Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide communications security over a computer network. The protocol is widely used in applications such as email, instant messaging, and voice over IP, but its use in securing HTTPS remains the most publicly visible.

The TLS protocol aims primarily to provide security, including privacy (confidentiality), integrity, and authenticity through the use of cryptography, such as the use of certificates, between two or more communicating computer applications. It runs in the presentation layer and is itself composed of two layers: the TLS record and the TLS handshake protocols.

The closely related Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is a communications protocol that provides security to datagram-based applications. In technical writing, references to "(D)TLS" are often seen when it applies to both versions.^[1]

TLS is a proposed Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard, first defined in 1999, and the current version is TLS 1.3, defined in August 2018. TLS builds on the now-deprecated SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) specifications (1994, 1995, 1996) developed by Netscape Communications for adding the HTTPS protocol to their Netscape Navigator web browser.

The handshake begins when a client connects to a TLS-enabled server requesting a secure connection and the client presents a list of supported (ciphers and hash functions).

cipher suites

From this list, the server picks a cipher and hash function that it also supports and notifies the client of the decision.

The server usually then provides identification in the form of a . The certificate contains the server name, the trusted certificate authority (CA) that vouches for the authenticity of the certificate, and the server's public encryption key.

digital certificate

The client confirms the validity of the certificate before proceeding.

random number

initialization vector

Support for registration of parameters.^[44]

IANA

Encryption: SSL certificates encrypt data sent between a web server and a user’s browser, ensuring that sensitive information is protected throughout transmission. This encryption technology stops unauthorized parties from intercepting and interpreting data, so protecting it from possible risks such as hacking or data breaches.

Authentication: SSL certificates also offer authentication, certifying the integrity of a website and that visitors are connecting to the correct server rather than a malicious impostor. This authentication method helps consumers gain trust by ensuring that they are dealing with a trustworthy and secure website.

Integrity: Another important role of SSL certificates is to ensure data integrity. SSL uses cryptographic techniques to verify that data communicated between the server and the browser is intact and unmodified during transit. This keeps malevolent actors from interfering with the data, ensuring its integrity and trustworthiness.

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Security[edit]

Attacks against TLS/SSL[edit]

Significant attacks against TLS/SSL are listed below.

In February 2015, IETF issued an informational RFC^[102] summarizing the various known attacks against TLS/SSL.

If all virtual servers belong to the same domain, a can be used.^[177] Besides the loose host name selection that might be a problem or not, there is no common agreement about how to match wildcard certificates. Different rules are applied depending on the application protocol or software used.^[178]

wildcard certificate

Add every virtual host name in the subjectAltName extension. The major problem being that the certificate needs to be reissued whenever a new virtual server is added.

From the application protocol point of view, TLS belongs to a lower layer, although the TCP/IP model is too coarse to show it. This means that the TLS handshake is usually (except in the STARTTLS case) performed before the application protocol can start. In the name-based virtual server feature being provided by the application layer, all co-hosted virtual servers share the same certificate because the server has to select and send a certificate immediately after the ClientHello message. This is a big problem in hosting environments because it means either sharing the same certificate among all customers or using a different IP address for each of them.

There are two known workarounds provided by X.509:

To provide the server name, RFC 4366 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions allow clients to include a Server Name Indication extension (SNI) in the extended ClientHello message. This extension hints to the server immediately which name the client wishes to connect to, so the server can select the appropriate certificate to send to the clients.

RFC 2817 also documents a method to implement name-based virtual hosting by upgrading HTTP to TLS via an HTTP/1.1 Upgrade header. Normally this is to securely implement HTTP over TLS within the main "http" URI scheme (which avoids forking the URI space and reduces the number of used ports), however, few implementations currently support this.

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Standards[edit]

Primary standards[edit]

The current approved version of (D)TLS is version 1.3, which are specified in:

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– a TLS extension used for SPDY and TLS False Start

Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation

– a secret anti-encryption program run by the U.S. National Security Agency

Bullrun (decryption program)

Certificate authority

Certificate Transparency

Delegated credential

– HSTS

HTTP Strict Transport Security

Key ring file

(PCT) – a historic Microsoft competitor to SSL 2.0

Private Communications Technology

(Quick UDP Internet Connections) – "…was designed to provide security protection equivalent to TLS/SSL"; QUIC's main goal is to improve perceived performance of connection-oriented web applications that are currently using TCP

QUIC

Server-Gated Cryptography

tcpcrypt

Datagram Transport Layer Security

TLS acceleration

Sullivan, Nick (2017-12-26). . The Cloudflare Blog. Retrieved 2020-03-14.

"Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet"

Thomson, Martin; Pauly, Tommy (December 2021). . doi:10.17487/RFC9170. RFC 9170.

Long-Term Viability of Protocol Extension Mechanisms

Wagner, David; Schneier, Bruce (November 1996). (PDF). The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings. USENIX Press. pp. 29–40.

"Analysis of the SSL 3.0 Protocol"

Rescorla, Eric (2001). . United States: Addison-Wesley Pub Co. ISBN 978-0-201-61598-2.

SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems

Stephen A. Thomas (2000). SSL and TLS essentials securing the Web. New York: Wiley. 978-0-471-38354-3.

ISBN

Bard, Gregory (2006). . International Association for Cryptologic Research (136). Retrieved 2011-09-23.

"A Challenging But Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack on SSL"

Canvel, Brice. . Archived from the original on 2016-04-20. Retrieved 2007-04-20.

"Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel"

RFC of change for TLS Renegotiation. 2010. :10.17487/RFC5746. RFC 5746.

doi

Linux Journal article by Rami Rosen

Creating VPNs with IPsec and SSL/TLS

Joshua Davies (2010). Implementing SSL/TLS. Wiley. 978-0470920411.

ISBN

Polk, Tim; McKay, Kerry; Chokhani, Santosh (April 2014). (PDF). National Institute of Standards and Technology. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-05-08. Retrieved 2014-05-07.

"Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations"

Abdou, AbdelRahman; van Oorschot, Paul (August 2017). . Transactions on Privacy and Security. 21 (1). ACM: 1:1–1:26. doi:10.1145/3139294. S2CID 5869541.

"Server Location Verification (SLV) and Server Location Pinning: Augmenting TLS Authentication"

Ivan Ristic (2022). Bulletproof TLS and PKI, Second Edition. Feisty Duck. 978-1907117091.

Transport Layer Security

cipher suites

digital certificate

random number

initialization vector

IANA

version 39

Windows 7

Android 4.0

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Security[edit]

Attacks against TLS/SSL[edit]

wildcard certificate

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Standards[edit]

Primary standards[edit]

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Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation

Bullrun (decryption program)

Certificate authority

Certificate Transparency

Delegated credential

HTTP Strict Transport Security

Key ring file

Private Communications Technology

QUIC

Server-Gated Cryptography

tcpcrypt

Datagram Transport Layer Security

TLS acceleration

"Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet"

Long-Term Viability of Protocol Extension Mechanisms

"Analysis of the SSL 3.0 Protocol"

SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems

ISBN

"A Challenging But Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack on SSL"

"Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel"

doi

Creating VPNs with IPsec and SSL/TLS

ISBN

"Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations"

"Server Location Verification (SLV) and Server Location Pinning: Augmenting TLS Authentication"

ISBN

Internet Engineering Task Force – TLS Workgroup