Evolution[edit]
Although the theory was not officially addressed in academia until the past half-century, the benefits of a diversionary foreign policy had long been accepted by governments and others as conventional wisdom.[7]
In 1956, Simmel and Lewis A. Coser both published work applying the in-group/out-group psychology hypothesis towards International Relations. Essentially, their work postulated that populations of nations increase their cohesion during times of conflict with an out-group (another nation, organization, etc.).[3] This often includes rallying around the country's leader. As an example, President George W. Bush's approval ratings soared to 80% following the attacks on September 11, 2001. This type of response suggests that leaders have an incentive to manufacture conflict whenever they are in the need of a boost of popularity. However, a 2022 study found that, using similar logic, presidents receive similar approval boosts when terminating a conflict.[8] This lessens the cynicism required for most theories of diversionary foreign policy and shows evidence of another tool presidents can, and may, use for diversionary purposes.
From this assertion, scholars have used this conventional wisdom to expand and test the theory's true applications.[7] A significant number of studies have attempted to establish connections between the instigation of war as a way to divert attention from a struggling economy, or general low approval ratings.[3] In addition, the theory has diverged into contemporary and traditional perspectives.
Conditions that lead to diversionary foreign policy[edit]
The purpose of diversionary foreign policy is to divert the attention of the public away from domestic issues. This means that the conditions leading to diversionary tactics include any sort of domestic unrest. This incorporates dissatisfaction with domestic policies and poor economic conditions. The theory predicts that the use of external force will increase the chance of reelection, so it would be used during a time when the president does not seem to have a good chance of reelection. The necessary conditions of the opposing state differ based on which theory one ascribes to, traditional or contemporary. The traditional view of diversionary foreign policy suggests that a state will target another in which conflict is likely to be prolonged, which would be against states with comparable military capabilities. According to this point of view, the prospect of victory is not the most important aspect in choosing an enemy because it is based on a sociological "in-group/out-group" perspective. This refers to the increase of cohesion among the "in-group" because of the common enemy or "out-group". On the other hand, contemporary diversionary theory states that, due to the uncertainty of international relations and the high cost of war, a state is more likely to prey on a weaker state where victory will be more quickly and easily obtained.[9] Overall, diversionary foreign policy is more likely seen in a major power because they are less constrained by the international community. It is also seen more in democracies where the government needs to be more responsive to public sentiment.[10] Election cycles have a lot to do with diversionary wars because a war ideally increases the chance that the incumbent administration will remain.[6]
Impact on international relation approaches[edit]
Challenges to realism and liberalism[edit]
The focus of the Diversionary War theory on individual state actors and their domestic situations as causes for war challenges the basis of major approaches to International Relations. Many of these International Relation theories used by scholars, such as liberalism and realism, focus on states as the main actors in the international system. Technically, this is referred to as using the interstate level of analysis. These scholars attribute the motives and actions of states to the states themselves, instead of the decision makers inside their governments.[4]
On the other hand, the use of diversionary foreign policy suggests that factors inside of a state, such as domestic disputes and economic lows, have as much of an impact on foreign policy as national interests. As a result, examinations of the use of diversionary wars shift the study of International Relations away from the interstate level of analysis, toward the domestic level of analysis, and even the individual level of analysis.[18] In fact, many critics of realism use examples of the use of diversionary wars as a means to discredit the theory.[10] However, modern approaches to realism, such as neoclassical realism, regard domestic politics as a crucial variable in foreign policy. This means the diversionary foreign policy thesis does in fact fit within the neoclassical realist framework.
Criticism and problems with the theory[edit]
As with most theories there are disagreements among experts regarding diversionary wars. Diversionary foreign policy is supported by anecdotal evidence because it is hard to prove a theory in international relations quantitatively. When quantitative or empirical tests are attempted, the results are fairly ambiguous and there is not enough consistency among various findings to establish a definitive conclusion [10] This creates a discrepancy between the theoretical and historical text and the empirical evidence.[24] Therefore, a good amount of criticism arises.
To begin with, there is an opposing theory that argues a state leader has the most leverage when citizens are content with domestic policy and he has high public approval ratings. It is then assumed that leaders are most likely to engage in international conflicts when the domestic approval is highest.[9] Furthermore, some analysts argue that the entire basis for the argument, the idea that a foreign enemy brings a country together, is not as well founded as it originally seems. This idea relies heavily on sociological studies that focus on the cohesion of small groups. Problems arise when theorists try to apply this to a large group such as a nation state, which is composed of many smaller groups. In fact, there are examples of external conflict leading to more unrest between domestic groups. For example, World War I led to internal problems in Russia, eventually culminating in the Bolshevik Revolution[10] Some also argue that a government cannot just incite an international conflict whenever they wish. Although there are always conflicts going on among the international community, not all are compelling enough to justify the use of force to the public and the government may even be accused of overreacting to a situation.[24]