Thing-in-itself

In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation. The concept of the thing-in-itself was introduced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and over the following centuries was met with controversy among later philosophers.^[1] It is closely related to Kant's concept of noumena or the objects of inquiry, as opposed to phenomena, its manifestations.

Criticism[edit]

F. H. Jacobi[edit]

The first to criticize the concept of a thing-in-itself was F. H. Jacobi, with the expression:

– in philosophy, is incomprehensibleness, or the impossibility of comprehending or conceiving a thing

Acatalepsy

– That mind-independent objects do not exist because it is impossible to conceive of them (a viewpoint put forward by George Berkeley)

Master argument

– Object or event that exists independently of the senses of a posited object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception

Noumenon

– Difference between using a word and mentioning it, according to which it is necessary to make a distinction between using a word (or phrase) and mentioning it as a thing in itself