Humanitarian intervention

There is not one standard or legal definition of humanitarian intervention; the field of analysis (such as law, ethics or politics) often influences the definition that is chosen. Differences in definition include variations in whether humanitarian intervention is limited to instances where there is an absence of consent from the host state; whether humanitarian intervention is limited to punishment actions; and whether humanitarian intervention is limited to cases where there has been explicit UN Security Council authorization for action.^[2] Nonetheless, there is a general consensus on some of its essential characteristics:^[3]


The customary international law concept of humanitarian intervention dates back to Hugo Grotius and the European politics in the 17th century.^[4][5] However, that customary law has been superseded by the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations, subject to two exhaustive exceptions: UN Security Council action taken under Chapter VII, and self-defence against an armed attack.^[6][7] The type and frequency of humanitarian interventions have changed drastically since the 19th century, with a massive increase in humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War.^[8] Historically, humanitarian interventions were limited to rescuing one's own citizens in other states or to rescue ethnically or religiously similar groups (e.g. Christian countries intervening on behalf of Christians in non-Christian countries).^[8] Over the course of the 20th century (in particular after the end of the Cold War), subjects perceived worthy of humanitarian intervention expanded beyond religiously and ethnically similar groups to encompass all peoples.^[8]


The subject of humanitarian intervention has remained a compelling foreign policy issue, especially since NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, as it highlights the tension between the principle of state sovereignty – a defining pillar of the UN system and international law – and evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force.^[9] Moreover, it has sparked normative and empirical debates over its legality, the ethics of using military force to respond to human rights violations, when it should occur, who should intervene,^[10] and whether it is effective. To its proponents, it marks imperative action in the face of human rights abuses, over the rights of state sovereignty, while to its detractors it is often viewed as a pretext for military intervention often devoid of legal sanction (as indeed a new customary law norm would require sufficient state practice^[11]) selectively deployed and achieving only ambiguous ends. Its frequent use following the end of the Cold War suggested to many that a new norm of military humanitarian intervention was emerging in international politics, although some now argue that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the US "war on terror" have brought the era of humanitarian intervention to an end.^[12]

Potential examples of previous humanitarian interventions include:


Some academics have referred to these cases as humanitarian interventions.^[45][46] However, in some cases this is only a retrospective classification of actions that were the result of a variety of motivations. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia for instance, was justified as self-defense rather than humanitarianism and has only later come to be seen as a possible example of humanitarian intervention.

Views held by States[edit]

The doctrine of humanitarian interventions has not been generally accepted. In April 2000, the 133 states forming the Group of 77 + China explicitly rejected “the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law.”^[48] This far, only the United Kingdom and Belgium explicitly defended the legality of humanitarian interventions.^[49][50]

Criticism[edit]

Many criticisms have been levied against humanitarian intervention.^[51] Inter-governmental bodies and commission reports composed by persons associated with governmental and international careers have rarely discussed the distorting selectivity of geopolitics behind humanitarian intervention nor potential hidden motivations of intervening parties. To find less veiled criticism one must usually turn to civil society perspectives, especially those shaped by independent scholars who benefit from academic freedom.^[52]


Some argue that humanitarian intervention is a modern manifestation of the Western colonialism of the 19th century;^[53] the subjects of such intervention are ruled not by one sole party or entity, but by a mix of local institutions, NGOs and the interveners themselves.^[54] Anne Orford's work is a major contribution along these lines, demonstrating the extent to which the perils of the present for societies experiencing humanitarian catastrophes are directly attributable to the legacy of colonial rule. In the name of reconstruction, a capitalist set of constraints is imposed on a broken society that impairs its right of self-determination and prevents its leadership from adopting an approach to development that benefits the people of the country rather than makes foreign investors happy. The essence of her position is that "legal narratives" justifying humanitarian intervention have had the primary effect of sustaining "an unjust and exploitative status quo".^[55]


Others argue that dominant countries, especially the United States and its coalition partners, are using humanitarian pretexts to pursue otherwise unacceptable geopolitical goals and to evade the non-intervention norm and legal prohibitions on the use of international force. Noam Chomsky and Tariq Ali are at the forefront of this camp, viewing professions of humanitarian motivation with deep skepticism. They argue that the United States has continued to act with its own interests in mind, with the only change being that humanitarianism has become a legitimizing ideology for projection of U.S. hegemony in a post–Cold War world. Ali in particular argues that NATO intervention in Kosovo was conducted largely to boost NATO's credibility.^[56][57] Chomsky's expression of "our excess of righteousness and disinterested benevolence" is often used to describe Kennedy's intervention in South Vietnam, which spread to all of Indochina. Furthermore, he asserts that the prospective leader of "humanitarian intervention" must uphold several qualifications. A first qualification is that the leader has to work as a moral agent that does not magnify the danger of elite culture, the efficacy of the intervention should be on the targeted population, and the people must be the moral agents that undertake humanitarian efforts.^[58]


A third type of criticism centers on the event-based and inconsistent nature of most policies on humanitarian intervention.^[59] These critics argue that there is a tendency for the concept to be invoked in the heat of action, giving the appearance of propriety for Western television viewers, but that it neglects the conflicts that are forgotten by the media or occur based on chronic distresses rather than sudden crises. Henry Kissinger, for example, finds that Bill Clinton's practice of humanitarian intervention was wildly inconsistent. The US launched two military campaigns against Serbia while ignoring more widespread slaughter in Rwanda, justifying the Russian assault on Chechnya, and welcoming to the United States the second-ranking military official of a widely recognized severe human rights violator - the communist government of North Korea.^[60]


Further, sceptics have also argued that humanitarian intervention may have perverse consequences.^[61] Castan Pinos claims that "humanitarian" interventions generate a multiplicity of collateral effects, including civilian deaths, conflict-aggravation, violence spill-over into neighbouring regions and mutual distrust between great powers.^[62]


Jeremy Weinstein, a political scientist at Stanford University, has argued for "autonomous recovery": although the number of civilian deaths rises when violence between rebel groups is left unchecked, the eventual victors can develop institutions and set the terms of their rule in a self-enforcing manner. Such self-enforcement reduces the risk of a country slipping back into violence.^[63]


Another criticism argues that humanitarian intervention has historically consisted of primarily actions directed by so-called Northern states within the internal affairs of so-called Southern states, and has also led to criticism from many non-Western states. These critics argue that the norm of non-intervention and the primacy of sovereign equality is something still cherished by the vast majority of states, which see humanitarian intervention not as a growing awareness of human rights, but a regression to the selective adherence to sovereignty of the pre–UN Charter world.^[64] During the Havana G-77 summit in 2000, the "so-called right of humanitarian intervention" as it was described, was condemned as having no basis in international law.^[65] Furthermore, in his criticism, Chomsky writes that "Humanitarian interventionism goes only one way - from the powerful to the weak", and condemns what he called the targeting of the concept of national sovereignty by humanitarian interventionists, arguing that the primary purpose of national sovereignty is to give weak states partial protection against strong states, and that the protection of national sovereignty under international law stops internal conflicts in weak countries being exploited by strong ones.^[66]

This article relies heavily on the French Wikipedia entry on humanitarian intervention, which was accessed for translation on August 27, 2005.