Intention
An intention is a mental state in which the agent commits themselves to a course of action. Having the plan to visit the zoo tomorrow is an example of an intention. The action plan is the content of the intention while the commitment is the attitude towards this content. Other mental states can have action plans as their content, as when one admires a plan, but differ from intentions since they do not involve a practical commitment to realizing this plan. Successful intentions bring about the intended course of action while unsuccessful intentions fail to do so. Intentions, like many other mental states, have intentionality: they represent possible states of affairs.
For the philosophical concept, see Intentionality. For other uses, see Intention (disambiguation).
Theories of intention try to capture the characteristic features of intentions. The belief-desire theory is the traditionally dominant approach. According to a simple version of it, having an intention is nothing but having a desire to perform a certain action and a belief that one will perform this action. Belief-desire theories are frequently criticized based on the fact that neither beliefs nor desires involve a practical commitment to performing an action, which is often illustrated in various counterexamples. The evaluation theory tries to overcome this problem by explaining intentions in terms of unconditional evaluations. That is to say that intentions do not just present the intended course of action as good in some respect, as is the case for desires, but as good all things considered. This approach has problems in explaining cases of akrasia, i.e. that agents do not always intend what they see as the best course of action. A closely related theory identifies intentions not with unconditional evaluations but with predominant desires. It states that intending to do something consists in desiring it the most. Opponents of this approach have articulated various counterexamples with the goal of showing that intentions do not always coincide with the agent's strongest desire. A different approach to the theories mentioned so far is due to Elizabeth Anscombe and denies the distinction between intentions and actions. On her view, to intend a goal is already a form of acting towards this goal and therefore not a distinct mental state. This account struggles to explain cases in which intentions and actions seem to come apart, as when the agent is not currently doing anything towards realizing their plan or in the case of failed actions. The self-referentiality theory suggests that intentions are self-referential, i.e. that they do not just represent the intended course of action but also represent themselves as the cause of the action. But the claim that this happens on the level of the content of the intention has been contested.
The term "intention" refers to a group of related phenomena. For this reason, theorists often distinguish various types of intentions in order to avoid misunderstandings. The most-discussed distinction is that between prospective and immediate intentions. Prospective intentions, also known as "prior intentions", involve plans for the future. They can be subdivided according to how far they plan ahead: proximal intentions involve plans for what one wants to do straightaway whereas distal intentions are concerned with a more remote future. Immediate intentions, on the other hand, are intentions that guide the agent while they are performing the action in question. They are also called "intentions-in-action" or "act-related" intentions. The term "intention" usually refers to anticipated means or ends that motivate the agent. But in some cases, it can refer to anticipated side-effects that are neither means nor ends to the agent. In this case, the term "oblique intention" is sometimes used. Intentions are rationally evaluable: they are either rational or irrational. Conscious intentions are the paradigmatic form of intention: in them, the agent is aware of their goals. But it has been suggested that actions can also be guided by unconscious intentions of which the agent is not aware.
The formation of intentions is sometimes preceded by the deliberation of promising alternative courses of action and may happen in decisions, in which the agent chooses between these alternatives. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions and are frequently used to explain why people engage in a certain behavior. Understanding the behavior of others in terms of intentions already happens in early childhood. Important in this context is the role of gestures, pointing, attention, and eye movement to understand the intentions of others and to form shared intentions. In the philosophy of action, a central question is whether it is true for all intentional actions that they are caused or accompanied by intentions. The theory of reasoned action aims to predict behavior based on how pre-existing attitudes and subjective norms determine behavioral intentions. In ethics, the intention principle states that whether an action is morally permissible sometimes depends on the agent's intention for performing this action.
Formation of intentions[edit]
Intentions can arise in different ways. The paradigmatic type of intention formation happens through practical reason in the form of decisions.[51] In this case, various alternatives are considered by the agent, who then chooses the most favorable one. This choice results in a commitment to the chosen plan of action and thereby constitutes the formation of an intention. Often the choice itself is preceded by deliberation. Deliberation involves formulating promising courses of action and assessing their value by considering the reasons for and against them.[52] An example of this type of intention formation is a student who is up all night thinking about whether to major in English and then finally decides to do so.[5][3] But not all decisions are preceded by deliberation and not every act of deliberation results in a decision. Another type of intention formation happens without making any explicit decision. In such cases, the agent just finds themselves committed to the corresponding course of action without consciously deciding for it or against its alternatives.[5] This is the case for many actions done out of habit. For example, habitually unlocking the office door in the morning is usually an intentional action that happens without a prior explicit decision to do so.[5] It has been argued that decisions can be understood as a type of mental action that consists in resolving uncertainty about what to do.[3] Decisions are usually seen as a momentary change from not having the intention to having it. This contrasts with deliberation, which normally refers to a drawn-out process.[3] But these technical distinctions are not always reflected in how the terms are used in ordinary language.[3]
Psychological functions[edit]
Intentions have various psychological functions in the agent's mind. Some theorists of intentions even base their definition of intentions on the functions they execute. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions. In this sense, they are closely related to motivation.[3] They also help guide the action itself and try to coordinate the agent's behavior over time.[5] A similar function of intentions is to coordinate one's behavior with the behavior of other agents, either by forming intentions together or by reacting to the intentions others already have.[5] This enables various complex forms of cooperation. Not every form of human behavior is guided by intentions. This concerns, for example, bodily reflexes like sneezing or other uncontrolled processes like digestion, which happen without following a previously devised mental plan. Intentions are intimately related to practical reason, i.e. to the reasons for which we act. These reasons are often explained in terms of beliefs and desires.[3] For example, the agent's reason to cross a road may consist in their desire to reach the other side and their belief that this is achieved by crossing it.[3] Because of this close connection to behavior, intentions are frequently used to explain why people engage in certain behavior. Such explanations are often teleological in the sense that they cited the intended goal as the reason for the behavior.[9][11]
Knowledge of the intention of others[edit]
Developmental psychology[edit]
Developmental psychology is, among other things, concerned with how children learn to ascribe intentions to others. Understanding intention is thought to be pivotal in understanding social contexts in numerous ways. First, acquiring an understanding of intention is important for development in that it helps children conceptualize how people and animals differ from objects. Much of behavior is caused by intentions, and understanding intentions helps to interpret these behaviors.[53] Second, intentions are integral to an understanding of morality.[54] Children learn to assign praise or blame based on whether actions of others are intentional. Intention is also necessary to understand and predict the plans and future actions of others.[55] Understanding the intentions and motives of others aids in the interpretation of communication,[56][57] and the achievement of cooperative goals.[58]
Psychological research suggests that understanding intentions of others may be a prerequisite for a higher-level understanding of other people's minds or theory of mind.[59] Theory of mind research attempts to map how children come to understand the mind as a representational device for the world.[60] This research has focused on the development of knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own. A basic ability to comprehend other people's intentions based on their actions is critical to the development of theory of mind.[59] Social, cognitive and developmental psychological research has focused on the question: How do young children develop the ability to understand other people's behaviors and intentions?
Relation to other concepts[edit]
Beliefs and desires[edit]
Intentions are closely related to other mental states, like beliefs and desires.[3] It is generally accepted that intentions involve some form of desire: the intended action is seen as good or desirable in some sense.[2] This aspect makes it possible for intentions to motivate actions. Various ways have been suggested how intentions are related to beliefs. On the one hand, it seems impossible to intend to do something one beliefs to be impossible.[2] Some accounts go even further and suggest that intentions involve the belief that one will perform the action in question.[2][1][5] Besides that, it has been suggested that beliefs are necessary for intentions to connect the behavior to the intended goal. On this view, intentions involve the belief that the intended behavior would cause the intended goal.[2][12]
Action[edit]
In the philosophy of action, a central question is how actions are to be defined, i.e. how they differ from other types of events like a sunrise, a car breaking down, or digestion. The most common approach to this question defines actions in terms of intentions.[5] According to Donald Davidson, an action is an event that is intentional under some description. On this view, it is a central aspect of actions that they are caused by an agent's mental state: their intention.[99][100][2] Another important aspect is that this causation happens in the right way, i.e. that the intention causes the event it planned and that the event is caused by employing the agent's abilities. These additional requirements are needed to exclude so-called "wayward" causal chains, i.e. cases in which the intended behavior happens but the corresponding intention either did not cause the behavior at all or did not cause it in the right way.[101][102][2][3]
Some philosophers have rejected this close link between action and intention. This criticism is based on the idea that a person can perform an action intentionally without having a corresponding intention to perform this action.[4][2][3] Doing something intentionally is usually associated with doing it for a reason. The question then is whether doing something for a reason is possible without having a corresponding intention.[2][3] This is especially relevant for simple actions that are part of bigger routines. Walking to the cinema, for example, involves taking various steps. According to this argument, each step is an intentional action but the agent does not form a distinct intention for each step. Instead, most of them are not explicitly represented by the mind.[4] Another counterexample against the thesis that performing an action intentionally involves intending to perform this action is based on the awareness of unintended side-effects, sometimes referred to as oblique intentions.[1][4][5] One example consists of a chairman deciding to endorse a new project to boost profits despite its negative impact on the environment. In this case, it has been argued that the chairman intentionally harms the environment without an intention to do so.[3]
