaraguan territory.[110][111]
There were isolated protests among the population against the draft implemented by the Sandinista government, which even resulted in full-blown street clashes in Masaya in 1988.[112] However, a June 1988 survey in Managua showed the Sandinista government still enjoyed strong support but that support had declined since 1984. Three times as many people identified with the Sandinistas (28%) than with all the opposition parties put together (9%); 59% did not identify with any political party. Of those polled, 85% opposed any further US aid to the Contras; 40% believed the Sandinista government to be democratic, while 48% believed it to be not democratic. People identified the war as the largest problem but were less likely to blame it for economic problems compared to a December 1986 poll; 19% blamed the war and US blockade as the main cause of economic problems while 10% blamed the government.[113] Political opposition groups were splintered and the Contras began to experience defections, although United States aid maintained them as a viable military force.[114][115]
After a cutoff in U.S. military support, and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict, the contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN. With the help of five Central American Presidents, including Ortega, the sides agreed that a voluntary demobilization of the contras should start in early December 1989. They chose this date to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 (even though the Reagan administration had pushed for a delay of contra disbandment).[116]
In the resulting February 1990 elections, Violeta Chamorro and her party the UNO won an upset victory of 55% to 41% over Daniel Ortega.[117] Opinion polls leading up to the elections divided along partisan lines, with 10 of 17 polls analyzed in a contemporary study predicting an UNO victory while seven predicted the Sandinistas would retain power.[118][119]
Possible explanations include that the Nicaraguan people were disenchanted with the Ortega government as well as the fact that already in November 1989, the White House had announced that the economic embargo against Nicaragua would continue unless Violeta Chamorro won.[120] Also, there had been reports of intimidation from the side of the contras,[121] with a Canadian observer mission claiming that 42 people were killed by the contras in "election violence" in October 1989.[122] Sandinistas were also accused of intimidation and abuses during the election campaign. According to the Puebla Institute, by mid-December 1989, seven opposition leaders had been murdered, 12 had disappeared, 20 had been arrested, and 30 others assaulted. In late January 1990, the OAS observer team reported that "a convoy of troops attacked four truckloads of UNO sympathizers with bayonets and rifle butts, threatening to kill them."[123] This led many commentators to conclude that Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas out of fear of a continuation of the contra war and economic deprivation.[119]