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Alfred P. Sloan

Alfred Pritchard Sloan Jr. (/sln/ SLOHN; May 23, 1875 – February 17, 1966) was an American business executive in the automotive industry. He was a long-time president, chairman and CEO of General Motors Corporation.[2] Sloan, first as a senior executive and later as the head of the organization, helped GM grow from the 1920s through the 1950s, decades when concepts such as the annual model change, brand architecture, industrial engineering, automotive design (styling), and planned obsolescence transformed the industry, and when the industry changed lifestyles and the built environment in America and throughout the world.

Alfred P. Sloan

Alfred Pritchard Sloan Jr.

(1875-05-23)May 23, 1875

February 17, 1966(1966-02-17) (aged 90)

President & CEO of General Motors

Irene Jackson

Sloan wrote his memoir, My Years with General Motors,[3] in the 1950s.[4] Like Henry Ford, the other "head man" of an automotive colossus, Sloan is remembered today with a complex mixture of admiration for his accomplishments, appreciation for his philanthropy, and unease or reproach regarding his attitudes during the interwar period and World War II.[5]

Philanthropy[edit]

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is a philanthropic non-profit organization established by Sloan in 1934. The foundation's programs and interests fall into the areas of science and technology, standard of living, economic performance, and education and careers in science and technology. For the year ending December 31, 2014, the total assets of the Sloan Foundation had a market value of about $1.876 billion.[13]


The Sloan Foundation bankrolled the 1956 Warner Bros. cartoon Yankee Dood It, which promotes mass production. In the late 1940s, the Sloan Foundation made a grant to Harding College (now Harding University) in Searcy, Arkansas. The foundation wanted to fund the production of a series of short films that would extol the virtues of capitalism and the American way of life.[14] This resulted in the production of a series of animated cartoons by John Sutherland (producer) which were released on the 16mm non-theatrical market, and also distributed theatrically in 35mm by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.


According to Edwin Black, Sloan was one of the central, behind-the-scenes 1934 founders of the American Liberty League, a political organization whose stated goal was to defend the Constitution, and who opposed Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. In turn, the league would finance other groups with openly more extreme agendas. One such group was the Sentinels of the Republic to which Sloan himself made a $1000 check. After a Congressional investigation into this group went public in 1936, Sloan issued a statement pledging not to further support the Sentinels.


Also according to Black, the GM chief continued to personally fund and organize fund-raising for the National Association of Manufacturers, which was critical of the New Deal.[15]


The Sloan Foundation has made three grants, of $3 million each, to the Wikimedia Foundation (WMF). These are some of the largest grants that the WMF has received.[16]

Criticism[edit]

Overly rational and profit-driven orientation[edit]

According to O'Toole (1995),[17] Sloan built a very objective organization, a company that paid significant attention to "policies, systems, and structures and not enough to people, principles, and values. Sloan, the quintessential engineer, had worked out all the intricacies and contingencies of a foolproof system." But this system left out employees and society.[18] One consequence of this management philosophy was a culture that resisted change. Proof that the system did not remain foolproof forever was seen in GM's problems of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.


In fact, Sloan's memoir and management treatise, My Years With General Motors,[3] foresaw some of these problems. About them, Sloan implied that only vigilant, intelligent management could meet them successfully. He predicted that remaining at the top [of its industry and the economy] would prove a bigger challenge for GM than was getting there; and it turned out that he was right. But he also seemed confident that the management style of GM under his leadership, if continued and adapted, could meet these challenges. He said, "There have been and always will be many opportunities to fail in the automobile industry. The circumstances of the ever-changing market and ever-changing product are capable of breaking any business organization if that organization is unprepared for change—indeed, in my opinion, if it has not provided procedures for anticipating change. In General Motors these procedures are provided by the central management, which is in a position to appraise the broad long-term trends of the market. ... As the industry has grown and evolved, we have adhered to this policy and have demonstrated an ability to meet competition and the shifts of customer demand."[19]


As these words of Sloan (1964) show in juxtaposition with the words of Peter F. Drucker (1946), Sloan (and his fellow GM executives) never agreed with Drucker on the lessons that Drucker drew from his study of GM management during the war. However, unlike many GM executives, Sloan did not put Drucker on his blacklist for writing the 1946 book; Drucker, in his new introduction [foreword] for the 1990 republishing of Sloan's memoir, said, "When his associates attacked me in a meeting called to discuss the book, Sloan immediately rose to my defense. 'I fully agree with you,' he said to his colleagues. 'Mr. Drucker is dead wrong. But he did precisely what he told us he would do when we asked him in. And he is as entitled to his opinions, wrong though they are, as you or I.'"[20] Drucker related that for 20 years after that meeting, Sloan and Drucker had a good relationship, in which Sloan would invite Drucker to lunch once or twice a year to discuss Sloan's philanthropic plans and the memoir that Sloan was working on assembling (what became My Years). Drucker said, "He asked for my opinions and carefully listened—and he never once took my advice."[20] History seems to have vindicated Drucker in his belief that Sloan's faith in rationality alone—and in the ability of other white-collar managers to be as astute as Sloan himself — was over-ardent. 40 years later, the management and board of directors who had run the original General Motors Corporation into the ground by 2009 were not "in a position to appraise the broad long-term trends of the market"—or were in that position, but not doing the job successfully therein.[21]


O'Toole described Sloan's style as follows:[22] "[W]hereas Taylor occasionally backs off to justify his ardor for efficiency in human terms, not once does Sloan make reference to any other values. Freedom, equality, humanism, stability, community, tradition, religion, patriotism, family, love, virtue, nature—all are ignored. In the one personal element in the book, he makes passing reference to his wife: he abandons her on the first day of a European vacation to return to business in Detroit. His language is as calculating as that of the engineer-of-old working with calipers and slide rule, as cold as the steel he caused to be bent to form cars: economizing, utility, facts, objectivity, systems, rationality, maximizing—that is the stuff of his vocabulary."[22]

Accounting system drawbacks[edit]

In 2005, Sloan's work at GM came under criticism for creating a complicated accounting system that prevents the implementation of lean manufacturing methods.[23] Essentially, the criticism is that by using Sloan's methods a company will value inventory just the same as cash, and thus there is no penalty for building up inventory.[23] Carrying excessive inventory is detrimental to a company's operation and induces significant hidden costs. This criticism must be viewed in the context that it is provided in hindsight. During the period in which Sloan advocated carrying what would now be considered excess inventory, the industrial and transportation infrastructure would not support what is now known as just-in-time inventory. During this period, the auto industry experienced incredible growth as the public eagerly sought to purchase this life-changing utility known as the automobile. The cost of lost sales due to lack of inventory was likely greater than the cost of carrying excess inventory. Sloan's system seems to have been widely adopted because of its advance over previous methods.


In his memoir, Sloan (who would freely acknowledge that he was not a trained accountant) said that the system that he implemented in the early 1920s was far better than what it replaced (which was, in so many words, an undesigned cacophony in which financial controls mostly didn't exist). He said that years later, a professional accountant (Albert Bradley, longtime CFO of GM) "was kind enough to say [that it] was pretty good for a layman."[24] Sloan was far from the sole author of GM's financial and accounting systems, as GM later had many trained minds in accounting and finance; but regardless of authorship, GM's financial controls, at one time considered top-notch, eventually proved to have latent drawbacks. Systems similar to GM's were implemented by other major companies, especially in the United States, and they eventually undermined the ability to compete with companies that used different accounting, according to Waddell & Bodek's 2005 analysis.[23]


Sloan's memoir, particularly Chapter 8, "The development of financial controls",[25] indicates that Sloan and GM appreciated the financial dangers of excess inventory even as early as the 1920s. However, Waddell & Bodek's 2005 analysis[23] indicates that this theory was not successfully implemented in GM's practice. For all of the intellectual understanding, the reality remained slow inventory turnover and an accounting system that functionally treated inventory similarly to cash.

Post-war[edit]

As the war drew to an end, most economists and New Deal policy makers assumed that without continued massive government spending, the pre-war Great Depression and its huge unemployment would return. The economist Paul Samuelson warned that unless government took immediate action, "there would be ushered in the greatest period of unemployment and industrial dislocation which any economy has faced." Many adhering to the prevailing Keynesian economic wisdom predicted economic disaster when the war ended.[32][33]


Sloan, however, felt otherwise and predicted a post-war boom. He pointed to workers' savings and pent-up demand, and predicted a huge jump in national income and a rise in standard of living. In line with his predictions, and despite a precipitous cut-back in government spending and the wholesale closure of defense plants, the economy boomed. One of the greatest periods of economic expansion in American history resulted.[32][33]

The - given to films dealing with science and technology by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation each year at the Sundance Film Festival.

Alfred P. Sloan Prize

Sloan was a member of , an organization that promoted the repeal of national Prohibition of alcohol in the U.S.

the Crusaders

- December 27, 1926

List of covers of Time magazine (1920s)

(1946). "Concept of the Corporation". New York, New York, US: John Day. LCCN 46003477. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

Drucker, Peter F.

McDonald, John; Seligman, Dan (2003). . Boston, Massachusetts, US: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-63285-0.

A ghost's memoir: the making of Alfred P. Sloan's My Years with General Motors

O'Toole, James (1995). . San Francisco, California, US: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 978-1-55542-608-8.

Leading change: overcoming the ideology of comfort and the tyranny of custom

(1964), McDonald, John (ed.), My Years with General Motors, Garden City, NY, US: Doubleday, LCCN 64011306, OCLC 802024. Republished in 1990 with a new introduction by Peter Drucker (ISBN 978-0385042352).

Sloan, Alfred P.

Sloan, Alfred P. (1941). Adventures of a white collar man. New York: Doubleday, Doran.  978-0-8369-5485-2.

ISBN

Waddell, William H.; Bodek, Norman (2005). Rebirth of American Industry: A Study of Lean Management. Vancouver, Washington, US: PCS Press.  978-0-9712436-3-7.

ISBN

Farber, David (2002). . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-23804-3. OCLC 49558636.

Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors

Ke, Rongzhu; Li, Jin; Powell, Michael (December 15, 2014). (PDF). Journal of Labor Economics: 197–252.

"Managing careers in organizations"

McKenna, Christopher D. (2006). "Writing the ghost-writer back in: Alfred Sloan, Alfred Chandler, John McDonald and the intellectual origins of corporate strategy". Management and Organizational History. 1 (2): 107–126. :10.1177/1744935906064087. S2CID 145091667.

doi

Pelfrey, William (2006). . New York: Amacom Publishing. ISBN 9780814408698. OCLC 811604070.

Billy, Alfred and General Motors: The Story of Two Unique Men, a Legendary Company, and a Remarkable Time in American History

Powers, Thomas L.; Steward, Jocelyn L. (October 26, 2010). "Alfred P. Sloan's 1921 repositioning strategy". Journal of Historical Research in Marketing. 2 (4): 426–442. :10.1108/17557501011092475.

doi

. Its total assets had a market value of over $1.5 billion in 2005.

Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

Official Generations of GM Wiki site: Sloan, Alfred Pritchard Jr.

Review of Klein and Olson's film Taken for a Ride

Extract from Bradford C. Snell, American Ground Transport: A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile, Truck, Bus and Rail Industries. Report presented to the Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, United States Senate, February 26, 1974, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1974, pp. 16-24.

Find Law

Taken for a Ride

in the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW

Newspaper clippings about Alfred P. Sloan