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State-owned enterprise

A state-owned enterprise (SOE) is a government entity which is established or nationalised by a national or provincial government, by an executive order or an act of legislation, in order to earn profit for the government, control monopoly of the private sector entities, provide products and services to citizens at a lower price, implement government policies, and/or to deliver products & services to the remote locations of the country. The national government or provincial government has majority ownership over these state owned enterprises. These state owned enterprises are also known as public sector undertakings in some countries.[1] Defining characteristics of SOEs are their distinct legal form and possession of financial goals and developmental objectives (e.g., a state railway company may aim to make transportation more accessible and earn profit for the government). SOEs are government entities established to pursue financial objectives and developmental goals.[2]

"Crown corporation" redirects here. For Crown corporations in Canada, its provinces and its territories, see Crown corporations of Canada.

Economic theory[edit]

In economic theory, the question of whether a firm should be owned by the state or by the private sector is studied in the theory of incomplete contracts developed by Oliver Hart and his co-authors.[9] In a world in which complete contracts were feasible, ownership would not matter because the same incentive structure that prevails under one ownership structure could be replicated under the other ownership structure. Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) have developed the leading application of the incomplete contract theory to the issue of state-owned enterprises.[10] These authors compare a situation in which the government is in control of a firm to a situation in which a private manager is in control. The manager can invest to come up with cost-reducing and quality-enhancing innovations. The government and the manager bargain over the implementation of the innovations. If the negotiations fail, the owner can decide about the implementation. It turns out that when cost-reducing innovations do not harm quality significantly, then private firms are to be preferred. Yet, when cost-reductions may strongly reduce quality, state-owned enterprises are superior. Hoppe and Schmitz (2010) have extended this theory in order to allow for a richer set of governance structures, including different forms of public-private partnerships.[11]

Effects[edit]

Compared to government bureaucracy[edit]

Compared to government bureaucracy, state owned enterprises might be beneficial because they reduce politicians' influence over the service.[14][15] Conversely, they might be detrimental because they reduce oversight and increase transaction costs (such as monitoring costs, i.e., it is more difficult and costly to govern and regulate an autonomous SOE than it is the public bureaucracy). Evidence suggests that existing SOEs are typically more efficient than government bureaucracy, but that this benefit diminishes as services get more technical and have less overt public objectives.[4]

Compared to regular enterprises[edit]

Compared to a regular enterprise, state-owned enterprises are typically expected to be less efficient due to political interference, but unlike profit-driven enterprises they are more likely to focus on government objectives.[15]

(PDF), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 301, GAO/AFMD-89-43FS Document: H402-4. Alternate location:

Profiles of Existing Government Corporations—A Study Prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office for the Committee on Government Operations

, archived from the original on 2015-10-25.

Malaysia GLC OpenDay 2015

Jewellord Nem Singh; Geoffrey C. Chen (2018), "", Third World Quarterly, 39:6, 1077–1097, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2017.1333888

State-owned enterprises and the political economy of state–state relations in the developing world

by Elmer G. Wiens.

The Public Firm with Managerial Incentives