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French Revolutionary Army

The French Revolutionary Army (French: Armée révolutionnaire française) was the French land force that fought the French Revolutionary Wars from 1792 to 1802. In the beginning, the French armies were characterised by their revolutionary fervour, their poor equipment and their great numbers. However, the French Revolutionary Army had become arguably the most powerful army in the world by the mid-1790s,[1] as the French armies had become well-experienced and organized, enabling them to comfortably outfight their enemies.[2]

Despite experiencing early disastrous defeats, the revolutionary armies successfully expelled foreign forces from French soil and then overran many neighboring countries, establishing client republics. Leading generals included Napoleon Bonaparte, Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, André Masséna, Jean Victor Marie Moreau and Étienne Macdonald.[3]


As a general description of French military forces during this period, it should not be confused with the "revolutionary armies" (armées révolutionnaires) which were paramilitary forces set up during the Terror.[4] Following the proclamation of the French Empire in 1804 the Revolutionary Army became the Imperial Army.

1791 Reglement[edit]

Officially, the Revolutionary Armies were operating along the guidelines set down in the 1791 Reglement, a set of regulations created during the years before the Revolution. The 1791 Reglement laid down several complex tactical maneuvers, maneuvers which demanded well trained soldiers, officers and NCOs to perform correctly. The Revolutionary Army was lacking in all three of these areas, and as a result the early efforts to conform to the 1791 Reglement were met with disaster. The untrained troops could not perform the complex maneuvers required, unit cohesion was lost and defeat was ensured.


Realizing that the army was not capable of conforming with the 1791 Reglement, commanders began experimenting with formations which required less training to perform. Many eminent French military thinkers had been clamoring for change decades before. In the period following the humiliating performance of the French Army during the Seven Years' War, they began to experiment with new ideas. Guibert wrote his epic Essai général de Tactique, Bourcet focused on staff procedures and mountain warfare, and Mesnil-Durand spent his time advocating l'ordre profond, tactics of maneuvering and fighting in heavy columnar formations, placing emphasis on the shock of cold steel over firepower.


In the 1770s, some commanders, among them the brilliant duc de Broglie performed exercises testing these tactics. It was finally decided to launch a series of experiments to try out the new tactics, and comparing them to the standard Fredrickian linear formation known as l'ordre mince which was universally popular throughout Europe. De Broglie decided that l'ordre profond worked best when it was supported by artillery and large numbers of skirmishers. Despite these exercises, l'ordre mince had strong and powerful supporters in the French Royal Army, and it was this formation which went into the 1791 Reglement as the standard.

Lazare Carnot[edit]

While the Cannonade of Valmy had saved the Republic from imminent destruction and caused its enemies to take pause, the guillotining of Louis XVI in January 1793 and the National Convention's proclamation that it would 'export the revolution' hardened the resolve of France's enemies to destroy the Republic and reinstate a monarchy.


In early 1793, the First Coalition was formed, not only from Prussia and Austria, but also Sardinia, Naples, the Dutch Republic, Spain and Great Britain. The Republic was under attack on several fronts, and in the fiercely Catholic region of La Vendée an armed revolt had broken out. The Revolutionary army was greatly overstretched, and it seemed that the fall of the republic was imminent.


In early 1793 Lazare Carnot, a prominent mathematician, physicist, and delegate to the Convention, was promoted to the Committee of Public Safety. Displaying an exceptional talent for organization and for enforcing discipline, Carnot set about rearranging the disheveled Revolutionary Armies. Realizing that no amount of reforming and discipline was going to offset the massive numerical superiority enjoyed by France's enemies, Carnot ordered (24 February 1793 decree of the national Convention) each département to provide a quota of new recruits, a number totaling around 300,000. By mid-1793, the Revolutionary Army had increased around 645,000 men.

Troops with exceptional morale or skill became , and were deployed in a screen in front of the Army. Their main fighting tactics were of a guerrilla-warfare nature. Both mounted and on foot, the large swarm of skirmishers would hide from enemies if possible, pepper their formations with fire and deploy ambushes. Unable to retaliate on the scattered skirmishers, the morale and unit cohesion of the better trained and equipped émigré and monarchist armies was gradually worn down. The incessant harassing fire usually resulted in a section of the enemy line wavering, and then the 'regular' formations of the Revolutionary Army would be sent into the attack.

skirmishers

Troops with less skill and of more dubious quality, making up the 'regular' part of the army, were formed into . The battalion column required little training to perfect, and provided commanders with potent "battering ram-style" formations with which to hit the enemy lines after the skirmishers had done their work. The skirmish screen also provided protection for those troops

battalion columns

Seeing the failure of the 1791 Reglement, several early revolutionary commanders followed de Broglie's example and experimented with the pre-revolutionary ideas, gradually adapting them until they discovered a system that worked. The final standard used by the early Revolutionary Armies consisted of the following:

Artillery[edit]

Supporting the skirmishers was the French artillery. The artillery had suffered least from the exodus of aristocratic officers during the early days of the Revolution, as it was commanded mostly by men drawn from the middle class. The man who would shape the era, Napoleon Bonaparte, himself was an artilleryman. The various technical improvements of Général Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval in the years preceding the Revolution, and the subsequent efforts of Baron du Teil and his brother Chevalier Jean du Teil meant that the French artillery was the finest in Europe. The Revolutionary Artillery was responsible for several of the Republic's early victories; for example at Valmy, on 13 Vendémiaire, and at Lodi. The revolutionary cannon played a vital role in their success. The cannon continued to have a dominating role on the battlefield throughout the Napoleonic Wars.

On 1 October, the Armée de la Rochelle was redesignated as the armée de l'Ouest.

Royalist French forces in opposition to the revolutionary government of France.

Émigré armies of the French Revolutionary Wars

Social background of officers and other ranks in the French Army, 1750–1815

Bertaud, Jean-Paul. The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-soldier to Instrument of Power (Princeton University Press, 1988)

Campaigns of Napoleon, 1216 pages. 1973. ISBN 0-02-523660-1; covers each battle

Chandler, David G.

Elting, John Robert. Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée, 784 pages. 1997.  0-306-80757-2

ISBN

Forrest, Alan. Soldiers of the French Revolution (1989)

Forrest, Alan. Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during Revolution and the Empire (1989)

excerpt and text search

Griffith, Paddy. The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789–1802 (1998)

excerpt and text search

Hazen, Charles Downer – The French Revolution (2 vol 1932) 948 pages.  B00085AF0W

ASIN

Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Napoleon's Military Machine (1995)

excerpt and text search

Lynn, John A. The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94, (1984) 356 pages,  0-8133-2945-0

ISBN

(1980). The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-31076-8.

Rothenberg, Gunther E.

Scott, Samuel F. "The Regeneration of the Line Army during the French Revolution." Journal of Modern History (1970) 42#3 pp 308–330.

in JSTOR

Scott, Samuel F. From Yorktown to Valmy: The Transformation of the French Army in an Age of Revolution (1998) Archived 2016-04-15 at the Wayback Machine

online

Skocpol, Theda. "Social revolutions and mass military mobilization." World Politics (1988) 40#2 pp 147–168.