Triangular diplomacy
In political science, triangular diplomacy is a foreign policy of the United States, developed during the Vietnam War (1955–1975) by Henry Kissinger, as a means to manage relations between the contesting communist powers, the Soviet Union and China. Connecting heavily with the correlating policy of linkage, the policy was intended to exploit the ongoing rivalry between the two Communist powers (following the Sino-Soviet split [1956–1966]), as a means to strengthen American hegemony and diplomatic interest.
See also: Linkage (policy)Interrelating primarily with the subsequent development of the détente era (1969–1979) during the Cold War, triangular diplomacy was instituted in order to prevent the decline of American authority during the Vietnam War following the perceived inefficiencies of George Kennan's defensive policy of containment and Dwight Eisenhower's offensive policy of rollback. Hence, triangular diplomacy was an instrumental facet in the shifting of Cold War policy toward talks of co-operation and diplomacy, and thus set a precedent for the eventual relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers through a focus on mutual benefit (as evidenced in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) treaties).
Terminology[edit]
In principle, the policy of triangular diplomacy seeks to link the interests of three powerful states in order to retain a balance of power within the international system. Most commonly, this involves an insecure state (or states) pursuing strategic alliances or economic deals in an attempt to both weaken the hegemony of a powerful adversary and strengthen their own position. First developed by U.S. advisor Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War era, the policy was argued to be most effective when reliant upon “the natural incentives and propensities of the players.[1]”
Conceived in a period of American political weakness, Kissinger's doctrine argues that foreign policy needed to rely on a combination of diplomacy and military power in order to bring benefits to all relevant players, and subsequently ensure international stability.[2] This doctrine heavily relates to a neorealist analysis of international politics, professed by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz.[3] Kissinger's desires to seek a “coalition” with China in order to stabilise the power of the Soviet Union reflects the neorealist balance of power theory, as insecure states are seeking to bring an equilibrium to the international order in an attempt to bring peace and benefit the relevant actors.[4]