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Action (philosophy)

In philosophy, an action is an event that an agent performs for a purpose, that is, guided by the person's intention.[1][2] The first question in the philosophy of action is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes.[3][4] According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, it involves discovering "[w]hat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm".[5] There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and the behavior is causalism:[1] driving the car is an action because it is caused by the agent's intention to do so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history.[2] Causalist theories include Donald Davidson's account, which defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way, and volitionalist theories, according to which volitions form a core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a constituent of it.

This article is about the theory of action in general. For Ludwig von Mises' work on this subject, see Human Action. For the concept in sociology, see Social action.

An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, and basic actions, for which this is not the case. Most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But many philosophers consider mental actions to be a distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations and decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do.

Individuation[edit]

The problem of individuation concerns the question of whether two actions are identical or of how actions should be counted. For example, on April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth both pulled the trigger of his gun, fired a shot and killed Abraham Lincoln. On a fine-grained theory of individuation, the pulling, the firing and the killing are three distinct actions.[3] In its most extreme form, there is one distinct action for every action type.[4] So, for example, since "singing" and "singing loudly" are two different action types, someone who sings loudly performs at least these two distinct actions.[3] This kind of view has the unintuitive consequence that even the most simple exercises of agency result in a vast number of actions. Theories of coarse-grained individuation of actions, on the other hand, hold that events that constitute each other or cause each other are to be counted as one action.[3][2] On this view, the action of pulling the trigger is identical to the action of firing the gun and to the action of killing Lincoln. So in doing all of these things, Booth performed only one action. One intuition in favor of this view is that we often do one thing by doing another thing:[2] we shoot the gun by pulling the trigger or we turn on the light by flipping the switch. One argument against this view is that the different events may happen at different times.[4] For example, Lincoln died of his injuries the following day, so a significant time after the shooting. This raises the question of how to explain that two events happening at different times are identical.[4]

Types[edit]

Basic and non-basic[edit]

An important distinction among actions is between basic and non-basic actions. This distinction is closely related to the problem of individuation since it also depends on the notion of doing one thing by or in virtue of doing another thing, like turning on a light by flipping a switch.[26][27][28] In this example, the flipping of the switch is more basic than the turning-on of the light. But the turning-on of the light can itself constitute another action, like the action of alerting the burglar. It is usually held that the chain or hierarchy of actions composed this way has a fundamental level at which it stops.[26][4] The action at this fundamental level is called a basic action: it is not done by doing something else.[3] For this reason, basic actions are simple while non-basic actions are complex.[26]


It is often assumed that bodily movements are basic actions, like the pressing of one's finger against the trigger, while the consequences of these movements, like the firing of the gun, are non-basic actions.[3] But it seems that bodily movements are themselves constituted by other events (muscle contractions)[4] which are themselves constituted by other events (chemical processes). However, it appears that these more basic events are not actions since they are not under our direct volitional control.[1][4] One way to solve these complications is to hold that basic actions correspond to the most simple commands we can follow.[26] This position excludes most forms of muscle contractions and chemical processes from the list of basic actions since we usually cannot follow the corresponding commands directly. What counts as a basic action, according to this view, depends on the agent's skills.[26] So contracting a given muscle is a basic action for an agent who has learned to do so. For something to be a basic action it is not just important what the agent can do but what the agent actually does. So raising one's right hand may only count as a basic action if it is done directly through the right hand. If the agent uses her left hand to lift the right hand then the raising of the right hand is not a basic action anymore.[1][4]


A contrasting view identifies basic actions not with bodily movements but with mental volitions.[1] One motivation for this position is that volitions are the most direct element in the chain of agency: they cannot fail, unlike bodily actions, whose success is initially uncertain.[3] One argument against this position is that it may lead to a vicious regress if it is paired with the assumption that an earlier volition is needed in order for the first volition to constitute an action.[16] This is why volitionists often hold that volitions cause actions or are parts of actions but are not full actions themselves.

Physical and mental[edit]

Philosophers have investigated the concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements.[9][16] It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action.[6] Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that all actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding section above. However, there is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that allows for the existence of both physical and mental actions.[16] Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering.[16]


One influential account of mental action comes from Galen Strawson, who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness".[16][29] According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions.[16] Mental actions, in the strict sense, are prefatory or catalytic: they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise.[29] They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the intended contents will appear.[16] Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off a wall, in which the jumping itself (corresponding to the triggering) is considered an action, but the falling (corresponding to the entertaining of a content) is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control.[16][29] Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent object that this account of mental actions is not complete.[16] Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during meditation, they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing a content from consciousness.[16]


One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events often appear to be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control.[16] Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the standard account of actions in terms of intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think about something already needs to include the content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action.[16] An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish the two.[30]

Related concepts[edit]

Deliberation and decision[edit]

Deliberations and decisions are relevant for actions since they frequently precede the action. It is often the case that several courses of action are open to the agent.[3] In such cases, deliberation performs the function of evaluating the different options by weighing the reasons for and against them. Deciding then is the process of picking one of these alternatives and forming an intention to perform it, thereby leading toward an action.[3][31]

Explanation and rationality[edit]

Explanations can be characterized as answers to why-questions.[32][33] Explanations of actions are concerned with why the agent performed the action. The most straightforward answer to this question cites the agent's desire. For example, John went to the fridge because he had a desire for ice cream. The agent's beliefs are another relevant feature for action explanation.[3] So the desire to have ice cream does not explain that John went to the fridge unless it is paired with John's belief that there is ice cream in the fridge. The desire together with the belief is often referred to as the reason for the action.[3][4] Causalist theories of action usually hold that this reason explains the action because it causes the action.[3][6]


Behavior that does not have a reason is not an action since it is not intentional. Every action has a reason but not every action has a good reason. Only actions with good reasons are considered rational.[34] For example, John's action of going to the fridge would be considered irrational if his reason for this is bad, e.g. because his belief that there is ice cream in the fridge is merely based on wishful thinking.[35]

Responsibility[edit]

The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. But in one sense the problem of responsibility is wider since we can be responsible not just for doing something but for failing to do something, so-called omissions.[3][2][4] For example, a pedestrian witnessing a terrible car accident may be morally responsible for calling an ambulance and for providing help directly if possible. Additionally to what the agent did, it is also relevant what the agent could have done otherwise, i.e. what powers and capacities the agent had.[36] The agent's intentions are also relevant for responsibility, but we can be responsible for things we did not intend. For example, a chain smoker may have a negative impact on the health of the people around him. This is a side-effect of his smoking that is not part of his intention. The smoker may still be responsible for this damage, either because he was aware of this side-effect and decided to ignore it or because he should have been aware of it, so-called negligence.[37]

Perception[edit]

In enactivism theory, perception is understood to be sensorimotor in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving the world. Alva Noë states: 'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us... [we]: crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look...'...'Perception is a mode of activity on the part of the whole animal...It cannot be represented in terms of merely passive, and internal, processes...' [38]

Problem of mental causation[edit]

Some philosophers (e.g. Donald Davidson[39]) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent. Those who hold the belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token-identity reductionists.[40] Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible.[41] For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes.[41] This viewpoint maintains that the relation, intentional properties that are created in the process of justifying one's actions are causally potent in that the process is an instance of action.[41] When considering that actions are causally potent, Dretske claims that the process of justifying one's actions is necessarily part of the causal system.[41] Others have objected to the belief that mental states can cause physical action without asserting that mental properties can be reduced to physical properties.[42] Such individuals suggest that mental states are epiphenomenal, in that they have no impact on physical states, but are nonetheless distinct entities (see epiphenomenalism).[43]

Ability

Action theory

Direct action

Enactivism

Praxeology

Social action

Social relation

Affectional action

Instrumental action

Traditional action

Value-rational action

Communicative action

Dramaturgical action

Symbolic interactionism

Group action

Philosophy of Spinoza

J. R. Finkel, , Up Down Left Right (2011)

"History of the Arrow"

Wilson, George. . In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

"Action"

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