Gaza War (2008–2009)
The Gaza War, also known as Operation Cast Lead (Hebrew: מִבְצָע עוֹפֶרֶת יְצוּקָה),[29] also known as the Gaza Massacre (Arabic: مجزرة غزة),[30][31][32] and referred to as the Battle of al-Furqan (معركة الفرقان) by Hamas,[33][34] was a three-week armed conflict between Gaza Strip Palestinian paramilitary groups and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that began on 27 December 2008 and ended on 18 January 2009 with a unilateral ceasefire. The conflict resulted in 1,166–1,417 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths.[35] Over 46,000 homes were destroyed in Gaza, making more than 100,000 people homeless.[36]
For the current hostilities, see 2023 Israel–Hamas war.
A six month long ceasefire between Israel and Hamas ended on 4 November, when the IDF made a raid into Deir al-Balah, central Gaza to destroy a tunnel, killing several Hamas militants. Israel said the raid was a preemptive strike and Hamas intended to abduct further Israeli soldiers,[37][38] while Hamas characterized it as a ceasefire violation,[37][39] and responded with rocket fire into Israel.[40][41] Attempts to renew a truce between Israel and Hamas were unsuccessful. On December 27, Israel began Operation Cast Lead with the stated aim of stopping rocket fire.[42][43] In the initial air assault, Israel attacked police stations, military targets including weapons caches and suspected rocket firing teams, as well as political and administrative institutions, striking in the densely populated cities of Gaza, Khan Yunis and Rafah.[44] After hostilities broke out, Palestinian groups fired rockets in retaliation for the aerial bombardments and attacks.[45] The international community considers indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian structures that do not discriminate between civilians and military targets as illegal under international law.[46][47][48]
An Israeli ground invasion began on 3 January. On 5 January, the IDF began operating in the densely populated urban centers of Gaza. During the last week of the offensive (from 12 January), Israel mostly hit targets it had damaged before and struck Palestinian rocket-launching units.[49] Hamas intensified its rocket and mortar attacks against mostly civilian targets in southern Israel, reaching the major cities of Beersheba and Ashdod for the first time during the conflict.[50][51][52] Israeli politicians ultimately decided against striking deeper within Gaza amid concerns of higher casualties on both sides and rising international criticism. The conflict ended on 18 January, when the IDF first declared a unilateral ceasefire, followed by Hamas' announcing a one-week ceasefire twelve hours later.[6][7] The IDF completed its withdrawal on 21 January.[53]
In September 2009, a UN special mission, headed by the South African Justice Richard Goldstone, produced a report accusing both Palestinian militants and the Israeli army of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, and recommended bringing those responsible to justice.[54] In 2011, Goldstone wrote that he does not believe that Israel intentionally targeted civilians in Gaza as a matter of explicit policy.[55] The other authors of the report, Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin, and Desmond Travers, stated that no new evidence had been gathered that disputed the report's findings.[56][57] The United Nations Human Rights Council ordered Israel to conduct various repairs of the damages. On 21 September 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council concluded that 75% of civilian homes destroyed in the attack were not rebuilt.[58]
Aftermath
Israel was victorious militarily, but its reputation was harmed.[5] The international community continued to isolate Hamas (except for Iran and Syria), because it rejected the Quartet demands to recognize Israel, accept the Oslo accords peace initiative and abandon violence in exchange for international recognition as representatives of the Palestinian people.[319] In the months following the war, Hamas suspended its use of rockets and shifted focus to winning support at home and abroad through cultural initiatives and public relations, with the aim to build a "cultural resistance". Hamas officials stated that "The current situation required a stoppage of rockets. After the war, the fighters needed a break and the people needed a break."[320]
The war was an Israeli tactical victory and a significant tactical defeat for Hamas.[4][321][322] Al-Qassam Brigades reported in "The outcome of al-Qassam operations during the Battle of al-Furqan" they killed 102 Israeli soldiers. On 19 January 2009, a spokesperson for the group said on al-Arabiya "Israel lost 'at least 80 soldiers' in the fighting" and said about Hamas losses "only 48 fighters slain in Israel war". According to United Nations report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission of Human Rights Council, which was on General Assembly's agenda on 29 October 2009: "The large discrepancy in the data confirms the Mission's observations below in the report about the reliability of the information about the Gaza military operations posted on websites of al-Qassam and other Palestinian armed groups."[323] In November 2010, the Hamas Interior Minister acknowledged that around 700 militants either part of Hamas or affiliated factions were killed in the war.[302]
Several senior Hamas military commanders and politburo members were killed, as well as approximately 50 explosives experts.[3] Hamas experienced "widespread desertion" in the face of the Israeli advance.[3] Hamas also lost a very large amount of weaponry and equipment; key storage facilities were discovered under mosques and public buildings.[3] A former Shin Bet deputy director who co-authored a report on the war noted, "Hamas had planned to stand and fight, but the Iz al-Qassam Brigades proved unequal to the task ... and consequently they failed to match the public image Hamas has tried so hard to present of stalwart, proficient Islamic warriors."[322]
In addition, the Israeli operation greatly curtailed years of Hamas rocket fire, returning a sense of normalcy to Southern Israel.[324] In the year before the war, Hamas had fired over 3,300 rockets at Israel's Gaza periphery towns. That number dropped to less than 300 in the ten months following the conflict.[325]
Defense analyst David Eshel stated, "The success of Operation Cast Lead in the densely populated Gaza Strip shows that an industrial military that coordinates operations among land, air and sea units, makes effective use of advanced technology, and shares intelligence and leads from the front can decisively defeat an asymmetrical enemy." He further noted, "Israel used a variety of tactics to outflank and defeat Hamas in its own territory. These included long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering, deception and disinformation."[2] As a result of its poor performance, Hamas relieved at least two brigade commanders on Iranian advice, and reportedly stripped 100 fighters of their membership. The organization decided to initiate a thorough investigation of the conduct of its fighters during the operation.[3][326] Hamas' leadership modified its tactical doctrine. The Qassam Brigades intensified military training at its various training camps and military academy in the Nuseirat refugee camp. The new training was thought to be more offensive, with a focus on hitting the rear of an IDF force. Hezbollah operatives were suspected of involvement in the program. In contrast to the pre-war period, when Hamas openly displayed its capabilities, the nature of the program was kept classified.[3]
The Israeli army said it destroyed about 80% of the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt that were being used to bring in weapons and rocket components. Residents in Rafah said they cleared away debris and discovered that many of the tunnels were intact, though they acknowledged the destruction of many.[327]
Propaganda and psychological warfare
Hamas
Before and during the conflict, Hamas' senior representatives released a number of statements designed to avert Israeli decision-makers from launching any military operation in Gaza and to cause demoralization among Israelis. Before the end of the pre-conflict ceasefire, Hamas boasted that it had countless surprises awaiting Israeli troops, should they advance.[328] Hamas representatives threatened on several occasions to abduct Israeli soldiers, and during the ground invasion tried to spread rumors that it actually had captured or killed more Israeli soldiers.[329]
On a video broadcast on Al-Aqsa TV on 10 January showing the names of Israeli towns hit by rockets, it was implied Tel-Aviv is the next target and that 'all options are open'.[330] Also, Hamas sent messages in Hebrew to Israeli citizens' mobile phones warning: "Rockets on all cities, shelters will not protect you."[331][332]
Hamas instrumentalized the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as a form of psychological weapon, declaring that he had been wounded by Israeli fire, later announcing that his condition was no longer of interest to them.[328]
According to IDF spokesman, Hamas' ruses in the battlefield included booby traps throughout Gaza's neighborhoods, such as mannequins placed at apartment entrances and rigged to explode when the soldiers approach.[329]
Arab television stations reported Hamas-provided statistics for Israeli casualties on the assumption that Israel is distorting its own figures of soldiers killed and wounded.[333]
A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that Hamas propaganda both rejected Hamas responsibility for the fighting and used it to attack the Palestinian Authority.[80]
Dr. Tal Pavel from Israeli think-tank International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) said that Hamas uses its Web sites to make comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany, portraying Israel as a destructive, oppressive regime afraid of Hamas rockets raining on Tel Aviv.[333]
Israel
The day before the beginning of the offensive on 27 December the IDF pulled troops back from the border and used its radio channels to broadcast talk of a "lull" to achieve a disinformation coup to lure Hamas fighters out of hiding.[334]
A broadcaster in Islamic Jihad's Voice of Jerusalem radio station in Gaza City reported that IDF have been breaking into his station signal "least once an hour" during conflict intensification to broadcast messages to Gaza's population that their problems were due to Hamas. The Israelis also dropped leaflets with similar messages and contact info to report about the whereabouts of militant leaders and weapons caches.[334] The leaflets also said, "The Israeli army will respond if the rocket fire continues."[332] In war zones, leaflets warned local residents that they had to flee. It also warned residents that their homes would be targeted if they were located in an area of possible target.[335] Dr. Yaniv Levitan of the University of Haifa said that the aim of the flyers was not to demoralize the civil population, but to implant recognition in hearts and minds that Hamas has failed, that there is an option of choosing another path.[333]
IDF spokespersons often reported that scores of demoralized Hamas fighters had been observed deserting. According to Ephraim Kam, deputy head of the Institute of National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, the claim could not be confirmed but it strengthened the Israeli population's will to continue and undermined the confidence of Hamas in Gaza.[328]
There was a mistrust of phone calls warning messages to people that they have "just minutes to evacuate before they bomb the house". According to a human rights lawyer at the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), despite the hundreds of phone calls to families warning their house is about to be blown up, only 37 were destroyed, presumably as of 3 January date.[332]