Cosmological argument
A cosmological argument, in natural theology, is an argument which claims that the existence of God can be inferred from facts concerning causation, explanation, change, motion, contingency, dependency, or finitude with respect to the universe or some totality of objects.[1][2][3] A cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an argument from universal causation, an argument from first cause, the causal argument, or the prime mover argument. Whichever term is employed, there are two basic variants of the argument, each with subtle yet important distinctions: in esse (essentiality), and in fieri (becoming).
The basic premises of all of these arguments involve the concept of causation. The conclusion of these arguments is that there exists a first cause, subsequently analysed to be God. The history of this argument goes back to Aristotle or earlier, was developed in Neoplatonism and early Christianity and later in medieval Islamic theology during the 9th to 12th centuries, and was re-introduced to medieval Christian theology in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas. The cosmological argument is closely related to the principle of sufficient reason as addressed by Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, itself a modern exposition of the claim that "nothing comes from nothing" attributed to Parmenides. Contemporary defenders of cosmological arguments include William Lane Craig,[4] Robert Koons,[5] John Lennox, Stephen Meyer, and Alexander Pruss.[6]
Versions of the argument[edit]
Argument from contingency[edit]
In the scholastic era, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency", following Aristotle in claiming that there must be something to explain why the Universe exists. Since the Universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (contingency), its existence must have a cause – not merely another contingent thing, but something that exists by necessity (something that must exist in order for anything else to exist).[18] In other words, even if the Universe has always existed, it still owes its existence to an uncaused cause,[19] Aquinas further said: "... and this we understand to be God."[20]
Aquinas's argument from contingency allows for the possibility of a Universe that has no beginning in time. It is a form of argument from universal causation. Aquinas observed that, in nature, there were things with contingent existences. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which these things did not in fact exist. Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If this is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Contingent beings, therefore, are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings: there must exist a necessary being whose non-existence is an impossibility, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is ultimately derived.
Aquinas' argument from contingency may also be formulated like this: if each contingently existing being considers himself Bn, then, because he exists contingently, he depends for his existence on a prior being Bn-1. Now, Bn-1 likewise, if it is contingent, depends on Bn-2. Nevertheless, this series cannot go on until Infinity. At a certain time, we will arrive at a B1, the First Being in existence, and since there is no "zeroth" Being or B0, B1 exists Necessarily, i.e. is not a contingent being. This was Aquinas' Third Way, under Question 2, Article 3 in the Summa Theologica[21]
The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz made a similar argument with his principle of sufficient reason in 1714. "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition," he wrote, "without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."[22]
Leibniz's argument from contingency is one of the most popular cosmological arguments in philosophy of religion. It attempts to prove the existence of a necessary being and infer that this being is God. Alexander Pruss formulates the argument as follows:
Cosmological argument and infinite regress[edit]
Depending on its formulation, the cosmological argument is an example of a positive infinite regress argument. An infinite regress is an infinite series of entities governed by a recursive principle that determines how each entity in the series depends on or is produced by its predecessor.[32] An infinite regress argument is an argument against a theory based on the fact that this theory leads to an infinite regress.[32][33] A positive infinite regress argument employs the regress in question to argue in support of a theory by showing that its alternative involves a vicious regress.[34] The regress relevant for the cosmological argument is the regress of causes: an event occurred because it was caused by another event that occurred before it, which was itself caused by a previous event, and so on.[32][35] For an infinite regress argument to be successful, it has to demonstrate not just that the theory in question entails an infinite regress but also that this regress is vicious.[32][35] Once the viciousness of the regress of causes is established, the cosmological argument can proceed to its positive conclusion by holding that it is necessary to posit a first cause in order to avoid it.[36]
A regress can be vicious due to metaphysical impossibility, implausibility or explanatory failure.[35][37] It is sometimes held that the regress of causes is vicious because it is metaphysically impossible, i.e. that it involves an outright contradiction. But it is difficult to see where this contradiction lies unless an additional assumption is accepted: that actual infinity is impossible.[36][33][35] But this position is opposed to infinity in general, not just specifically to the regress of causes.[32] A more promising view is that the regress of causes is to be rejected because it is implausible.[36] Such an argument can be based on empirical observation, e.g. that, to the best of our knowledge, our universe had a beginning in the form of the Big Bang[36] (albeit the possibility that it existed for eternity before the Big Bang is also not strictly excluded on physics grounds alone[38]). But it can also be based on more abstract principles, like Ockham's razor (parsimony), which posits that we should avoid ontological extravagance by not multiplying entities without necessity.[39][35] A third option is to see the regress of causes as vicious due to explanatory failure, i.e. that it does not solve the problem it was formulated to solve or that it assumes already in disguised form what it was supposed to explain.[35][37][40] According to this position, we seek to explain one event in the present by citing an earlier event that caused it. But this explanation is incomplete unless we can come to understand why this earlier event occurred, which is itself explained by its own cause and so on.[35] At each step, the occurrence of an event has to be assumed. So it fails to explain why anything at all occurs, why there is a chain of causes to begin with.[32][35]
Objections and counterarguments[edit]
"What caused the first cause?"[edit]
One objection to the argument asks why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Proponents argue that the first cause is exempt from having a cause, as this is part of what it is to be the first cause, while opponents argue that this is special pleading or otherwise untrue.[36] Critics often press that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why the first cause is indeed exempt,[41] whereas defenders maintain that this question has been answered by the various arguments, emphasizing that none of the major cosmological arguments rests on the premise that everything has a cause, and so the question does not address the actual premises of an argument and rests on a misunderstanding of them.[42]
William Lane Craig, who popularized and is notable for defending the Kalam cosmological argument, argues that the infinite is impossible, whichever perspective the viewer takes, and so there must always have been one unmoved thing to begin the universe. He uses Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel and the question "What is infinity minus infinity?" to illustrate the idea that the infinite is metaphysically, mathematically, and even conceptually impossible. Other reasons include the fact that it is impossible to count down from infinity, and that, had the universe existed for an infinite amount of time, every possible event, including the final end of the universe, would already have occurred. He therefore states his argument in three points: firstly, everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; secondly, the universe began to exist; so, thirdly, therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.[43] Craig argues in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology that there cannot be an infinite regress of causes and thus there must be a first uncaused cause, even if one posits a plurality of causes of the universe.[44] He argues Occam's razor may be employed to remove unneeded further causes of the universe to leave a single uncaused cause.[45]
Secondly, it is argued that the premise of causality has been arrived at via a posteriori (inductive) reasoning, which is dependent on experience. David Hume highlighted this problem of induction and argued that causal relations were not true a priori. However, as to whether inductive or deductive reasoning is more valuable remains a matter of debate, with the general conclusion being that neither is prominent.[46] Opponents of the argument tend to argue that it is unwise to draw conclusions from an extrapolation of causality beyond experience.[1] Andrew Loke replies that, according to the Kalam cosmological argument, only things which begin to exist require a cause. On the other hand, something that is without beginning has always existed and therefore does not require a cause. The Kalam and the Thomistic cosmological argument posit that there cannot be an actual infinite regress of causes,[47] therefore there must be an uncaused first cause that is beginningless and does not require a cause.[48]
Not evidence for a theistic God[edit]
According to this objection, the basic cosmological argument merely establishes that a first cause exists, not that it has the attributes of a theistic god, such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.[49] This is why the argument is often expanded to assert that at least some of these attributes are necessarily true, for instance in the modern Kalam argument given above.[1]
Defenders of the cosmological arguments also reply that theologians of note are aware of the need to additionally prove other attributes of the first cause beyond that one exists. One notable example of this is found in Aquinas' Summa Theologiae in which much of the first part (Prima Pars) is devoted to establishing the attributes of this first cause, such as its uniqueness, perfection, and intelligence.[50] Thus defenders of cosmological arguments would reply that while it is true that the cosmological argument only establishes a first cause, this is merely the first step which then allows for the demonstration of the other theistic attributes.
Existence of causal loops[edit]
A causal loop is a form of predestination paradox arising where traveling backwards in time is deemed a possibility. A sufficiently powerful entity in such a world would have the capacity to travel backwards in time to a point before its own existence, and to then create itself, thereby initiating everything which follows from it. The usual reason given to refute the possibility of a causal loop is that it requires that the loop as a whole be its own cause. Richard Hanley argues that causal loops are not logically, physically, or epistemically impossible: "[In timed systems,] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them".[51] However, Andrew Loke argues that causal loop of the type that is supposed to avoid a first cause suffers from the problem of vicious circularity and thus it would not work.[52]
Existence of infinite causal chains[edit]
David Hume and later Paul Edwards have invoked a similar principle in their criticisms of the cosmological argument.[53] William L. Rowe has called this the Hume-Edwards principle: