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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Single Convention, 1961 Convention, or C61) is a United Nations treaty that controls activities (cultivation, production, supply, trade, transport) of specific narcotic drugs and lays down a system of regulations (licenses, measures for treatment, research, etc.) for their medical and scientific uses; it also establishes the International Narcotics Control Board.

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

30 March 1961
8 August 1972 (amendment)

13 December 1964 (original text)[1]
8 August 1975 (as amended in 1972)[2]

40 ratifications

186[3] (as of 2022)

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish

The Single Convention was adopted in 1961[1] and amended in 1972.[2] As of 2022, the Single Convention as amended has been ratified by 186 countries.[3] The convention has since been supplemented by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which controls LSD, MDMA, and other psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; the three conventions establish the legal framework for international drug control and the war on drugs.

Ratification[edit]

The Single Convention as amended in 1972 had been ratified or acceded to by 186 states.[3] Only Chad remained party to the original 1961 Convention in its unamended form.[3] The Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu are not parties.[3]


Since the Single Convention is not self-executing, parties must enact legislation to carry out its provisions, and the UNODC works with countries' legislatures to ensure compliance.

Organic states group: As producers of the organic raw materials for most of the global drug supply, these countries had been the traditional focus of international drug control efforts. They were open to socio-cultural drug use, having lived with it for centuries. While , Turkey, Pakistan and Burma took the lead, the group also included the coca-producing states of Indonesia and the Andean region of South America, the opium- and cannabis-producing countries of South and Southeast Asia, and the cannabis-producing states in the Horn of Africa. They favored weak controls because existing restrictions on production and export had directly affected large segments of their domestic population and industry. They supported national control efforts based on local conditions and were wary of strong international control bodies under the UN. Although essentially powerless to fight the prohibition philosophy directly, they effectively forced a compromise by working together to dilute the treaty language with exceptions, loopholes and deferrals. They also sought development aid to compensate for losses caused by strict controls.

India

Manufacturing states group: This group included primarily Western industrialized nations, the key players being the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, , the Netherlands, West Germany, and Japan. Having no cultural affinity for organic drug use and being faced with the effects of drug abuse on their citizens, they advocated stringent controls on the production of organic raw materials and on illicit trafficking. As the principal manufacturers of synthetic psychotropics, and backed by a determined industry lobby, they forcefully opposed undue restrictions on medical research or the production and distribution of manufactured drugs. They favored strong supranational control bodies as long as they continued to exercise de facto control over such bodies. According to W.B. McAllister's Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, their strategy was essentially to "shift as much of the regulatory burden as possible to the raw-material-producing states while retaining as much of their own freedom as possible."

Switzerland

Strict control group: These were essentially non-producing and non-manufacturing states with no direct economic stake in the drug trade. The key members were France, Sweden, Brazil, and the . Most of the states in this group were culturally opposed to drug use and suffered from abuse problems. They favored restricting drug use to medical and scientific purposes and were willing to sacrifice a degree of national sovereignty to ensure the effectiveness of supranational control bodies. They were forced to moderate their demands to secure the widest possible agreement.

Republic of China

Weak control group: This group was led by the and often included its allies in Europe, Asia and Africa. They considered drug control a purely internal issue and adamantly opposed any intrusion on national sovereignty, such as independent inspections. With little interest in the drug trade and minimal domestic abuse problems, they refused to give excessive power to any supranational body, especially over internal decision-making.

Soviet Union

Neutral group: This was a diverse group including most of the African countries, Central America, sub-Andean South America, Luxembourg and the . They had no strong interest in the issue apart from ensuring their own access to sufficient drug supplies. Some voted with political blocs, others were willing to trade votes, and others were truly neutral and could go either way on the control issue depending on the persuasive power of the arguments presented. In general, they supported compromise with a view to obtaining the broadest possible agreement.

Vatican

The League of Nations adopted several drug control treaties prior to World War II, such as the International Opium Convention, and International Convention relating to Dangerous Drugs (1925)[4] specifying uniform controls on addictive drugs such as cocaine and opium, and its derivatives. However, the lists of controlled substances were fixed in the treaties' text. Consequently, it was necessary to periodically amend or supersede the conventions with the introduction of new treaties to keep up with advances in chemistry. According to a 1954 interview with United States Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger, the cumbersome process of conference and state-by-state ratification could take many decades.[5]


A Senate of Canada committee reported: "The work of consolidating the existing international drug control treaties into one instrument began in 1948, but it was 1961 before an acceptable third draft was ready."[6] That year, the UN Economic and Social Council convened a plenipotentiary conference of 73 nations for the adoption of a single convention on narcotic drugs. That meeting was known as the United Nations Conference on Narcotic Drugs. The participating states organized themselves into five distinct caucuses:[6]


These competing interests, after more than eight weeks of negotiations, finally produced a compromise treaty. Several controls were weakened; for instance, the proposed mandatory embargoes on nations failing to comply with the treaty became recommendations. The 1953 New York Opium Protocol, which had not yet entered into force, limited opium production to seven countries; the Single Convention lifted that restriction, but instituted other regulations and put the International Narcotics Control Board in charge of monitoring their enforcement. A compromise was also struck that allowed heroin and some other drugs classified as particularly dangerous to escape absolute prohibition.[7]


The Single Convention created four Schedules of controlled substances and a process for adding new substances to the Schedules without amending the treaty. The Schedules were designed to have significantly stricter regulations than the two drug "Groups" established by predecessor treaties. For the first time, cannabis was added to the list of internationally controlled drugs. In fact, regulations on the cannabis plant – as well as the opium poppy, the coca bush, poppy straw and cannabis tops – were embedded in the text of the treaty, making it impossible to deregulate them through the normal Scheduling process. A 1962 issue of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs' Bulletin on Narcotics proudly announced that "after a definite transitional period, all non-medical use of narcotic drugs, such as opium smoking, opium eating, consumption of cannabis (hashish, marijuana) and chewing of coca leaves, will be outlawed everywhere. This is a goal which workers in international narcotics control all over the world have striven to achieve for half a century."[7]


A 3 August 1962, Economic and Social Council resolution ordered the publication of the Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.[8] The legal commentary was written by the United Nations Secretary-General staff member Adolf Lande, the former Secretary of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug Supervisory Body, operating under a mandate to give "an interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in the light of the relevant conference proceedings and other material."[9] The Commentary contains the Single Convention's legislative history and is an invaluable aid to interpreting the treaty.


The Single Convention entered into force on 13 December 1964, having met Article 41's requirement of 40 ratifications. As of 1 January 2005, 180 states were Parties to the treaty.[10] Others, such as Cambodia, have committed to becoming Parties.[11]


On 21 May 1971, the UN Economic and Social Council called a conference of plenipotentiaries to consider amendments to the Single Convention. The conference met at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 6 to 24 March 1972, producing the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The amendments entered into force on 8 August 1975.[10]


On 11 November 1990, mechanisms for enforcing the Single Convention were expanded significantly by the entry into force of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which had been signed at Vienna on 20 December 1988. The Preamble to this treaty acknowledges the inadequacy of the Single Convention's controls to stop "steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". The new treaty focuses on stopping organized crime by providing for international cooperation in apprehending and convicting gangsters and starving them of funds through forfeiture, asset freezing, and other methods. It also establishes a system for placing precursors to Scheduled drugs under international control. Some non-Parties to the Single Convention, such as Andorra, belong to this treaty and thus are still under the international drug control regime.

Schedule I – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a drug.

Schedule II – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a drug.

Schedule III – The preparation, because of the substances which it contains, is not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill effects; and the drug therein is not readily recoverable.

Schedule IV – The drug, which is already in Schedule I, is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects, and such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages.

Consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for medical and scientific purposes;

Used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule Ill, and of substances not covered by this convention;

Exported;

Added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate; and

Acquired within the limit of the relevant estimate for special purposes.

The Single Convention gives the UN Economic and Social Council's Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) power to add or delete drugs from the Schedules, in accordance with the World Health Organization's findings and recommendations. Any Party to the treaty may request an amendment to the Schedules, or request a review of the commission's decision. The Economic and Social Council is the only body that has power to confirm, alter, or reverse the CND's scheduling decisions. The United Nations General Assembly can approve or modify any CND decision, except for scheduling decisions.


The CND's annual meeting serves as a forum for nations to debate drug policy. At the 2005 meeting, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and Iran rallied in opposition to the UN's zero-tolerance approach in international drug policy. Their appeal was vetoed by the United States, while the United Kingdom delegation remained reticent.[53] Meanwhile, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John Walters clashed with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa on the issue of needle exchange programs. Walters advocated strict prohibition, while Costa opined, "We must not deny these addicts any genuine opportunities to remain HIV-negative."[54]


The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is mandated by Article 9 of the Single Convention to "endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs." The INCB administers the estimate system, which limits each nation's annual production of controlled substances to the estimated amounts needed for medical and scientific purposes.


Article 21 provides that "the total of the quantities of each drug manufactured and imported by any country or territory in any one year shall not exceed the sum of" the quantity:


Article 21 bis, added to the treaty by a 1971 amendment, gives the INCB more enforcement power by allowing it to deduct from a nation's production quota of cannabis, opium, and coca the amounts it determines have been produced within that nation and introduced into the illicit traffic. This could happen as a result of failing to control either illicit production or diversion of licitly produced opium to illicit purposes.[55] In this way, the INCB can essentially punish a narcotics-exporting nation that does not control its illicit traffic by imposing an economic sanction on its medicinal narcotics industry.


The Single Convention exerts power even over those nations that have not ratified it. The International Narcotics Board states:[56]


Article 14 authorizes the INCB to recommend an embargo on imports and exports of drugs from any noncompliant nations. The INCB can also issue reports critical of noncompliant nations, and forward those reports to all Parties. This happened when the United Kingdom reclassified cannabis from Class B to class C, eliminating the threat of arrest for possession.[57] See Cannabis reclassification in the United Kingdom.


The most controversial decisions of the INCB are those in which it assumes the power to interpret the Single Convention. Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain continue to experiment with medically supervised injection rooms, despite the INCB's objections that the Single Convention's allowance of "scientific purposes" is limited to clinical trials of pharmaceutical grade drugs and not public health interventions.[58] These European nations have more leverage to disregard the Board's decisions because they are not dependent on licit psychoactive drug exports (which are regulated by the Board). As international lawyer Bill Bush notes, "Because of the Tasmanian opium poppy industry, Australia is more vulnerable to political pressure than, say, Germany."[58]


The INCB is an outspoken opponent of drug legalization. Its 2002 report rejects a common argument for drug reform, stating, "Persons in favour of legalizing illicit drug use argue that drug abusers should not have their basic rights violated; however, it does not seem to have occurred to those persons that drug abusers themselves violate the basic rights of their own family members and society." The report dismisses concerns that drug control conflicts with principles of limited government and self-determination, arguing, "States have a moral and legal responsibility to protect drug abusers from further self-destruction." The report takes a majoritarian view of the situation, declaring, "Governments must respect the view of the majority of lawful citizens; and those citizens are against illicit drug use."[59]


Article 48 designates the International Court of Justice as the arbiter of disputes about the interpretation or application of the Single Convention, if mediation, negotiation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution fail.

Related treaties[edit]

Previous treaties[edit]

Article 44 provided that the Single Convention's entry into force terminated several predecessor treaties, including:

Convention on Psychotropic Substances

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

Drug policy

Riboulet-Zemouli, K. (2022) . Paris and Washington, DC: FAAAT editions. ISBN 979-10-97087-23-4

High Compliance, a Lex Lata Legalization for the Non-Medical Cannabis Industry: How to Regulate Recreational Cannabis in Accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

Wisehart, D. (2020) Drug Control and International Law.  9780367584993

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Mills, James H. (2016) The IHO as actor : the case of cannabis and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961. Hygiea Internationalis, 13(1), 5–115. :10.3384/hygiea.1403-8668.1613195

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Bewley-Taylor, D. (2014) . Amsterdam: TNI.

The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition

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1962/914(XXXIV)D. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: Preparations for the coming into force

Alfons NOLL, LL.M.: , Bulletin on Narcotics, 1977.

Drug abuse and penal provisions of the international drug control treaties

Bayer, I. and Ghodse, H.: , United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Evolution of International Drug Control, 1945–1995

Beeby, Dean: , Canadian Press, 20 April 2003.

Health Canada considers abandoning highly potent marijuana strain

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An anniversary to regret: 40 years of failure of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

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Cannabis: Our Position for a Canadian Public Policy

Cappato, Marco and Perduca, Marco: , 9 October 2002.

Concept Paper for Campaign by the Transnational Radical Party and the International Antirohibitionist League to Reform the UN Conventions on Drugs

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Controlled Substances Act – U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

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Controls Required by the Single Convention

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Convention on Psychotropic Substances

Cowan, Richard: , 9 July 2001.

As More and More Countries Begin to Question Cannabis Prohibition, The Debate Should Be An International. Basic Rights Versus Toothless Treaties

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Drugs policy in the Netherlands

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Fazey, Cindy: , National Addiction Centre, 2003.

A Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis

Fazey, Cindy: , 14 March 2003.

The Mechanics and Dynamics of the UN System for International Drug Control

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The UN Conventions

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The UN Drug Policies and the Prospect for Change

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Interview with Dr. Philip O. Emafo, President of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)

McAllister, William B. , Routledge, 2000

Drug diplomacy in the twentieth century: an international history

McLaughlin, Aideen: , 13 March 2005.

Drugs expert warns: cannabis as dangerous to society as heroin

1 January 2005.

Monthly Status of Treaty Adherence

Archived 28 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine The chemical name and structure of each substance under the control of the Treaty. Correlates the drugs and substances controlled by the Treaty with those named in the Canadian Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the UK Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the US Controlled Substances Act.

Narcotic Drugs under International Control ("Yellow List")

Bulletin on Narcotics, 8 May 2005.

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Provision of Marijuana and Other Compounds For Scientific Research – Recommendations of The National Institute on Drug Abuse National Advisory Council

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Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002

Riley, Diane: , Nov. 1998.

Drugs and Drug Policy in Canada: A Brief Review & Commentary

28 March 2003.

Road to Vienna: British Government Chides International Narcotics Control Board on Cannabis Rescheduling Critique

Cannabis Control Policy: A Discussion Paper, Health Protection Branch, Department of National Health and Welfare, Canada, Jan. 1979.

The Single Convention and Its Implications for Canadian Cannabis Policy

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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961

Tan, Amy: , Reuters, 12 April 2002.

Singapore death penalty shrouded in silence

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