Mixed-member majoritarian representation
Mixed member majoritarian representation (MMM) is type of a mixed electoral system combining majoritarian (or plurality) and proportional methods, where the disproportional results of district contests using a plurality voting system or other, usually first-past-the-post voting (a system called majoritarian in this context), are completely separate from the proportional component. Mixed member majoritarian systems are therefore described as semi-proportional representation, and are usually contrasted with mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) which aims to provide proportional representation via additional compensation ("top-up") seats.
Not to be confused with Mixed-member proportional representation.The most common type of MMM system is the supplementary member (SM) system (a form of parallel voting), whereby representatives are voted into a chamber using at least two different systems independently of each other. Most commonly this combines first-past-the-post (single member plurality) voting (FPTP/SMP) with party-list proportional representation (list-PR). The system has been applied in the election of national parliaments as well as local governments in various places such as Taiwan, Lithuania, Russia and Kazakhstan. While FPTP with list-PR is the most common pairing in parallel systems, any other combination is effectively possible and therefore not all parallel voting systems are mixed-member majoritarian (and not all effectively MMM systems are strictly parallel - non-compensatory), however as most of them used in practice are, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.
According to the academic typology of Massicotte & Blais (1999)[1], mixed-member majoritarian versions come in the following forms:
Advantages and disadvantages[edit]
General[edit]
Mixed-member majoritarian systems generally allow smaller parties that cannot win individual elections to secure some representation in the legislature; however, unlike in a proportional system they will have a substantially smaller delegation than their share of the total vote. It is also argued that MMM does not lead to the degree of fragmentation found in party systems under forms of proportional representation, which some consider to be an advantage and some a disadvantage.[2]
A criticism of adding a proportional component to majoritarian electoral systems is that the largest parties are more likely to rely on the support of smaller ones in order to form a government, than if the system was majoritarian only. However, smaller parties are still disadvantaged as the larger parties still predominate. In countries where there is one dominant party and a divided opposition, the proportional seats may be essential for allowing an effective opposition. Furthermore, the likelihood of no governing majority is dependent on many other factors, same as under first-past-the-post.
In parallel voting and other supplementary member systems, there is a chance that two classes of representatives will emerge under an SM system: with one class beholden to their electorate seat, and the other concerned only with their party.
The major critique of MMM systems is that they cannot guarantee overall proportionality. Large parties can win very large majorities, disproportionate to their percentage vote. For example, in the 2014 Hungarian election, the Fidesz/KDNP grouping won 133 of 199 Parliamentary seats with 44.87% of the overall vote.
Combined with a high threshold, small parties may still be shut out of representation entirely despite winning a substantial portion of the overall vote.[3] So that their constituency vote is not wasted, voters may vote for a large party's local candidate tactically, while voters of large parties may vote for allied smaller parties with their list vote so as to help them over the threshold. An example of this being played out can be seen in the 2014 Japanese election where the government's junior coalition partner, Komeito took only 1.5% in the local constituencies, but 13.7% on the PR list. Most of the Komeito votes came from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
Compared to mixed member proportional[edit]
Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems are often contrasted with mixed-Member proportional (MMP) systems. There are a unique set of advantages and disadvantages that apply to this specific comparison.
Under MMM a party that can gerrymander local districts can win more than its share of seats, so parallel systems need fair criteria to draw district boundaries. Normally, under mixed member proportional representation a gerrymander can help a local candidate, but it cannot raise a major party's share of seats, unless the compensatory link is effectively disentangled, for example using decoy lists and tactical voting.
In Japan, an electoral system based on a single-seat constituency system was introduced in 1994 to facilitate a change of government and prevent corruption. It was decided that a portion of the seats would be elected through a proportional representation system to accommodate minority parties. In Japan's political culture, however, this system further reinforced the dominant-party system, and except for a brief period between 2009 and 2012, the opposition parties faced the LDP as a minority force, aided by the proportional representation system. And subsequently Thailand and Russia adopted a parallel system to provide incentives for greater party cohesiveness.
The party is sure to elect the candidates at the top of its list, guaranteeing safe seats for the leadership. By contrast, under the MMP system a party that does well in the local seats might not need or receive any compensatory list seats, so the leadership has to run in the local seats. On the other hand, because of the low reputation of lawmakers elected by proportional representation in Japan, party leaders of major parties are implicitly expected to be elected in their electoral districts. Although political parties can designate the order of the list, it is customary for the order to change according to the percentage of close defeats.
Mixed-member majoritarian systems support the creation of single-party majorities more often than mixed proportional member systems. This may be a positive or a negative depending on the view of the voter.