Nuclear weapons debate
The nuclear weapons debate refers to the controversies surrounding the threat, use and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The only time nuclear weapons have been used in warfare was during the final stages of World War II when USAAF B-29 Superfortress bombers dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945. The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them have been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades.
See also: Nuclear ethics
Nuclear disarmament refers both to the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world. Proponents of disarmament typically condemn a priori the threat or use of nuclear weapons as immoral and argue that only total disarmament can eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine deterrence and make conventional wars more likely, more destructive, or both. The debate becomes considerably complex when considering various scenarios for example, total vs partial or unilateral vs multilateral disarmament.
Nuclear proliferation is a related concern, which most commonly refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries and increases the risks of nuclear war arising from regional conflicts. The diffusion of nuclear technologies -- especially the nuclear fuel cycle technologies for producing weapons-usable nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- contributes to the risk of nuclear proliferation. These forms of proliferation are sometimes referred to as horizontal proliferation to distinguish them from vertical proliferation, the expansion of nuclear stockpiles of established nuclear powers.
Arguments[edit]
Under the scenario of total multilateral disarmament, there is no possibility of nuclear war. Under scenarios of partial disarmament, there is a disagreement as to how the probability of nuclear war would change. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine the ability of governments to threaten sufficient retaliation upon an attack to deter aggression against them. Application of game theory to questions of strategic nuclear warfare during the Cold War resulted in the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), a concept developed by Robert McNamara and others in the mid-1960s.[15] Its success in averting nuclear war was theorized to depend upon the "readiness at any time before, during, or after an attack to destroy the adversary as a functioning society."[16] Those who believe governments that should develop or maintain nuclear-strike capability usually justify their position with reference to the Cold War, claiming that a "nuclear peace" was the result of both the US and the USSR possessing mutual second-strike retaliation capability. Since the end of the Cold War, theories of deterrence in international relations have been further developed and generalized in the concept of the stability–instability paradox[17][18] Proponents of disarmament call into question the assumption that political leaders are rational actors who place the protection of their citizens above other considerations, and highlight, as McNamara himself later acknowledged with the benefit of hindsight, the non-rational choices, chance, and contingency, which played a significant role in averting nuclear war, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Able Archer 83 crisis of 1983.[19] Thus, they argue that evidence trumps theory and deterrence theories cannot be reconciled with the historical record.
Kenneth Waltz argues in favor of the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons.[20] In the July 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs Waltz took issue with the view of most US, European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers that a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable. Instead, Waltz argues that it would probably be the best possible outcome by restoring stability to the Middle East since it would balance the Israeli regional monopoly on nuclear weapons.[21] Professor John Mueller of Ohio State University, author of Atomic Obsession[22] has also dismissed the need to interfere with Iran's nuclear program and expressed that arms control measures are counterproductive.[23] During a 2010 lecture at the University of Missouri, which was broadcast by C-Span, Dr. Mueller also argued that the threat from nuclear weapons, including that from terrorists, has been exaggerated in the popular media and by officials.[24]
In contrast, various American government officials, including Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry,[25][26][27] who were in office during the Cold War period, now advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons in the belief that the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence is obsolete and that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective ever since the Cold War ended.[25] A 2011 article in The Economist argued, along similar lines, that risks are more acute in rivalries between relatively-new nuclear states that lack the "security safeguards" developed by the Americans and the Soviets and that additional risks are posed by the emergence of pariah states, such as North Korea (possibly soon to be joined by Iran), armed with nuclear weapons as well as the declared ambition of terrorists to steal, buy, or build a nuclear device.[28]