Operation Citadel
Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) was the German offensive operation in July 1943 against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient, proposed by Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Manstein during the Second World War on the Eastern Front that initiated the Battle of Kursk. The deliberate defensive operation that the Soviets implemented to repel the German offensive is referred to as the Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation. The German offensive was countered by two Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (Russian: Полководец Румянцев) and Operation Kutuzov (Russian: Кутузов). For the Germans, the battle was the final strategic offensive that they were able to launch on the Eastern Front. As the Allied invasion of Sicily began, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threats in the Mediterranean, rather than use them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front.[19] Germany's extensive loss of men and tanks during the operations ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.
The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting off a large number of forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient.[20]
The Kursk salient or bulge was 250 kilometres (160 mi) long from north to south and 160 kilometres (99 mi) from east to west.[21] The plan envisioned an envelopment by a pair of pincers breaking through the northern and southern flanks of the salient.[22] Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies, who were considering withdrawing from the war.[23] It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments industry.[24]
The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German intentions, provided in part by the British intelligence services, the intelligence transmitted by the Lucy spy ring, and Tunny intercepts. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead.[25] The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, mainly the new Panther tank but also larger numbers of the Tiger heavy tank.[26][27][28] This gave the Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts. The defensive preparations included minefields, fortifications, artillery fire zones and anti-tank strong points, which extended approximately 300 km (190 mi) in depth.[29] Soviet mobile formations were moved out of the salient and a large reserve force was formed for strategic counter-offensives.[30]
Termination of Operation Citadel[edit]
On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Kluge and Manstein to his headquarters at Rastenburg in East Prussia.[156] Two days earlier, the Western Allies had invaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to discontinue the offensive. Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive offensive against his sector, but Manstein was less welcoming. Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein stated, "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely beaten."[157] Hitler agreed to temporarily allow the continuance of the offensive in the southern part of the salient, but the following day he ordered Manstein's reserve – the XXIV Panzer Corps – to move south to support the 1st Panzer Army. This removed the force Manstein believed was needed to succeed.[158]
The offensive continued in the southern part with the launch of Operation Roland on 14 July. But after three days, on 17 July, the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to end its offensive operations and begin withdrawing. This marked the end of Operation Roland. One of the panzer corps' divisions was transferred to Italy and the other two were sent south to meet new Soviet offensives.[159] The strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly underestimated by German intelligence, and the Red Army soon went onto the offensive.[158] In his post-war memoirs Lost Victories, Manstein was highly critical of Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle.[160] The veracity of Manstein's claims of a near victory is debatable. The extent of Soviet reserves was far greater than he realised. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple of weeks later. [161][162] The result was a battle of attrition for which the Germans were ill-prepared and which they had little chance of winning.[163]
During Operation Citadel, Luftwaffe units in the area made 27,221 flying sorties with 193 combat losses (0.709% loss rate per sortie). Soviet units from 5 July to 8 July made 11,235 flying sorties with combat losses of 556 aircraft (4.95% per sortie).[16] From a tactical perspective this might have been viewed as a success for the Germans, as they were surely destroying Soviet armor and aircraft with a better kill ratio of 1:6. The problem was that then the Germans were lacking strategic reserves when Western air power began viciously devastating the Luftwaffe and penetrating into Italy. By the fall of 1943 just 25% of Luftwaffe day fighters were in the Eastern Front, ending any hopes of German air superiority in the east.