Lysis (dialogue)

Synopsis[edit]

Socrates finds himself in a wrestling school frequented by young men who, between their classes, like to discuss various topics. Among them is one called Hippothales, who Socrates can tell right away is deeply in love with another boy. Upon hearing this, the young men that are present jump in to confirm Socrates' impression, adding that Hippothales is so madly in love (μαίνεται), that his singing for the unrequited love has beaten the drums of those around him (204d-205a). The object of Hippothales' desires is a boy called Lysis, from whom the dialogue takes its name, and Socrates asks for permission to go and speak with him directly. Hippothales accepts, and tells Socrates that all he needs to attract Lysis is to start discussing with someone, so great is the boy's interest in debates. Socrates does exactly that and Lysis approaches with his friend Menexenus. He begins by asking Lysis, who is obviously underage, whether his parents allow him to do whatever he wishes (207d). Lysis replies that he is not; his parents forbid certain things that even slaves are allowed to do, like driving the chariot. Through his method of dialectics, Socrates forces upon Lysis the conclusion that his parents' behaviour cannot simply be due to his age, as they surely trust the boy with other important things, like transcribing a document for instance. Their denials must therefore be related to his wisdom, or lack thereof (210a-210d). At this point, Socrates thinks of making a friendly pass to Hippothales, by suggesting that Lysis could learn a lot if he were to associate with him, but refrains at the last minute, seeing how timidly Hippothales was looking at them (210e).


Deciding not to expose Hippothales, Socrates diverges into what will become the dialogue's main theme: the nature of a loving friendship. The exact word in the Greek text is philia (φιλία),^[2] which in the context of its time was more than just "friendship". It referred to an intimate love that developed between free men, a love that in certain cases could include the erotic.^[1] Keeping in mind this "desirous" aspect of philia is important in understanding the argument that follows, as it would probably not apply to friendship in the modern sense. Turning his questioning towards Menexenus (211d), Socrates concludes that philia is asymmetrical, and that one can love someone who does not love him in return, in contrast with animals who always requite the love of their masters (212d).


Socrates continues by passing through a series of definitions on the nature of friendship, which he negates himself, even though his listeners are convinced every single time. First, regarding friendship, he supposes that “like attracts like”, just as Homer said, so good men will always be attracted to other good men and bad to the bad. The problem, however, is that bad men cannot be friends with anyone, not even themselves, while the good are so self-fulfilled that there is nothing they need to look for in another person (214e). It must be therefore that opposites attract each other (215e), as Hesiod said, but Socrates refutes this again. So if attraction happens neither between things that are alike, nor things that are opposites, there must be something in between the good and bad, and those who fall in this category are actually the ones most likely to be attracted by the good in loving friendship (216e). These intermediaries are pushed, Socrates says, by the fear of evil. They seek the good to save themselves, just like a human body, which in itself is neither good nor bad, but seeks the "friendship" of a doctor when sick (217b).


Menexenus finds this last definition complete, but Socrates, upon reflection, cries in despair that both of them have been led astray (218c). First, and on a minor point, once this intermediary thing becomes a friend of the good, and considering that friendship works only among equals, then the two, good and in-between, have both become equals, which means that Socrates' definition has slipped back to the initial "like attracts like" which they have already refuted. Most importantly, however, since philia assumes the goal of betterment, the person who seeks the loving friendship of another is actually moved by the love of a certain virtue he can attain through this other (219c-d). Their definition then leads to an infinite recursion, by which friendship is always towards something for the sake of another friendship, achievable through the first (ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα (220e)). Socrates says their definition is like chasing ghosts (εἴδωλα). He ends by admitting that for all their discussion, a proper definition is still elusive. And yet, Socrates says that he considers the two boys, Lysis and Menexenus, to be friends, even though he failed to define friendship properly.


Although Socrates managed to refute all of his definitions, there are reasons to believe that his last, the one where loving friendship exists between one who is good and one who is in-between, is what Plato intended as true,^[1] a definition consistent with the one Socrates gives of eros in the Symposium.