Realism (international relations)
Realism, a school of thought in international relations theory, is a theoretical framework that views world politics as an enduring competition among self-interested states vying for power and positioning within an anarchic global system devoid of a centralized authority. It centers on states as rational primary actors navigating a system shaped by power politics, national interest, and a pursuit of security and self-preservation.[1][2]
This article is about the international relations theory. For other uses, see Realism.
Realism involves the strategic use of military force and alliances to boost global influence while maintaining a balance of power. War is seen as an inevitability inherent in the anarchic conditions of world politics. Realism also emphasizes the complex dynamics of the security dilemma, where actions taken for security reasons can unintentionally lead to tensions between states.[1]
Unlike idealism or liberalism, realism underscores the competitive and conflictual nature of global politics. In contrast to liberalism, which champions cooperation, realism asserts that the dynamics of the international arena revolve around states actively advancing national interests and prioritizing security. While idealism leans towards cooperation and ethical considerations, realism argues that states operate in a realm devoid of inherent justice, where ethical norms may not apply.[1]
Early popular proponents of realism included Thucydides (5th century BCE), Machiavelli (16th century), Hobbes (17th century), and Rousseau (18th century).[3] Carl von Clausewitz (early 19th century), another contributor to the realist school of thought, viewed war as an act of statecraft and gave strong emphasis on hard power. Clausewitz felt that armed conflict was inherently one-sided, where typically only one victor can emerge between two parties, with no peace.[4]
Realism became popular again in the 1930s, during the Great Depression. At that time, it polemicized with the progressive, reformist optimism associated with liberal internationalists like US President Woodrow Wilson.[1] The 20th century brand of classical realism, exemplified by theorists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, has evolved into neorealism—a more scientifically oriented approach to the study of international relations developed during the latter half of the Cold War.[1] In the 21st century, realism has experienced a resurgence, fueled by escalating tensions among world powers. Some of the most influential proponents of political realism today are John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.
Realists fall into three classes based on their view of the essential causes of conflict between states:
Realism entails a spectrum of ideas,[6][7][8][9] which tend to revolve around several central propositions, such as:
Political scientists sometimes associate realism with Realpolitik,[12]
as both deal with the pursuit, possession, and application of power. Realpolitik, however, is an older prescriptive guideline limited to policy-making, while realism is a wider theoretical and methodological paradigm which aims to describe, explain, and predict events in international relations. As an academic pursuit, realism is not necessarily tied to ideology; it does not favor any particular moral philosophy, nor does it consider ideology to be a major factor in the behavior of nations. Another example that can be linked to realism would be the prisoner's dilemma. Primarily, the prisoner's dilemma refers to the game theory where each of the parties choose to protect their own self-interests at the expense of the other participant. Diving deep further into the mechanic of the game theory, each participant is asked the same question at a different place and time, which creates a challenging position for each individual whether to cooperate and tell the truth, or not, therefore creating a dilemma.[13] This illustrates how a realist state might interact with another state; whether to protect its own resources or risk everything to achieve its goals.
However, realists are generally critical of liberal foreign-policy.[14] Garrett Ward Sheldon has characterised the priorities of realists as Machiavellian and seen them as prioritising the seeking of power,[15] although realists have also advocated the idea that powerful states concede spheres of influence to other powerful states.[16][17]
Realism in statecraft[edit]
The ideas behind George F. Kennan's work as a diplomat and diplomatic historian remain relevant to the debate over American foreign policy, which since the 19th century has been characterized by a shift from the Founding Fathers' realist school to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations. In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power and the reliance on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft is considered impractical. According to the Wilsonian approach, on the other hand, the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist approach likened Clinton's policies to social work. Some argue that in Kennan's view of American diplomacy, based on the realist approach, such apparent moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and may lead to the erosion of power, to America's detriment.[21] Others argue that Kennan, a proponent of the Marshall Plan (which gave out bountiful American aid to post-WW2 countries), might agree that Clinton's aid functioned strategically to secure international leverage: a diplomatic maneuver well within the bounds of political realism as described by Hedley Bull.
Realists often hold that statesmen tend towards realism whereas realism is deeply unpopular among the public.[22] When statesmen take actions that divert from realist policies, academic realists often argue that this is due to distortions that stem from domestic politics.[23] However, some research suggests that realist policies are actually popular among the public whereas elites are more beholden to liberal ideas.[24] Abrahamsen suggested that realpolitik for middle powers can include supporting idealism and liberal internationalism.[25]
Criticisms[edit]
Democratic peace[edit]
Democratic peace theory advocates also that realism is not applicable to democratic states' relations with each another as their studies claim that such states do not go to war with one another.[35] However, realists and proponents of other schools have critiqued this claim, claiming that its definitions of "war" and "democracy" must be tweaked in order to achieve this result. The interactive model of democratic peace observes a gradual influence of both democracy and democratic difference on wars and militarized interstate disputes.[36] A realist government may not consider it in its interest to start a war for little gain, so realism does not necessarily mean constant battles.[37]
Hegemonic peace and conflict[edit]
Robert Gilpin developed the theory of hegemonic stability theory within the realist framework, but limited it to the economic field. Niall Ferguson remarked that the theory has offered insights into the way that economic power works, but neglected the military and cultural aspects of power.[38]
John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney state that the Iraq War, conventionally blamed on liberal internationalism by realists, actually originates more closely from hegemonic realism. The "instigators of the war", they suggest, were hegemonic realists. Where liberal internationalists reluctantly supported the war, they followed arguments linked to interdependence realism relating to arms control.[39] The realist scholar John Mearsheimer states that "One might think..." events including the Bush Doctrine are "evidence of untethered realism that unipolarity made possible," but disagrees and contends that various interventions are caused by a belief that a liberal international order can transcend power politics.[40]
Appeasement[edit]
In the mid-20th century, realism was seen as discredited in the United Kingdom due to its association with appeasement in the 1930s. It re-emerged slowly during the Cold War.[47]
Scholar Aaron McKeil pointed to major illiberal tendencies within realism that, aiming for a sense of "restraint" against liberal interventionism, would lead to more proxy wars, and fail to offer institutions and norms for mitigating great power conflict.[48]
Realism as degenerative research programs[edit]
John Vasquez applied Imre Lakatos's criteria, and concluded that realist-based research program is seen as degenerating due to the protean character of its theoretical development, an unwillingness to specify what makes the true theory, a continuous adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws, and lack of strong research findings.[49] Against Vasquez, Stephen Walt argued that Vasquez overlooked the progressive power of realist theory.[50] Kenneth Waltz claimed that Vasquez misunderstood Lakatos.[51]
Abstract theorizing and non-consensus moral principles[edit]
The mainstream version of realism is criticized for abstract theorizing at the expense of historical detail and for a non-consensus foundation of the moral principles of the "rules of international conduct"; as evidenced in the case of Russian invasion of Ukraine.[52]