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1948 Arab–Israeli War

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War, also known as the First Arab–Israeli War, followed the civil war in Mandatory Palestine as the second and final stage of the 1948 Palestine war. The civil war became a war of separate states with the Israeli Declaration of Independence on 14 May 1948, the end of the British Mandate for Palestine at midnight, and the entry of a military coalition of Arab states into the territory of Mandatory Palestine the following morning. The war formally ended with the 1949 Armistice Agreements which established the Green Line.

This article is about the international phase of the 1948 Palestine war. For the preceding civil war phase, see 1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine. For the entire conflict, see 1948 Palestine war.

Since the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the 1920 creation of the British Mandate of Palestine, and in the context of Zionism and the mass migration of European Jews to Palestine, there had been tension and conflict between Arabs, Jews, and the British. British policies dissatisfied both Arabs and Jews. Arab opposition developed into the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, while the Jewish opposition developed into the 1944–1947 Jewish insurgency in Palestine.


The civil war began the day after the adoption of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine 29 November 1947 – which planned to divide the territory into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and the Special International Regime encompassing the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. At the end of a series of offensives that began April 1948, in which Zionist forces had conquered cities and territories in Mandatory Palestine in preparation for the establishment of a Jewish state, Zionist leaders announced the Israeli Declaration of Independence 14 May 1948.[16] The following morning, after the termination of the British Mandate, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and expeditionary forces from Iraq entered Palestine.[17][18][19][20] The invading forces took control of the Arab areas and attacked Israeli forces and several Jewish settlements.[21][22][23] The 10 months of fighting took place mostly on the territory of the British Mandate and in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon, interrupted by several truce periods.[24]


As a result of the war, the State of Israel controlled the area that the UN had proposed for the Jewish state, as well as almost 60% of the area proposed for the Arab state,[25] including the Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle area, Upper Galilee, some parts of the Negev and a wide strip along the Tel AvivJerusalem road. Israel also took control of West Jerusalem, which was meant to be part of an international zone for Jerusalem and its environs. Transjordan took control of East Jerusalem and what became known as the West Bank, annexing it the following year. The territory which became the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt.


Over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes in the area that became Israel, marking the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem,[26] in what they refer to as the Nakba (Arabic for "the catastrophe"). A similar number of Jews moved to Israel during the three years following the war, including 260,000 from the surrounding Arab states.[27][28][29]

Political objectives

Yishuv

Yishuv's aims evolved during the war.[72] Mobilisation for a total war was organised.[73] Initially, the aim was "simple and modest": to survive the assaults of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. "The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs' public rhetoric reinforced these fears". As the war progressed, the aim of expanding the Jewish state beyond the UN partition borders appeared: first to incorporate clusters of isolated Jewish settlements and later to add more territories to the state and give it defensible borders. A third and further aim that emerged among the political and military leaders after four or five months was to "reduce the size of Israel's prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth column, by belligerency and expulsion".[72]


Shay Hazkani's research concludes that Ben-Gurion and segments of the religious Zionist leadership drew parallels between the war and the biblical wars of extermination, and states this was not a fringe position. IDF indoctrination pamphlets were distributed to recruits instructing them that God “demands a revenge of extermination without mercy to whoever tries to hurt us for no reason.”.[74][75]


Plan Dalet, or Plan D, (Hebrew: תוכנית ד', Tokhnit dalet) was a plan worked out by the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary group and the forerunner of the Israel Defense Forces, in autumn 1947 to spring 1948, which was sent to Haganah units in early March 1948. The intent of Plan Dalet is subject to much controversy, with historians on the one extreme asserting that it was entirely defensive, and historians on the other extreme asserting that the plan aimed at maximum conquest and expulsion of the Palestinians. According to Walid Khalidi and Ilan Pappé, its purpose was to conquer as much of Palestine and to expel as many Palestinians as possible,[62][76] though according to Benny Morris there was no such intent. In his book The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé asserts that Plan Dalet was a "blueprint for ethnic cleansing" with the aim of reducing both rural and urban areas of Palestine.[77]


According to Gelber, the plan specified that in case of resistance, the population of conquered villages was to be expelled outside the borders of the Jewish state. If no resistance was met, the residents could stay put, under military rule.[78] According to Morris, Plan D called for occupying the areas within the UN sponsored Jewish state, several concentrations of Jewish population outside those areas (West Jerusalem and Western Galilee), and areas along the roads where the invading Arab armies were expected to attack.[79]


The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs' true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly.[80]

Initial line-up of forces

Military assessments

Though the State of Israel faced the formidable armies of neighbouring Arab countries, due to previous battles the Palestinians themselves hardly existed as a military force by the middle of May.[101] The British Intelligence and Arab League military reached similar conclusions.[102]


The British Foreign Ministry and the CIA believed that the Arab states would finally win in case of war.[103][104] Martin Van Creveld says that in terms of manpower, the sides were fairly evenly matched.[105]


In May, Egyptian generals told their government that the invasion would be "a parade without any risks" and Tel Aviv would be taken "in two weeks."[106] Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all possessed air forces, Egypt and Syria had tanks, and all had some modern artillery.[107] Initially, the Haganah had no heavy machine guns, artillery, armoured vehicles, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons,[61] nor military aircraft or tanks.[53] The four Arab armies that invaded on 15 May were far stronger than the Haganah formations they initially encountered.[108]


On 12 May, three days before the invasion, David Ben-Gurion was told by his chief military advisers (who over-estimated the size of the Arab armies and the numbers and efficiency of the troops who would be committed – much as the Arab generals tended to exaggerate Jewish fighters' strength) that Israel's chances of winning a war against the Arab states were only about even.[107]

Yishuv/Israeli forces

Sources disagree about the quantity of arms at the Yishuv's disposal at the end of the Mandate. According to Karsh before the arrival shipments from Czechoslovakia as part of Operation Balak, there was roughly one weapon for every three fighters, and even the Palmach could arm only two out of every three of its active members.[61] According to Collins and LaPierre, by April 1948, the Haganah had accumulated only about 20,000 rifles and Sten guns for the 35,000 soldiers who existed on paper.[109] According to Walid Khalidi "the arms at the disposal of these forces were plentiful".[62] France authorised Air France to transport cargo to Tel Aviv on 13 May.[110]


Yishuv forces were organised in nine brigades, and their numbers grew following Israeli independence, eventually expanding to twelve brigades. Although both sides increased their manpower over the first few months of the war, the Israeli forces grew steadily as a result of the progressive mobilisation of Israeli society and the influx of an average of 10,300 immigrants each month.[111] By the end of 1948, the Israel Defense Forces had 88,033 soldiers, including 60,000 combat soldiers.[112]

Israeli usage of biological warfare

Research by Israeli historians Benny Morris and Benjamin Kedar show that during the 1948 war, Israel conducted a biological warfare operation codenamed "Cast Thy Bread." According to Morris and Kedar, the Haganah initially used typhoid bacteria to contaminate water wells in newly cleared Arab villages to prevent the population including militiamen from returning. Later, the biological warfare campaign expanded to include Jewish settlements that were in imminent danger of being captured by Arab troops and inhabited Arab towns not slated for capture. There were also plans to expand the biological warfare campaign into other Arab states including Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, but they were not carried out.[233]

In 1948, the Egyptian film tells the story of an Egyptian fighter pilot.[266]

A Girl from Palestine

A 2015 PBS documentary, , depicts the Al Schwimmer-led airborne smuggling missions to arm Israel.[267]

A Wing and a Prayer

List of battles and operations in the 1948 Palestine war

List of modern conflicts in the Middle East

List of wars involving Israel

The Israeli Knesset:

About the War of Independence

Archived 15 August 2002 at the Wayback Machine

United Nations: System on the Question of Palestine

: Palestinian viewpoint concerning the context of the 1948 war at the Library of Congress Web Archives (archived 13 September 2002)

Stephen R. Shalom

The BBC on the UN Partition Plan

The BBC on the Formation of Israel

. Time Magazine. 15 March 1948. Archived from the original on 3 July 2007. Retrieved 31 October 2009.

"I Have Returned"

. Time Magazine. 19 April 1948. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 31 October 2009.

"War for Jerusalem Road"