Katana VentraIP

North Korea and weapons of mass destruction

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons program[7] and, as of June 2023, is estimated to have an arsenal of approximately 30 nuclear weapons and sufficient production of fissile material for six to seven nuclear weapons per year.[8] North Korea has also stockpiled a significant quantity of chemical and biological weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[9] Since 2006, the country has conducted six nuclear tests at increasing levels of expertise, prompting the imposition of sanctions.[10]

"Nuclear program of North Korea" redirects here. For its nuclear power program, see Nuclear power in North Korea.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

September 3, 2017

6

40 weapons (estimate)[4][5]

15,000 km (9,300 mi) Hwasong-17[6][b]

Not a member (withdrew in 2003)

One Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor, completed in 1967. Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975.[145] Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that this reactor could have been used to produce up to 1–2 kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee said that the amount was no more than a few hundred grams.[146]

[144]

A newer nuclear reactor with a capacity of 5 . This gas-graphite moderated Magnox type reactor is North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of its plutonium has been produced. A full core consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a maximum of 27–29 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor for optimal burnup.[147] The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006, is estimated to be able to produce 0.9 grams of plutonium per thermal megawatt every day of its operation. The material required to make a single bomb is approximately four to eight kilograms. Often, North Korea has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework), 2005, and 2007.

MWe

Chemical and biological weapons[edit]

North Korea began to develop its own chemical industry and chemical weapon (CW) program in 1954, immediately following the end of the Korean War. However, substantial progress was not made until the 1960s, when Kim Il Sung "issued a 'Declaration for Chemicalization' whose aim was to further develop an independent chemical industry capable of supporting various sectors of its economy, as well as support chemical weapons production" and established North Korea's Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau.[180]


In the late 1960s and early 1970s, North Korea received Soviet and Chinese aid in developing its chemical industry. In 1979, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency believed that North Korea "had only a defensive CW capability."[180] It is unclear when North Korea "acquired the capability for independent CW production"; estimates range from the 1970s to early 1980s.[180] However, by the late 1980s, North Korea's CW capabilities had expanded; the South Korean Ministry of National Defense reported in 1987 that the North "possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons" including mustard gas (a blister agent) and some nerve agents.[180] In 2009 the International Crisis Group reported that the consensus expert view was that North Korea had a stockpile of about 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin (GB) and other nerve agents.[181] The South Korean Ministry of National Defense had the same estimate in 2010.[180][182] In 2014, the South Korean Defense Ministry estimated that "the North had stockpiled 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons and had a capacity to produce a variety of biological weapons."[183] In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense reported to Congress that North Korea's CW program "likely possesses a CW stockpile" and likely had "the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents."[7] The report also found that "North Korea probably could employ CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles. In addition, North Korean forces are prepared to operate in a contaminated environment; they train regularly in chemical defense operations."[7] The report indicated that North Korea "continues to develop its biological research and development capabilities" and "may consider the use of biological weapons as an option, contrary to its obligations under the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention."[7]


North Korea is a signatory to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons in warfare.[180] North Korea is also a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).[7] Although the nation has signed the BWC, it "has failed to provide a BWC Confidence-Building Measure declaration since 1990."[7] North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[7] It is one of four countries that have not ratified the CWC (the others are Israel, Egypt, and South Sudan).[184]


North Korea has refused to acknowledge possessing chemical weapons, as called for by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, passed in 2006.[180]


After the 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong (in which North Korea attacked Yeonpyeong Island with conventional weapons, killing a number of civilians), the National Emergency Management Agency of South Korea distributed 1,300 gas masks to South Koreans living in the western border (a flashpoint for conflict); the agency also distributed another 610,000 gas masks to members of the South Korean civil defense corps, which numbers 3.93 million.[180] The agency also announced the renovation of underground emergency shelters.[180] Gas masks are effective against some chemical agents, but not against blister agents such as mustard gas, Lewisite, and Phosgene oxime, which North Korea is thought to have in its stockpiles.[180] In October 2013, South Korea and the United States "agreed to build a joint surveillance system to detect biochemical agents along the demilitarized zone" and to share information.[180]


Also in 2015, Melissa Hanham of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies released an analysis of a photograph of North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un visiting the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute, a factory supposedly for the production of bacillus thuringiensis of use in pesticides. Hanham's analysis concluded that the factory actually produces weaponized anthrax.[185] Hanham noted that pesticide production factories are "an old and well-used cover for a biological weapons program" and an example of dual-use technology.[185] A number of other experts agreed that "the photos most likely show an operational biological weapons facility."[185] The North Korean government denied the allegations; an official spokesperson for the National Defence Commission, through the official Korean Central News Agency, challenged the U.S. Congress to inspect the Institute and "behold the awe-inspiring sight of the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute."[186]


North Korea possesses various types of chemical weapons, including nerve, blister, blood, and vomiting agents, as well as some biological weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.[187] [188][189]


In 2017, Kim Jong-nam, the estranged elder half-brother of Kim Jong Un, was assassinated with VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia by suspected North Korean agents.[183]


The identified stockpile is between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. It is one of the world's largest possessors of chemical weapons, ranking third after the United States and Russia.[190]

 – initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully. It is believed that North Korea has deployed some 150–200 such missiles on mobile launchers.

Hwasong-5

 – later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range (550–700 km) and a smaller warhead (600–750 kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use.

Hwasong-6

[212] – larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a 650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190–250 m. Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600 km.

Hwasong-7

is also known as Scud-ER in rest of the world is further development of Hwasong-6 with range of (1000–1000+ km) and is capable of hitting Japan.[213][214][215]

Hwasong-9

 – believed to be a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM. Originally believed to have been tested as the first or second stage of Unha, but debris analysis showed that the Unha used older technology than it is believed the Hwasong-10 uses.[191] Also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X, Musudan and BM25, predicted to have a range of 2,500–4,000 km.[216] A DoD report puts BM25 strength at fewer than 50 launchers.[217]

Hwasong-10

 – a short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile, modified copy of the Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently deployed either in the late 1990s or early 2000s (decade).

Hwasong-11

 – a long-range, solid-fueled, SLBM. Also called the KN-11 by the Defense Department. Possibly derived from the Chinese JL-1 SLBM.[218]

Pukguksong-1

– a long-range, land based development of the solid fueled Pukguksong-1.[219] Also known as the KN-15.[220]

Pukguksong-2

 – a medium-range, liquid-fueled, mobile missile. First tested in May 2017.[221] also known as KN-17 outside of Korea, South Korean experts estimate range of 5000 to 6000 km based on successful test conducted in May.[222]

Hwasong-12

– Also known as the KN-20, a long-range, road transportable ICBM,[223] tested on July 4 and 29,[224] 2017, estimated range is 6,700–10,000 km (4,200–6,200 mi)[225][226][227][228][118][229][230][231] John Schilling estimates the current accuracy of the North's Hwasong-14 as poor at the mooted ranges which threaten US cities[117] (which would require more testing[119][232] to prove its accuracy).[233] Michael Elleman has pointed out that the NHK video[232] which captured the descent of the reentry vehicle (RV) shows its failure to survive reentry. If the RV had survived reentry, the video would have shown a bright image all the way to impact in the sea. However a recent CIA assessment notes that North Korea's ICBM reentry vehicles would likely perform adequately if flown on a normal trajectory to continental U.S. targets.[234]

Hwasong-14

– 13,000 km range, successfully tested on November 28, 2017.[235]

Hwasong-15

– 700 km range, Successfully tested on May 4, 2019. Similar to 9K720 Iskander.[196] Demonstrated range of 800 kilometers on September 15, 2021.[236]

KN-23

– potential range over 15,000 km depending on the warhead weight, according to initial Japanese estimate. The ICBM was believed to be first successfully tested on a full flight on November 18, 2022. The ICBM's long-range accuracy, and its ability to survive re-entry, are unknown as of 2022.[237][238]

Hwasong-17

International inspections[edit]

On October 31, 2018, lawmaker Kim Min-ki of South Korea's ruling Democratic Party of Korea issued a statement revealing that officials from South Korea's National Intelligence Service had observed several of North Korea's nuclear and missile test sites and that they were now ready for the upcoming international inspections.[262] Kim also stated that the now inactive North Korean Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site and the Sohae Satellite launching ground were included in these observations.[262] The visit by the intelligence officials was in tandem with the September 2018 Pyongyang Agreement, which saw North Korean leader Kim Jung-Un agree to close Sohae and allow international experts to observe the dismantling of the missile engine testing site and a launch pad.[262] The international experts will also be allowed to witness the dismantling of other North Korean nuclear and missile test sites as well.[262] Yongbyon, the main nuclear facility in North Korea, has also been inactive during the past year as well, but has not yet completely closed.[262]

Korean conflict

Korean reunification

2017–18 North Korea crisis

2002 State of the Union Address

Foreign relations of North Korea

List of nuclear weapons tests of North Korea

North Korea–Pakistan relations

North Korea–United States relations

Nuclear power in North Korea

Sohae Satellite Launching Station

North Korea nuclear disarmament

South Korea and weapons of mass destruction

Federation of American Scientists guide to North Korean chemical weapons

Jonathan D. Pollack, Proliferation Papers, Paris, IFRI, Spring 2010

"North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy"

– Key facts (based on South Korean defense ministry data); AFP, June 1, 2005

North Korea's missile arsenal

– Oxford Research Group, April 2004

North Korea: Problems, Perceptions and Proposals

Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on May 25, 2009

Archived January 9, 2006, at the Wayback Machine Information on the North Korean nuclear program including links to source documents

Nuclear Files.org

Annotated bibliography for the North Korean nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library

 – analysis by Narushige Michishita, IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 17, 2007

The February 13 Action Plan and the Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Contains primary source documents related to the DPRK's efforts to obtain nuclear technology dating back to the mid-1960s

North Korean International Documentation Project

A Collection of stories regarding North Korea's Nuclear Program

TIME Archives

Chung Min Lee, , Proliferation Papers, Paris, IFRI, Winter 2009

"The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran"

Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005

"North Korea's nuclear program, 2005"

– An analysis of Japan's role in the Six-Party Talks by Linus Hagström.

Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks

North Korea: Economic Sanctions

Chronology of U.S. – North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy

Congressional Research Service.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

IISS North Korea's Ballistic Missile Programme

Archived December 24, 2020, at the Wayback Machine

List of all sanctions against North Korea

– Reuters (Updated September 3, 2017)

Nuclear North Korea