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Capability approach

The capability approach (also referred to as the capabilities approach) is a normative approach to human welfare that concentrates on the actual capability of persons to achieve lives they value rather than solely having a right or freedom to do so.[1] It was conceived in the 1980s as an alternative approach to welfare economics.[2]

In this approach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum combine a range of ideas that were previously excluded from (or inadequately formulated in) traditional approaches to welfare economics. The core focus of the capability approach is improving access to the tools people use to live a fulfilling life.[1][3]

Key terms[edit]

Functionings[edit]

In the most basic sense, functionings consist of "beings and doings".[9] As a result, living may be seen as a set of interrelated functions. Essentially, functionings are the states and activities constitutive of a person's being. Examples of functionings can vary from elementary things, such as being healthy, having a good job, and being safe, to more complex states, such as being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. Moreover, Amartya Sen contends that functionings are crucial to an adequate understanding of the capability approach; capability is conceptualized as a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings.[9]


In other words, functionings are the subjects of the capabilities referred to in the approach: what we are capable of, want to be capable of, or should be capable of being and/or do. Therefore, a person's chosen combination of functionings, what they are and do, is part of their overall capability set — the functionings they were able to do. Yet, functionings can also be conceptualized in a way that signifies an individual's capabilities. Eating, starving, and fasting would all be considered functionings, but the functioning of fasting differs significantly from that of starving because fasting, unlike starving, involves a choice and is understood as choosing to fast despite the presence of other options.[9] Consequently, an understanding of what constitutes functionings is inherently tied together with an understanding of capabilities, as defined by this approach.

Capabilities[edit]

Capabilities are the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for a person to achieve. Formulations of capability have two parts: functionings and opportunity freedom — the substantive freedom to pursue different functioning combinations.[10] Ultimately, capabilities denote a person's opportunity and ability to generate valuable outcomes, taking into account relevant personal characteristics and external factors. The important part of this definition is the "freedom to achieve", because if freedom had only instrumental value (valuable as a means to achieve an end) and no intrinsic value (valuable in and of itself) to a person's well-being, then the value of the capability set as a whole would simply be defined by the value of a person's actual combination of functionings.[9] Such a definition would not acknowledge the entirety of what a person is capable of doing and their resulting current state due to the nature of the options available to them. Consequently, the capability set outlined by this approach is not merely concerned with achievements; rather, freedom of choice, in and of itself, is of direct importance to a person's quality of life.[9]


For example, the difference between fasting and starving, on person's well-being, is whether the person is choosing not to eat.[11] In this example, the functioning is starving but the capability to obtain an adequate amount of food is the key element in evaluating well-being between individuals in the two states. In sum, having a lifestyle is not the same as choosing it; well-being depends on how that lifestyle came to be.[9] More formally, while the combination of a person's functionings represents their actual achievements, their capability set represents their opportunity freedom — their freedom to choose between alternative combinations of functionings.[11]


In addition to being the result of capabilities, some functionings are also a prerequisite for capabilities, i.e., there is a dual role of some functionings as both ends and instruments. Examples of functionings that are a direct requirement for capabilities are good nourishment, mental and physical health, and education.[12]


Nussbaum further distinguishes between internal capabilities that are personal abilities, and combined capabilities that are "defined as internal capabilities together with the social/political/economic conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen".[13] She points out that the notion of (combined) capability "combines internal preparedness with external opportunity in a complicated way, so that measurement is likely to be no easy task."[14]


An extension of the capabilities approach was published in 2013 in Freedom, Responsibility and Economics of the Person. This book explores the interconnected concepts of person, responsibility and freedom in economics, moral philosophy and politics. It tries to reconcile the rationality and morality of individuals. It presents a methodological reflection (phenomenology versus Kantian thought) with the aim to re-humanise the person, through actions, and through the values and norms that lead to corresponding rights and obligations that must be ordered. The book extends the capabilities approach in a critical form. In particular, it considers freedom in relation to responsibility, that is, the capacity of people to apply moral constraints to themselves. By contrast, Sen's capability approach considers freedom as a purely functional rationality of choice.

Agency[edit]

Amartya Sen defines an agent as someone who acts and brings about change, whose achievement can be evaluated in terms of his or her own values and goals.[11] This differs from a common use of the term "agent" sometimes used in economics and game theory to mean a person acting on someone else's behalf.[11] Agency depends on the ability to personally choose the functionings one values, a choice that may not correlate with personal well-being. For example, when a person chooses to engage in fasting, they are exercising their ability to pursue a goal they value, though such a choice may not positively affect physical well-being. Sen explains that a person as an agent need not be guided by a pursuit of well-being; agency achievement considers a person's success in terms of their pursuit of the whole of their goals.[9]


For the purposes of the capability approach, agency primarily refers to a person's role as a member of society, with the ability to participate in economic, social, and political actions. Therefore, agency is crucial in assessing one's capabilities and any economic, social, or political barriers to one's achieving substantive freedoms. Concern for agency stresses that participation, public debate, democratic practice, and empowerment, should be fostered alongside well-being.[15]


Alkire and Deneulin pointed out that agency goes together with the expansion of valuable freedoms. That is, in order to be agents of their lives, people need the freedom to be educated, speak in public without fear, express themselves, associate, etc.; conversely, people can establish such an environment by being agents.[10] In summary, the agency aspect is important in assessing what a person can do in line with his or her conception of the good.[16]

Contrast with other approaches[edit]

Utility-based or subjective approaches[edit]

Much of conventional welfare economics today is grounded in a utilitarian approach according to the classical Benthamite form of utilitarianism, in which the most desirable action is the one that best increases peoples' psychological happiness or satisfaction.[10] The "utility" of a person stands for some measure of his or her pleasure or happiness. Some merits associated with this approach to measuring well-being are that it recognizes the importance of taking account of the results of social arrangements in judging them and the need to pay attention to the well-being of the people involved when judging social arrangements and their results.[11] Amartya Sen, however, argues this view has three main deficiencies: distributional indifference; neglect of rights, freedoms, and other non-utility concerns; and adaptation and mental conditioning.[11]


Distributional indifference refers to a utilitarian indifference between different the distributions of utility, so long as the sum total is the same (note that the utilitarian is indifferent to the distribution of happiness, not income or wealth—the utilitarian approach would generally prefer, all else being equal, more materially equal societies assuming diminishing marginal utility). Sen argues that we may "want to pay attention not just to "aggregate" magnitudes, but also to extents of inequalities in happiness".[49] Sen also argues that while the utilitarian approach attaches no intrinsic value (ethics) to claims of rights and freedoms, some people value these things independently of their contribution to utility.


Lastly, Amartya Sen makes the argument that the utilitarian view of individual well-being can be easily swayed by mental conditioning and peoples' happiness adapting to oppressive situations. The utility calculus can essentially be unfair to those who have come to terms with their deprivation as a means for survival, adjusting their desires and expectations. The capability approach, on the other hand, doesn't fall victim to these same criticisms because it acknowledges inequalities by focusing on equalizing people's capabilities, rather than happiness. It stresses the intrinsic importance of rights and freedoms when evaluating well-being, and it avoids overlooking deprivation by focusing on capabilities and opportunities, not state of mind.

Resource-based approaches[edit]

Another common approach in conventional economics, in economic policy and judging development, has traditionally been to focus on income and resources. These sorts of approaches to development focus on increasing resources, such as assets, property rights, or basic needs.[10] However, measuring resources is fundamentally different from measuring functionings, such as the case in which people don't have the capability to use their resources in the means they see fit. Arguably, the main difficulty in a resource- or income-based approach to well-being lies in personal heterogeneities, namely the diversity of human beings.[11]


Different amounts of income are needed for different individuals to enjoy similar capabilities, such as an individual with severe disabilities whose treatment to ensure the fulfillment of basic capabilities may require dramatically more income compared to an able-bodied person. All sorts of differences, such as differences in age, gender, talents, etc. can make two people have extremely divergent opportunities of quality of life, even when equipped with exactly the same commodities. Additionally, other contingent circumstances which affect what an individual can make of a given set of resources include environmental diversities (in geographic sense), variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives, and distribution within the family.[11]


The capability approach, however, seeks to consider all such circumstances when evaluating people's actual capabilities. Furthermore, there are things people value other than increased resources. In some cases, maximizing resources may even be objectionable. As was recognized in the 1990 Human Development Report, the basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy, and creative lives. This end is often lost in the immediate concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial wealth that are only a means to expansion of capabilities. Overall, though resources and income have a profound effect on what can or cannot be done, the capability approach recognizes that they are not the only things to be considered when judging well-being, switching the focus from a means to a good life to the freedom to achieve actual improvements in lives, which one has reason to value.

The Capability Approach to Education[edit]

The capability approach has also impacted educational discourse.[50] Rather than seeing the success of an education system based on the measurable achievements of students, such as scores in examinations or assessments, educational success through a capabilities perspective can be seen through the capabilities that such an education enables. Through an education programme a student is able to acquire knowledge, skills, values and understanding and this enables a young person to think in new ways, to ‘be’, to develop agency in society and make decisions. These are not easily ‘measurable’ in the same way examination results are, but can be seen to be an important outcome of an educational programme. A number of writers have explored what these education ‘capabilities’ might be. Terzi's[51] list focuses on the minimum entitlement of education for students with disabilities—these include Literacy, Numeracy, Sociality and Participation among others. Walker,[52] working in Higher Education offers Practical Reason, Emotional Resilience, Knowledge and imagination. Hinchcliffe[53] offers a set of capabilities for students of Humanities subjects, including critical examination and judgement, narrative imagination, recognition/ concern for others (citizenship in a globalised world). Further exploration of the capability approach to education has sought to explore the role that subject disciplines play in the generation of subject specific capabilities, drawing on the ideas of Powerful Knowledge from Michael Young[54] and the Sociology of Education. Geography as a school subject has explored these as ‘GeoCapabilities’.[55][56]

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