United Nations Operation in Somalia II
The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was the second phase of the United Nations intervention in Somalia and took place from March 1993 until March 1995, following the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991. UNOSOM II carried on from the transitory United States-controlled (UN-sanctioned) Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which had been preceded by UNOSOM I. Notably, UNOSOM II embarked on a nation-building mission, diverging from its predecessors.[15] As delineated in UNSCR 814, the operation's objectives were to aid in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, foster political reconciliation, and re-establish political and civil administrations across Somalia.[16]
UNOSOM II was a substantial multinational initiative, uniting over 22,000 troops from 27 nations. This operation marked the largest multilateral force ever assembled for peacekeeping, and at that time, it was the costliest UN operation.[16] Notably, it was the first UN mission authorized from the start to use military force proactively, beyond self-defense.[17]
Four months into its mandate in June 1993, UNOSOM II transformed into a military campaign as it found itself entangled in armed conflict with Somali factions, predominantly against the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid. As the intervention progressed, military operations against the SNA took focus, relegating the task of political reconciliation, institution-building and humanitarian aid to a peripheral role.[18][15] Three months into the conflict, the US military would implement Operation Gothic Serpent to assist UNOSOM II against the SNA with special forces. Soon after, the infamous Battle of Mogadishu took place, signifying the end of the hunt for Aidid and military operations in Somalia.[19] The United States withdrew six months after the battle, and the remaining UN forces departed from Somalia in early 1995, concluding the operation.[20]
UNOSOM II faced heavy criticism for alleged human rights abuses, violations of international law, and the use of excessive force, attracting scrutiny from a wide range of humanitarian organizations, academics and journalists.[21][22][23][24] Furthermore, the operation was widely criticized for an overemphasis on military operations, diverging from its original humanitarian intent.[25] The humanitarian impact and number of lives saved is disputed.[26]
Criticism of UNOSOM II[edit]
Over emphasis on military operations[edit]
UNOSOM II was widely criticized for placing too much emphasis on military operations. Over 90% of the operations $1.6 billion budget was used for military or security purposes.[137][60] In July 1993, UN relief head Jan Eliasson publicly admonished UNOSOM II for spending 10 times as much on military operations in Somalia than it did on aid. At the time he would caution that the original objective of sending troops to Somalia was being forgotten.[138] Due to the war with the Somali National Alliance and the insurgency, UNOSOM II would end up spending far more than the allocated $1.6 billion.[139]
Ramesh Thakur, a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed out that the extent, intensity, and frequency of military force used by UNOSOM II after 5 June 1993, did not align with the principles and definition of a peacekeeping operation as defined by the United Nations.[15] The day after the Battle of Mogadishu, after being asked by journalists on national news if Malaysia disagreed with any UNOSOM policies, Defence Minister Najib Razak would comment: "We find there is too much emphasis on military action, like it was an obsession."[140] This would lead to accusations from some Somalia observers that UNOSOM was helping build up the myth of Aidid by depicting him as the only Somali capable of defying a foreign military presence.[83]
Excessive force and human rights abuses[edit]
UNOSOM II forces were criticized for various instances of human rights abuses, violations of international law and excessive force by a wide range of academics, foreign correspondents and humanitarian organizations.[141][142][143][25][87] Doctors Without Borders,[144] Human Rights Watch[145] and Amnesty International[23] would all criticize UNOSOM II on these grounds. Africa Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders would both publish detailed reports of abuses by UN forces during the summer of 1993.[25][146] While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force stemmed from the highest echelons of the command structure and were not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers.[25] According to de Waal, on several occasions UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu violated the Geneva Conventions.[89] Among the forces responsible for human rights abuses were the United States, Italy, France, Nigeria and numerous other UNOSOM contingents.[77]
Some of the most widely criticized events that occurred from 5 June to 3–4 October 1993 include:
Aftermath and legacy[edit]
UNOSOM II is widely regarded as unsuccessful in achieving its main objectives and having ended in failure, largely due to the decision to withdraw without completing its goals following the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.[8][79][9][10][158] According to Alex de Waal, the failure of the operation can only be understood, "...in the context of the routine brutality and impunity of many of the military contingents, which antagonized Somalis who would have otherwise been supportive."[42] A 1995 Amnesty International report would conclude that the operation had demonstrated a poor record of promoting and protecting human rights, which would consequently severely impede its ability to function.[18]
UNOSOM II’s complete departure in early 1995 did not result in the eruption of violence that was widely predicted, though the civil war continued to simmer with occasional clashes between factions.[127][159] The withdrawal led to the formation of local administrations gaining momentum throughout Somalia, such as localized Islamic Courts and regional administrations like Puntland, resulting in period of relative stability and economic growth until the early 2000's.[160] Somali political science professor Hussein Adam notes, "With the collapse of UNOSOM-sponsored institutions, more authentic entities, including authoritative local leaders, have emerged. With the distorting effect of UNOSOM no longer present, the process of both political and economic transformation has been facilitated. In certain places, including northern Mogadishu, alternative institutions have emerged without any external support."[159]
In the view of Walter Clarke, a high ranking US official involved in Operation Restore Hope, and Jeffrey Herbst, Associate Professor at Princeton University, "The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers...on other such missions."[161] The figure of Somalis saved following the large scale military intervention in December 1992 is disputed by various other academics and organizations. According to an assessment by the Washington based independent NGO Refugee Policy Group, only 10,000 to 25,000 lives of the approximately 100,000 rescued by international assistance had been saved by the UNITAF and UNOSOM II interventions, though de Waal argues the true figure of lives saved may have been even lower.[162][147]
Charles W. Maynes, an American diplomat and editor of Foreign Policy, reported that according to private estimates by CIA officials, U.S. troops alone may have been responsible for between 7,000 and 10,000 Somali casualties.[163] Mohamed Sahnoun, former Special Representative of the Secretary General to Somalia claimed 6,000 to 10,000 Somalis had been killed in the war with UNOSOM forces.[14] This has led to debates about the net impact of UNOSOM II.[26][147]
In Somali culture, the era has become the subject of numerous plays and poetry. As noted by Dr. Ana Ljubinkovic, these works often take the form of sophisticated dramas, showcasing a critical perspective of UNOSOM's perceived arrogance and misjudgments.[78]