Consociationalism
Consociationalism (/kənˌsoʊʃiˈeɪʃənəlɪzəm/ kən-SOH-shee-AY-shən-əl-iz-əm) is a form of democratic power sharing.[1] Political scientists define a consociational state as one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, but which remains stable due to consultation among the elites of these groups. Consociational states are often contrasted with states with majoritarian electoral systems.
The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy, and the avoidance of violence. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, as in Lebanon, it is known as confessionalism.
Consociationalism is sometimes seen as analogous to corporatism.[2][3] Some scholars consider consociationalism a form of corporatism. Others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate class conflict, while consociationalism developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.[4]
Concurrent majority can be a precursor to consociationalism. A consociational democracy differs from consensus democracy (e.g. in Switzerland), in that consociational democracy represents a consensus of representatives with minority veto, while consensus democracy requires consensus across the electorate.[5]
The idea has received significant criticism in its applicability to democratic political systems, especially with regard to power-sharing.
Origins[edit]
Consociation was first discussed in the 17th century New England Confederation. It described the interassociation and cooperation of the participant self-governing Congregational churches of the various colonial townships of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. These were empowered in the civil legislature and magistracy.[6] It was debated at length in the Boston Synod of 1662.[7] This was when the Episcopalian Act of Uniformity 1662 was being introduced in England.
Consociationalism was originally discussed in academic terms by the political scientist Arend Lijphart. However, Lijphart has stated that he "merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly – and independently of both academic experts and one another – invented years earlier".[8] Theoretically, consociationalism was inducted from Lijphart's observations of political accommodation in the Netherlands, after which Lijphart argued for a generalizable consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation.[9] The Netherlands, as a consociational state, was between 1857 and 1967 divided into four non-territorial pillars: Calvinist, Catholic, socialist, and general, although until 1917 there was a plurality ("first past the post") electoral system rather than a proportional one. In their heyday, each comprised tightly organised groups, schools, universities, hospitals and newspapers, all divided along a Balkanised social structure. The theory, according to Lijphart, focuses on the role of social elites, their agreement and co-operation, as the key to a stable democracy. Based on this initial study of consociational democracy, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary trace consociationalism back to 1917, when it was first employed in the Netherlands, while Gerhard Lehmbruch suggests 'precursors' of consociationalism as early as the 1555 Peace of Augsburg.[10][11]
State-building[edit]
While Lijphart's initial theory drew primarily from Western European democracies in its formulation of consociationalism, it has gained immense traction in post-conflict state-building contexts in the past decades.[12][13] This development has been reflected in the expansion of the favourable conditions to external factors in the literature as well.[14][12][15] Rather than internally constructed by state elites, these recent examples have been characterised by external facilitation, and at times imposition, through international actors.[16][17][12] In the process, consociational arrangements have frequently been used to transform immediate violent conflict and solidify peace settlements in extremely fragile contexts of deeply divided societies.[18] The volatile environments in which these recent examples have been implemented have exhibited the need for external interference not only for their initial implementation but also for their continued existence.[19][12] As such, a range of international actors have assumed mediating and supporting roles to preserve power-sharing agreements in targeted states. Most prominently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has involved an "international regulating body" in the form of a High Representative who in one period frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of the state to implement legislation on which domestic elites were reluctant to come to an agreement on.[20]
While the current results of consociational arrangements implemented in post-conflict state-building endeavours have been mixed, scholars such as O'Leary and McGarry maintain that they have often proven to be the most practical approach to ending immediate conflict and creating the necessary stability for peace-building to take place.[18] Its utility has been seen in its transformative aspect, flexibility, and "realist" approach to existing identity formations that are difficult to incorporate in a majoritarian system.[21]
Lijphart also identified a number of "favourable conditions" under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time.[24] Michael Kerr summarised Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as:[25]
Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism.[22] This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all".[26]
John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and there must be a multiple balance of power, but more importantly the subcultures must be stable.[27] Michael Kerr, in his study of the role of external actors in power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, adds to McGarry and O'Leary's list the condition that "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state to non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation".[25]
Arguments in favor[edit]
In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stages. Supporters of the consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict management.[28]
The political systems of a number of countries operate or used to operate on a consociational basis, including Belgium, Italy, Cyprus (effective 1960–1963),[42][43][44] the First Czechoslovak Republic,[45] Israel, Lebanon, the Netherlands (1917–1967), Northern Ireland, Switzerland (consultation mostly across ideological lines), Ethiopia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and South Africa. Some academics have also argued that the European Union resembles a consociational democracy, with consultation across ideological lines.[46][47]
Additionally, a number of peace agreements are consociational, including:
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's political system was also described as consociational,[53] although it lacked ethnic quotas.[54]
In addition to the two-state solution to solve the Arab–Israeli conflict, some have argued for a one-state solution under a consociational democracy in the state of Israel, but this solution is not very popular, nor has it been discussed seriously at peace negotiations.[55]
During the 1980s the South African government attempted to reform apartheid into a consociational democracy. The South African Constitution of 1983 applied Lijphart's powersharing ideas by establishing a Tricameral Parliament. During the 1990s negotiations to end apartheid the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) proposed a settlement based upon consociationalism. The African National Congress (ANC) opposed consociationalism and proposed instead a settlement based upon majoritarian democracy. The NP abandoned consociationalism when the U.S. Department of State came out in favor of the majoritarian democracy model in 1992.[56]