Battle of Madagascar
The Battle of Madagascar (5 May – 6 November 1942) was an Allied campaign to capture the Vichy French-controlled island Madagascar during World War II. The seizure of the island by the British was to deny Madagascar's ports to the Imperial Japanese Navy and to prevent the loss or impairment of the Allied shipping routes to India, Australia and Southeast Asia. It began with Operation Ironclad, the seizure of the port of Diego-Suarez (now Antsiranana) near the northern tip of the island, on 5 May 1942.[7][8]
For the 1811 naval battle of Madagascar, see Battle of Tamatave. For Madagascar in World War II in general, see Madagascar in World War II.A subsequent campaign to secure the entire island, Operation Stream Line Jane, was opened on 10 September. The Allies broke into the interior, linking up with forces on the coast and secured the island by the end of October. Fighting ceased and an armistice was granted on 6 November.[9] This was the first large-scale operation by the Allies combining sea, land and air forces. The island was placed under Free French control.[10][11]
Background[edit]
Geopolitical[edit]
Diego-Suarez is a large bay, with a fine harbour, near the northern tip of the island of Madagascar. It has an opening to the east through a narrow channel called Oronjia Pass. The naval base of Diego-Suarez lies on a peninsula between two of the four small bays enclosed within Diego-Suarez Bay. The bay cuts deeply into the northern tip of Madagascar's Cape Amber, almost severing it from the rest of the island.[12]: 133 In the 1880s, the bay was coveted by France, which claimed it as a coaling station for steamships travelling to French possessions farther east. The colonization was formalized after the first Franco-Hova War when Queen Ranavalona III signed a treaty on 17 December 1885 giving France a protectorate over the bay and surrounding territory; as well as the islands of Nosy Be and St. Marie de Madagascar. The colony's administration was subsumed into that of French Madagascar in 1897.[13]
In 1941, Diego-Suarez town, the bay and the channel were well protected by naval shore batteries.[12]: 133
Vichy[edit]
Following the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia east of Burma by the end of February 1942, submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy moved freely throughout the north and eastern expanses of the Indian Ocean. In March, Japanese aircraft carriers raided merchant ships in the Bay of Bengal, and attacked bases in Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). This raid drove the British Eastern Fleet out of the area and they were forced to relocate to a new base at Kilindini Harbour, Mombasa, Kenya.[14]
The move made the British fleet more vulnerable to attack. The possibility of Japanese naval forces using forward bases in Madagascar had to be addressed. The potential use of these facilities particularly threatened Allied merchant shipping, the supply route to the British Eighth Army and also the Eastern Fleet.
Japanese Kaidai-type submarines had the longest range of any Axis submarines at the time – more than 10,000 mi (16,000 km) in some cases, but being challenged by the United States Navy's then-relatively new Gato-class fleet submarines' 11,000 nmi (20,000 km; 13,000 mi) top range figures. If the Imperial Japanese Navy's submarines could use bases on Madagascar, Allied lines of communication would be affected across a region stretching from the Pacific and Australia, to the Middle East and as far as the South Atlantic.
On 17 December 1941, Vice Admiral Fricke, Chief of Staff of Germany's Maritime Warfare Command (Seekriegsleitung), met Vice Admiral Naokuni Nomura, the Japanese naval attaché, in Berlin to discuss the delimitation of respective operational areas between the German Kriegsmarine and Imperial Japanese Navy forces. At another meeting on 27 March 1942, Fricke stressed the importance of the Indian Ocean to the Axis powers and expressed the desire that the Japanese begin operations against the northern Indian Ocean sea routes. Fricke further emphasized that Ceylon, the Seychelles, and Madagascar should have a higher priority for the Axis navies than operations against Australia.[12]: 116 By 8 April, the Japanese announced to Fricke that they intended to commit four or five submarines and two auxiliary cruisers for operations in the western Indian Ocean between Aden and the Cape of Good Hope, but they refused to disclose their plans for operations against Madagascar and Ceylon, only reiterating their commitment to operations in the area.[12]: 117
Allies[edit]
The Allies had heard the rumours of Japanese plans for the Indian Ocean and on 27 November 1941, the British Chiefs of Staff discussed the possibility that the Vichy government might cede the whole of Madagascar to Japan, or alternatively permit the Japanese Navy to establish bases on the island. British naval advisors urged the occupation of the island as a precautionary measure.[12]: 131 On 16 December, General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French in London, sent a letter to the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in which he also urged a Free French operation against Madagascar.[15]: 223 Churchill recognised the risk of a Japanese-controlled Madagascar to Indian Ocean shipping, particularly to the important sea route to India and Ceylon, and considered the port of Diego-Suarez as the strategic key to Japanese influence in the Indian Ocean. However, he also made it clear to planners that he did not feel Britain had the resources to mount such an operation and, following experience in the Battle of Dakar in September 1940, did not want a joint operation launched by British and Free French forces to secure the island.[15]: 223
By 12 March 1942, Churchill had been convinced of the importance of such an operation and the decision was reached that the planning of the invasion of Madagascar would begin in earnest. It was agreed that the Free French would be explicitly excluded from the operation. As a preliminary battle outline, Churchill gave the following guidelines to the planners and the operation was designated Operation Bonus:[15]: 225
On 14 March, Force 121 was constituted under the command of Major-General Robert Sturges of the Royal Marines with Rear-Admiral Edward Syfret being placed in command of naval Force H and the supporting sea force.[12]: 132