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NATO bombing of Yugoslavia

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out an aerial bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War. The air strikes lasted from 24 March 1999 to 10 June 1999. The bombings continued until an agreement was reached that led to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo, and the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, a UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The official NATO operation code name was Operation Allied Force (Serbian: Савезничка сила / Saveznička sila) whereas the United States called it Operation Noble Anvil (Serbian: Племенити наковањ / Plemeniti nakovanj);[31] in Yugoslavia the operation was incorrectly called Merciful Angel (Serbian: Милосрдни анђео / Milosrdni anđeo), possibly as a result of a misunderstanding or mistranslation.[32]

NATO's intervention was prompted by Yugoslavia's bloodshed and ethnic cleansing of Albanians, which drove the Albanians into neighbouring countries and had the potential to destabilize the region. Yugoslavia's actions had already provoked condemnation by international organisations and agencies such as the UN, NATO, and various INGOs.[33][34] Yugoslavia's refusal to sign the Rambouillet Accords was initially offered as justification for NATO's use of force.[35] NATO countries attempted to gain authorisation from the UN Security Council for military action, but were opposed by China and Russia, who indicated that they would veto such a measure. As a result, NATO launched its campaign without the UN's approval, stating that it was a humanitarian intervention. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except in the case of a decision by the Security Council under Chapter VII, or self-defence against an armed attack – neither of which were present in this case.[36]


By the end of the war, the Yugoslavs had killed 1,500[37] to 2,131 combatants.[38] 10,317 civilians were killed or missing, with 85% of those being Kosovar Albanian and some 848,000 were expelled from Kosovo.[39] The NATO bombing killed about 1,000 members of the Yugoslav security forces in addition to between 489 and 528 civilians. It destroyed or damaged bridges, industrial plants, hospitals, schools, cultural monuments, and private businesses, as well as barracks and military installations. In total, between 9 and 11 tonnes of depleted uranium was dropped across all of Yugoslavia.[40] In the days after the Yugoslav army withdrew, over 164,000 Serbs and 24,000 Roma left Kosovo. Many of the remaining non-Albanian civilians (as well as Albanians perceived as collaborators) were victims of abuse which included beatings, abductions, and murders.[41][42][43][44][45] After Kosovo and other Yugoslav Wars, Serbia became home to the highest number of refugees and IDPs (including Kosovo Serbs) in Europe.[46][47][48]


The bombing was NATO's second major combat operation, following the 1995 bombing campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the first time that NATO had used military force without the expressed endorsement of the UN Security Council and thus, international legal approval,[49] which triggered debates over the legitimacy of the intervention.

Background

A NATO-facilitated ceasefire between the KLA and Yugoslav forces was signed on 15 October 1998, but both sides broke it two months later and fighting resumed. When the killing of 45 Kosovar Albanians in the Račak massacre was reported in January 1999, NATO decided that the conflict could only be settled by introducing a military peacekeeping force to forcibly restrain the two sides.[50] Yugoslavia refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords, which among other things called for 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law; and the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment and requisition public facilities for its use free of cost.[51][35] NATO then prepared to install the peacekeepers by force, using this refusal to justify the bombings.

An end to all military action and the immediate termination of ;

violence and repressive activities by the Milošević government

Withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo;

Stationing of UN peacekeeping presence in Kosovo;

Unconditional and safe return of all and displaced persons;

refugees

Establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo based on , in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Rambouillet Accords

NATO's objectives in the Kosovo conflict were stated at the North Atlantic Council meeting held at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 12 April 1999:[52]

During the night of 24/25 March 1999: Yugoslav Air Force scrambled five MiG-29s to counter the initial attacks. Two fighters that took off from were vectored to intercept targets over southern Serbia and Kosovo were dealt with by NATO fighters. The MiG-29 flown by Maj. Dragan Ilić was damaged; he landed with one engine out and the aircraft was later expended as a decoy. The second MiG, flown by Maj. Iljo Arizanov, was shot down by an USAF F-15C piloted by Lt. Col. Cesar Rodriguez. A pair from Batajnica Air Base (Maj. Nebojša Nikolić and Maj. Ljubiša Kulačin) were engaged by USAF Capt. Mike Shower who shot down Nikolić while Kulačin evaded several missiles fired at him, while fighting to bring his malfunctioning systems back to working order. Eventually realising that he could not do anything, and with Batajnica AB under attack, Kulačin diverted to Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport, hiding his aircraft under the tail of a parked airliner.[113] The fifth and last MiG-29 to get airborne that night was flown by Maj. Predrag Milutinović. Immediately after take-off his radar failed and electrical generator malfunctioned. Shortly after, he was warned of being acquired by fire control radar, but he eluded the opponent by several evasive manoeuvres. Attempting to evade further encounters, he approached Niš Airport, intending to land, but he was eventually shot down by a KLU F-16AM flown by Maj. Peter Tankink and forced to eject.[114][115]

Niš Airport

In the morning of 25 March, Maj. Slobodan Tešanović stalled his MiG-29 while landing on after a re-basing flight. He ejected safely.[116][117]

Ponikve Airbase

During the war Yugoslav strike aircraft and G-4 Super Galebs performed some 20–30 combat missions against the KLA in Kosovo at treetop level[118] causing some casualties. During one of those missions on 25 March 1999, Lt. Colonel Života Ðurić was killed when his J-22 Orao hit a hill in Kosovo. It was never firmly established whether an aircraft malfunction, pilot error or if enemy action (by KLA) was the cause (NATO never claimed they shot it down).[116]

J-22 Oraos

In the afternoon of 25 March 1999 two Yugoslav MiG-29s took off from Batajnica to chase a lone NATO aircraft flying in the direction of the Bosnian border. They crossed the border and were engaged by two US . Both MiGs were shot down by Captain Jeff Hwang.[119] One MiG pilot, Major Slobodan Perić, having evaded at least one missile before being hit ejected, was later smuggled back to Yugoslavia by the Republika Srpska police. The other pilot, Captain Zoran Radosavljević, did not eject and was killed.[120]

F-15s

the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade, under the command of Colonel Zoltán Dani, equipped with the Isayev S-125 'Neva-M' (NATO designation SA-3 Goa), downed an American F-117 Nighthawk.[121][122] The pilot ejected and was rescued by search and rescue forces near Belgrade. This was the first and so far only time a stealth aircraft has been shot down by hostile ground fire in combat.

On 27 March 1999

Several times between 5 and 7 April 1999, Yugoslav MiG-29s were scrambled to intercept NATO aircraft, but turned back due to malfunctions.

[117]

On 7 April 1999 four were shot down.[123]

RQ-5A Hunter UAVs

On 30 April, some US sources claim that a second F-117A was damaged by a surface-to-air missile. Although the aircraft returned to base, it supposedly never flew again.[125][126]

[124]

On 2 May, a USAF was shot down near Šabac by a SA-3, again fired by the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade. The pilot Lt. Colonel David Goldfein, commander of the 555th Fighter Squadron, was rescued.[127] On the same day an A-10 Thunderbolt II was damaged by a Strela 2 shoulder-mounted SAM over Kosovo and had to make an emergency landing at a Skopje airport in Macedonia,[128] and a Marine Corps Harrier crashed while returning to the amphibious assault carrier USS Kearsarge from a training mission. Its pilot was rescued.[129]

F-16

On 4 May, a Yugoslav , piloted by Lt. Col. Milenko Pavlović, commander of the 204th Fighter Aviation Wing, was shot down at a low altitude over his hometown Valjevo by two USAF F-16s. The falling aircraft was possibly hit as well by Strela 2 fired by Yugoslav troops. Pavlović was killed.[120]

MiG-29

On 11 May, an A-10 was lightly damaged over Kosovo by .[128][130]

9K35 Strela 10

During the war NATO lost two strike helicopters (one on 26 April and the other on 4 May in Albania near the border with Yugoslavia, in training accidents resulting in death of two US Army crew members.

AH-64 Apache

NATO reported that it lost 21 UAVs to technical failures or enemy action during the conflict, including at least seven German UAVs and five French UAVs. While the commander of the Yugoslav Third Army claimed that 21 NATO UAVs had been shot down by Yugoslav forces, another Yugoslav general claimed that Yugoslav air defences and ground forces had shot down 30 UAVs. One of the preferred Yugoslav tactics to destroy hostile UAVs involved the use of transport helicopters in air-to-air combat role. The first IAI RQ-5 Hunter drone lost by the US Army in the campaign was apparently shot down by a Mi-8 helicopter flying alongside, with the door gunner firing a 7.62 mm machine gun. The manoeuvre was repeated several times until Allied air supremacy made this practice too dangerous.[132]

[131]

Averre, Derek. "From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's Relations with the West," International Affairs 85#3 (2009), pp. 575–591

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Byman, Daniel. L and Waxman, Mathew C. "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate". International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4. 2000. Pp. 5–38.

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Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame

January 2000

Kosovo Operation Allied Force—After Action Report

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Operation Allied Force

Human Rights Watch

Civilian deaths in the NATO air campaign

PBS Frontline

frontline: war in europe

Officially confirmed/documented NATO helicopter losses

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"Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns"

Literature list on Operation Allied Force

Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force – Defence Technical Information Center

Archived 23 October 2008 at the Wayback Machine–Storming Media, Pentagon reports

Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force

–Air University

Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force

A detailed list of incidents in which civilians were killed

BBC: Nato's bombing blunders

Archived 4 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine Rand Corporation study on why Yugoslavia gave in during the Kosovo War of 1999

Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did

short exposé by the Rand Corporation

Why Milosevic Gave Up When He Did